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Introduction 1 
1. Introduction 
Driven by globalization processes, the business environment of the 21st century has turned 
into a highly complex and constantly changing landscape. Intensified competition, increased 
cost-pressure, and rapid technological change are the challenges today’s companies have to 
face. In order to survive in such an increasing global market-place, firms are required to re-
spond effectively to these challenges (Jones/George 2003; Narula/Duysters 2004; Segal-
Horn/Faulkner 1999). In their quest to always be one step ahead of their competitors, many 
firms have realized that they lack either the capacities or competences necessary to do so by 
themselves. As a result, organizations have shown a growing propensity to team up with other 
firms, turning cooperative arrangements into a popular means of conducting business (Das 
2006; Das/Rahman 2010; Kale/Singh 2009).  
It is a fallacy to believe that inter-firm partnerships primarily take place at the final stages of 
the value chain, where companies jointly produce or market final products The changing na-
ture of competition has forced organizations to ally in various activities across all value-added 
steps, even involving crucial areas, such as research and development (R&D) (Hagedoorn 
2002; Quinn/Hilmer 1994). In order to cope with the continuing pressure of rapidly develop-
ing and commercializing innovations, organizations have turned more and more to external 
sources of knowledge (Arora et al. 2001; Chatterji 1996; Grimpe/Kaiser 2010; Quinn 2000) 
by integrating R&D supplier firms into the innovation process. The prevailing need to pursue 
innovation through external R&D activities is met by a market of specific technical and scien-
tific services that is constantly growing in width and depth (Chiesa et al. 2004).  
Despite its increasing prevalence (Arora/Gambardella 2010; Calantone/Stanko 2007; 
Grimpe/Kaiser 2010; Huang et al. 2009), the outsourcing of R&D activities must, however, 
be considered a double-edged sword. On the one hand, leveraging the advantages of speciali-
zation by using the “market” for the generation of valuable knowledge inputs enables firms to 
keep pace with the consequences of operating in a fast-moving business environment. On the 
other hand, engaging external providers to perform certain R&D activities opens doors to an-
other unknown: the R&D supplier firm’s behavior.  
While idealists may believe in the “happily-ever-after” of outsourcing partnerships, realists 
should always consider that supplier firms are driven by their own motives and agendas and 
are thus prone to opportunism (e.g., Gooroochurn/Hanley 2007; Kloyer 2011; 
Kloyer/Scholderer 2012; Sampson 2007). Having its roots in transaction cost theory (TCT), 
opportunism describes: “... a lack of candor or honesty in transactions, to include self-interest 
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seeking with guile” (Williamson 1975, p. 26). Based on its definition, opportunism goes fur-
ther than just pursuing own goals. Opportunism embraces the entire spectrum of behavior, 
such as lying, stealing, cheating, and other forms of deceit (Williamson 1985), in order to en-
force own interests, regardless of the consequences such behavior may have for the partner 
firm.  
Due to its devious nature, opportunism is a major threat to inter-firm collaboration in general 
(e.g., Caniёls/Gelderman 2010; Das/Rahman 2010; Gassenheimer et al. 1996; Parkhe 1993). 
It must, however, be considered especially hazardous to partnerships that involve R&D activi-
ties as knowledge assets drive firms’ competitive advantage (Fey/Birkinshaw 2005; O’Regan 
et al. 2008). An opportunistic R&D supplier could not only hold back parts of the generated 
knowledge but could use it for own competitive activities or sell it to third parties 
(Kloyer/Scholderer 2012). For the outsourcing firm, any of the scenarios would be disastrous, 
to say the least. Against this background, it is not surprising that the opportunism phenome-
non has equally attracted the attention of research and practice. While managers are primarily 
interested in how to prevent or effectively restrain unethical behavior in exchange relation-
ships, the research interest in opportunism is threefold. After, first, determining the factors 
that cause such unethical partner behavior (e.g., Katsikeas et al. 2009; Morgan et al. 2007; 
Ting et al. 2007; Yaqub 2009), research seeks, second, to identify effective mechanisms to 
safeguard against opportunism (e.g., Brown et al. 2000; Cavusgil et al. 2004; Helm/Kloyer 
2004; Jap/Anderson 2003; Yaqub 2009) and finally, third, examines the consequences of 
partner misbehavior for the success of the exchange relationship (e.g., Luo et al. 2009; Mor-
gan et al. 2007; Parkhe 1993; Ting et al. 2007).  
While prior work has certainly provided relevant insights, the opportunism phenomenon has 
not yet been captured in its entirety (Das/Rahman 2010; Hawkins et al. 2008). Through three 
research papers, this dissertation treats and contributes to each of the three aforementioned 
areas of opportunism research and aims at answering the overarching research question of 
what is needed to set up and maintain successful R&D outsourcing relationships.  
Paper 1, the first pillar of this dissertation, is dedicated to identifying the factors that provoke 
supplier opportunism and thus contributes to the first area of opportunism research. Gaining 
knowledge about the opportunism drivers is crucial for the anticipation of unethical partner 
behavior. Despite the large body of empirical evidence, there is still wide disagreement on the 
role some factors play in driving partner opportunism (e.g., partner dependence; Hawkins et 
al. 2009). Furthermore, some variables have received either comparably limited empirical 
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attention (e.g., information asymmetries; Steinle et al. 2014) or have been completely over-
looked in the past (e.g., internal uncertainty). Paper 1 addresses these issues. By combining 
transaction cost- and principal-agent theory (PAT), it is, to the best of the author’s knowledge, 
the first study that simultaneously considers the whole range of opportunism drivers in an 
R&D supply context.  
As the second pillar of this dissertation, Paper 2 seeks to examine the mechanisms that are 
effective in deterring opportunism and spurring supplier knowledge sharing, thus contributing 
to the second area of opportunism research. Even though the economic literature presents nu-
merous measures to deter partner misbehavior (e.g., Brown et al. 2000; Helm/Kloyer 2004; 
Vázquez et al. 2007), there is no consensus on their effectiveness (e.g., Achrol/Gundlach 
1999; Caniëls/Gelderman 2010). Furthermore, and most importantly, prior work has mainly 
focused on hard mechanisms, while little is known about the role soft, human-related 
measures play in curbing partner opportunism (Kloyer 2011, Kloyer/Scholderer 2012). By 
placing a special focus on the “human element” in exchange relationships, Paper 2 addresses 
the shortcomings of prior empirical studies. Besides considering several hard factors, Paper 2 
takes into account soft factors such as supplier trust, intrinsic motivation, and organizational 
culture and examines their influence on supplier knowledge sharing.  
Also covering the second area of opportunism research, the third and last pillar of this disser-
tation, Paper 3, takes up a determinant of opportunism discussed in Paper 2: the R&D suppli-
er’s trust in the buyer firm. Trust has widely been recognized in the academic literature as 
being crucial for designing effective exchange relationships. However, opinions diverge on 
whether trust is non-calculative and trustee-specific or calculative and transaction-specific in 
nature (e.g., Dietz/Den Hartog 2006; Noteboom 2002). Paper 3 combines these views and 
examines trust in R&D supply relations as the consequence of both calculative and non-
calculative reasons. Besides exploring several sources of supplier trust, Paper 3 examines 
whether trust can provide fertile soil for the supplier’s intrinsic motivation to flourish. Intrin-
sic motivation is assumed to be crucial for knowledge sharing (Ko et al. 2005; Lin 2007) and 
considered to evolve more easily in a positive and friendly atmosphere (Frey/Bohnet 1995; 
Ryan/Deci 2000b). As this issue has somehow managed to remain under the radar of re-
searchers, Paper 3 taps novel ground by investigating the influence trust has on intrinsic moti-
vation.  
The third area of opportunism research, which deals with the consequences of partner misbe-
havior, is covered in both Papers 1 and 2. While much effort has been put into determining 
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the effects unethical partner behavior has for either the party affected by opportunism (e.g., 
Morgan et al. 2007; White/Lui 2005) or the cooperation as a whole (e.g., Luo et al. 2009; 
Parkhe 1993), there is no study to date that explores the consequences opportunism may have 
for the success of the alleged opportunist, the R&D supplier firm. This dissertation contrib-
utes to narrowing this gap by examining the influence of supplier opportunism (Paper 1) and 
supplier knowledge sharing (Paper 2) on the supplier firm’s success. 
The rest of this dissertation will proceed as follows. Chapter 2 expands on this introduction, 
delving somewhat deeper into the nature of inter-firm cooperation. After providing some 
depth and clarity on definitions and categorization attempts in Section 2.1, the reader is then 
introduced to the phenomenon of R&D outsourcing, which represents the object of observa-
tion in this dissertation. A brief outline of the term “research and development” in Section 
2.2.1 is followed by a presentation of the concept of R&D outsourcing in Section 2.2.2 and an 
examination of its advantages and drawbacks in the subsequent two sections. Chapter 3 takes 
up the most critical drawback of R&D outsourcing and thus focuses on making the reader 
familiar with the opportunism phenomenon. After a brief introduction on the types and defini-
tions of opportunism in Section 3.1, Section 3.2 sheds light on the central areas of opportun-
ism research and the existing research gaps. It concludes with a short outline of the three re-
search papers that form the Chapters 4, 5 and 6 of this dissertation. Finally, Chapter 7 summa-
rizes the main findings of each paper, highlights the research contributions and the managerial 
implications of this dissertation, and concludes with the limitations and avenues for further 
research. 
 
2. Inter-firm-cooperation: The case of R&D outsourcing 
2.1 Definition and classification of inter-firm cooperation 
The prominence of the cooperation phenomenon in business practice has attracted research 
interests and, thus, led to a huge amount of literature on this topic. Even though prior research 
may have certainly illuminated the cooperation phenomenon and its variety of manifestations, 
the multitude of definition- and systematization attempts has created some confusion as well 
(Peters 2012). To date, for example, there is no commonly agreed definition of the term “co-
operation” (Nooteboom 1999). This is due to the fact that the cooperation phenomenon is 
used in various disciplines, thus leading to conceptual differences in its meaning. However, 
even within the economic domain, finding a clear-cut definition is difficult. This situation is 
aggravated by the fact that the term “cooperation” is not commonly used in English language 
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(Etter 2003). Instead, similar notions such as “collaboration,” “alliance,” or “strategic alli-
ance” are applied to refer to the very same phenomenon (see Table 1). 
Table 1. Overview of selected definitions of the cooperation phenomenon 
Author(s) Notion Definition 
Contractor/Lorange  
(2002: 486) 
Alliance “… is defined here as any interfirm cooperation that falls 
between the extremes of discrete, short-term contracts and 
the complete merger of two or more organizations.” 
Das/Teng 
(2000a: 33) 
Strategic 
alliances 
“… are voluntary cooperative inter-firm agreements aimed at 
achieving competitive advantage for the partners.” 
Gulati/Singh 
(1998: 781) 
Alliance “… is commonly defined as any voluntarily initiated cooper-
ative agreement between firms that involves exchange, shar-
ing, or co-development, and it can include contributions by 
partners of capital, technology, or firm-specific assets.” 
Inkpen  
(1998: 69) 
Alliances “… are generally formed for the joint accomplishment of 
individual firm goals linked to the strategic mission of each 
partner firm. Strategic alliances can have a variety of organi-
zational arrangements, such as joint ventures (JVs), licensing 
agreements, distribution and supply agreements, research and 
development partnerships, and technical exchanges.” 
Morris/Hergert 
(1987: 16) 
Collaborative 
agreement 
is “ … defined as a linkage between companies to jointly 
pursue a common goal.” 
Parkhe 
(1993: 794) 
Strategic 
alliances 
“… are voluntary interfirm cooperative agreements, often 
characterized by inherent instability arising from uncertainty 
regarding a partner’s future behaviour and the absence of a 
higher authority to ensure compliance.” 
Schermerhorn 
(1975: 847) 
Cooperation is “…the presence of deliberate relations between otherwise 
autonomous organizations for the joint accomplishment of 
individual operating goals.” 
Against this background, it is advisable to first cast a glance at the etymological roots of the 
term “cooperation.” According to the Oxford Learner’s Dictionaries (2016), the term “coop-
eration” is derived from the Latin verb “cooperari,” with “co” meaning “together” and 
“operari” meaning “to work,” describing “the fact of doing something together or of working 
together towards a shared aim.” When taking a closer look at the definitions presented in 
Table 1, it becomes obvious that despite their different facets, every definition transports the 
core message of “doing something together.” Combining this core message with additional 
aspects of the above-mentioned definitions allows the derivation of a working definition that 
serves as the foundation for the remainder of this dissertation.  
According to this working definition, an inter-firm cooperation shall be understood as a vol-
untarily initiated agreement between two or more separate organizations aimed at achieving 
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competitive advantage for the partners by joint execution of certain tasks or functions with the 
entities remaining legally independent. 
While the heterogeneity and complexity of different manifestations of inter-firm arrangements 
can certainly not be captured in their entirety, there are several criteria used for characterizing 
inter-firm alliances (see Table 2). Their application allows a further specification of the type 
of inter-firm arrangement considered in this dissertation. 
Table 2. Overview of the characteristics of inter-firm arrangements 
Dimensions Characteristics 
Intensity Informal agreements Contractual Agreements 
w/o equity w/ equity 
Direction Horizontal Vertical Diagonal 
Functional area Procurement R&D Production Marketing 
Type of bonding Bi-lateral Tri-lateral Simple network Complex network 
Relation of 
partners Equal Subordinative 
Duration 
Temporal Enduring 
Short-term Middle-term Long-term 
While all cooperative arrangements fall between “markets” and “hierarchies” (Williamson 
1991), they differ in their intensity of cooperation. The intensity of cooperation reflects the 
extent and type of statutory specifications of an inter-firm collaboration. Inter-firm arrange-
ments can be grounded on rather informal agreements based on a handshake or declarations of 
intent, or they can be more formal in nature, backed up by a broad range of contractual 
agreements (Hennart 1988) and/or (cross) equity participations of the partnering firms (Baur 
1975; Peters 2012; Rupprecht-Däullary 1994).  
Different forms of inter-firm arrangements can, furthermore, be classified according to the 
direction of cooperation (Baur 1975; Rupprecht-Däullary 1994). Horizontal partnerships are 
alliances between firms in the same position in the value chain that step forward simultane-
ously as competitors and cooperation partners (Baur 1975; Peters 2012; Rupprecht-Däullary 
1994). Vertical alliances, in contrast, represent partnerships between firms that operate within 
the same industry but occupy successive positions in the value chain (Baur 1975; Peters 2012; 
Rupprecht-Däullary 1994). If the collaborating firms neither reside in the same industry nor 
can be assigned to the same value chain, the collaboration is called a diagonal alliance (Baur 
1975; Peters 2012; Rupprecht-Däullary 1994).  
The partnering firms do not necessarily cooperate throughout the entire sphere of the value 
chain but rather only in selective areas (Doz/Hamel 1998): areas they have either significant 
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shortcomings in or that allow a more efficient outcome when teaming up with external part-
ners. Those areas can include, amongst others, procurement, R&D, production, or marketing 
(Abel 1992; Rupprecht-Däullary 1994).  
The number of partners in an inter-firm cooperation can vary depending on the availability of 
appropriate firms to team up with and the cooperation’s primary purpose (Engels 2007). Apart 
from bilateral (dyadic) relationships, inter-firm arrangements can involve multiple actors be-
ing variously connected with each other, e.g., networks (Kutschker 1994). The firms’ relation-
ship can be characterized by either equality or by one or more partners being subordinated to 
the other partner(s) of the inter-firm arrangement (Pausenberger 1989). 
As a last classification criterion, the duration of inter-firm partnerships has to be mentioned. 
Cooperative relationships can be either limited or unlimited in time (Abel 1992; Baur 1975; 
Eisele 1995). Temporal arrangements are partnerships that are dissolved once the objectives 
that formed the foundation for cooperation have been achieved (Baur 1975). Depending on 
the time interval, inter-firm arrangements can be classified as being short-, medium- or long-
term oriented. While project collaborations or license agreements are rather temporal in na-
ture, equity joint ventures are usually long-term-oriented forms of cooperation (Peters 2012). 
Although all forms and types of inter-firm arrangements certainly represent exciting research 
objects, the focus of this dissertation has to be narrowed down to one specific type: the out-
sourcing of R&D activities. Following the characterization criteria presented in Table 2, it can 
be described as a vertical cooperation between two parties involving the knowledge-intensive 
area of R&D. Instead of being equal partners, the collaborating firms maintain a typical prin-
cipal-agent-relationship, with the R&D buyer being the principal and the supplier being the 
agent. The “horizon” of their relationship is limited to one or a series of projects. With some 
exceptions that may also involve equity links between buyer and supplier firm, R&D out-
sourcing relationships are usually based on contractual agreements. According to German 
law, the R&D contract can either be a work contract (“Werkvertrag”, §§631ff BGB) or a ser-
vice contract (“Dienstvertrag”, §§611ff BGB), depending on whether the supplier firm owes a 
specific R&D outcome to the buyer (typical for development activities) or just its efforts with 
no guarantee of success (typical for research activities).  
In order to provide the reader with a better understanding of the phenomenon of R&D out-
sourcing, which is dealt with in detail in Section 2.2.2, the reader is first introduced to the area 
of “research and development” (R&D) in Section 2.2.1.  
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2.2 The outsourcing of R&D 
2.2.1 Definition of research and development (R&D) 
Research and development plays a crucial role in the innovation process since the manufactur-
ing of new products and services relies on the creation and application of new knowledge 
(Madhavan/Grover 1998). As a critical component of innovation and the development of new 
technologies, R&D provides the basis for a firm’s competitive advantage and, thus, heavily 
contributes to a firm’s overall performance and growth (Akhilesch 2014). While there is, to 
date, no unique definition of the term “R&D,” researchers usually turn to the OECD’s (2015, 
p. 30) definition presented in the Frascati Manual, which enjoys broad international ac-
ceptance:  
“Research and development comprise creative work undertaken on a systematic ba-
sis in order to increase the stock of knowledge, including knowledge of man, culture 
and society, and the use of this stock of knowledge to devise new applications.” 
As the definition implies, research activities comprise the extension of the knowledge base, 
whereas development describes the translation of that knowledge into new applications. Fur-
ther classified along a spectrum that highlights the cause-effect and time relationships (Rous-
sel et al. 1991), R&D can, more precisely, be split up into three interdependent activities: 
basic research, applied research, and development (OECD 2015, Wetter 2011). Figure 1 de-
picts these closely interlinked activities that constitute the R&D process and thus assume a 
central position in the innovation process1. 
Figure 1. The R&D process as a part of the innovation process following Gerpott (2005: 50) 
 
Highly theoretical in nature, basic research has the primary aim of systematically extending 
scientific knowledge, usually without being directed towards any specific practical aim or 
                                                
1  For reasons of illustration and simplification, the innovation process is depicted as a linear model. In practice, 
the innovation process often follows non-linear patterns involving spiral and overlapping stages (e.g., Hauser 
et al. 2006; Koen et al. 2002; Roy/Cross 1983). Moreover, the impetus for innovation can emerge from 
sources other than the R&D department, just as ideas and improvements can occur at any stage of the innova-
tion process (see, e.g., Roy/Cross 1983). However, the simplicity and the structured nature of linear models 
has led to them still being widely applied in research and practice (Godin 2006). 
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application (OECD 2015; Wetter 2011). Many basic research projects do not lead to the de-
sired outcome as they either produce inconclusive findings or only marginally enhance the 
existing knowledge base (Hartmann 2004; Wetter 2011). Given its high risks and costs and 
the generally low chances of commercial application, basic research is usually not funded 
privately but by governments, universities, or non-profit organizations (Bund 2000; Hartmann 
2004; Specht/Beckmann 1996; Wetter 2011). However, the results of basic research are usual-
ly made accessible to the public through publication in academic journals (OECD 2015; 
Schweitzer 2007). 
Like basic research, applied research is undertaken in order to generate new or refined scien-
tific or technical knowledge. However, in building the link between science and practice 
(Wetter 2011), applied research is typically aimed at solving some general or particular prac-
tical problem (Hartmann 2004; OECD 2015). Unlike the results of basic research, those of 
applied research are of direct value to the research organization as they can usually be applied 
to commercial ends. Hence, private organizations are more than willing to conduct applied 
research but normally keep their research findings strictly under lock and key (Schweitzer 
2007). While the distinction between basic and applied research is a meaningful one, both 
types of research should, however, be viewed as mutually interdependent. This is simply due 
to the fact that applied research often draws on earlier basic research results and that basic 
research results, if not applied to a practical problem, would vanish into oblivion without hav-
ing any impact other than satisfying humanity’s curiosity (Nickerson 1999). 
Development, or more precisely experimental development, describes the activity of systemat-
ically applying new knowledge derived from research and/or practical experience in order to 
produce improved or totally new materials, devices or products, and systems or methods, and 
improve prototypes and processes to meet desired requirements (Hartmann 2004; OECD 
2015; Wetter 2011). Whereas basic research is often conducted by the public sector, most of 
the development is undertaken by the private sector (Bund 2000; Düttmann 1989), which is 
certainly due to development activities having greater market proximity and, thus, increased 
chances of economic exploitation.  
Table 3 summarizes the central characteristics of the three R&D activities that were described 
in detail above.  
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Table 3. Main characteristics of the three R&D categories 
Characteristics Basic research Applied research Development 
Primary aim extend scientific knowledge 
extend knowledge to 
solve practical problem 
use knowledge to devise 
new applications 
Commercial focus none/very low medium/high high 
Time horizon long-term medium-term short-term 
Degree of uncertainty high medium/high comparably low 
Funded (primarily) by public sector private sector private sector 
 
Intense competition and the accelerated pace of technological change have led to new prod-
ucts, services, and processes only having a short economic half-life (Piachaud 2002; Veuge-
lers/Cassiman 1999). This circumstance forces firms to innovate, develop, reap the returns, 
and start all over again within ever-shortening time intervals (Huang et al. 2009). In order to 
meet the challenges associated with competing in a highly volatile business environment, it is 
likely that, at least from time to time, firms tap into external sources of knowledge 
(Grimpe/Kaiser 2010). Due to its role as a core “high-value function” of a firm 
(Grimpe/Kaiser 2010; Leiblein et al. 2002), R&D is probably one of the last areas one would 
think of being subject to outsourcing. However, the “market for technology” is constantly 
growing, both in size and importance. More and more firms offer R&D services, and an in-
creasing number of companies make use of these services (Arora et al. 2001; Chiesa et al. 
2004; Sampson 2007).  
But what is actually meant by outsourcing? The following sections are aimed at illuminating 
the reader’s understanding of the outsourcing phenomenon by first, presenting a definition 
and taking a look at its development over time and second, discussing its advantages and dis-
advantages. 
 
2.2.2 Definition and development of the outsourcing phenomenon 
Due to its increasing popularity in recent times (e.g., Arora et al. 2001; Sampson 2007), it 
may be tempting to believe that outsourcing is a new concept. While it may have certainly 
changed in shape over time, the concept of outsourcing is centuries old (Jenster et al. 2005). 
However, it was not until the late 1980s that management consultant Peter Drucker publicly 
addressed the outsourcing phenomenon in his widely received 1989 Wall Street Journal arti-
cle “Sell the Mailroom.” Subsumed under the slogan “Do what you do best, outsource the 
rest,” Drucker (1989) advised companies to contract out in-house activities such as clerical, 
maintenance, and support work in order to improve productivity. With the increasing manage-
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rial attention in the 1980s, outsourcing had begun to be tentatively adopted in organizations 
(Hätönen/Eriksson 2009) and has developed over time into a viable business strategy that as-
sists firms in coping with the challenges provided by a dynamic and fast-paced business envi-
ronment (Espino-Rodríguez/Padrón-Robaina 2006; McCarthy et al. 2013; McIvor 2005). In-
stead of creating large organizations that gather all value adding activities under one roof, 
firms’ managers have increasingly recognized and favored the potential value of using exter-
nal capabilities (Howells et al. 2008; McCarthy et al. 2013). Outsourcing has, furthermore, 
progressed over time from involving only peripheral business activities towards encompass-
ing more critical ones as well (McIvor 2005). Even sensitive activities such as R&D have 
been handed over to external providers in recent times. Tapping into external sources of 
knowledge allows manufacturing firms, which must constantly develop new and often highly 
complex products, to address market demands more quickly and thus to encounter successful-
ly the challenges of a fast-moving business environment (Sampson 2007).  
A look at the term “outsourcing” shows that it is an acronym combining the notions “outside,” 
“resource,” and “using,” thus describing a move beyond company boundaries to acquire spe-
cific resources or activities not possessed by the firm (Grimpe/Kaiser 2010). R&D outsourc-
ing can therefore be understood as a firm’s decision to contract out certain R&D activities 
required for the production of final products or the provision of services to independent com-
panies and institutions specializing in the respective fields by means of contractual agree-
ments (Grimpe/Kaiser 2010; Howells 1999). Specialized companies and institutions can—
according to Bund (2000)—belong to one of the following four groups: 
• R&D departments of other firms: In recent years, there has been a trend amongst lead-
ing technological firms to make their knowledge available to third parties by selling 
those R&D results on the market they do not need themselves. 
• Existing suppliers: The increasing cooperation between manufactures and their suppli-
ers leads to supplier firms carrying out certain R&D activities on behalf of the manu-
facturers without the parties being aware this being some kind of outsourcing, which is 
why it is referred to as “hidden outsourcing.” Typical examples are found in large-
scale project business, IT-project business, or special machinery manufacturing, where 
technical solutions are either customized or newly developed (Nuhn 1987). 
• Specialized R&D providers: There is an increase in specialized providers such as in-
dependent freelancers, engineering offices, and R&D firms that perform R&D activi-
ties on behalf of the contracting firm.  
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• Other R&D institutions: Universities and public research institutes such as Max-
Planck, Helmholtz, and Fraunhofer often provide R&D services, particularly in basic 
or applied research.  
In this dissertation, the focus is on cooperation with firms that clearly present themselves as 
R&D suppliers, which excludes cases of so-called “hidden outsourcing.” Furthermore, this 
thesis concentrates on the provision of R&D services that include either the contract-specific 
development of new knowledge or the application of existing knowledge in a given context, 
which also excludes firms that only sell their R&D results. Lastly, the focus is not on coopera-
tion with universities and public research institutes but private, legally, and (usually) econom-
ically independent supplier firms. It is therefore the collaboration with the third group of spe-
cialized firms and institutions mentioned above that is the object of interest in this disserta-
tion.  
A closer look at the externalization of R&D activities illustrates that the traditional view on 
R&D outsourcing has changed remarkably in literature and practice over time. As Figure 2 
visualizes, the outsourcing concept has developed from being a typical “buy”-decision to-
wards including a vast array of hybrid R&D arrangements that fall in between the two ex-
tremes “market” and “hierarchy” (Bund 2000). 
Figure 2. Forms of coordination between ”make” R&D and ”buy” R&D according to Bund 
(2000: 57) 
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According to Bund (2000), the variety of arrangements can be characterized by the influence 
the outsourcing firm has on its external partner. A decrease in the degree of hierarchical coor-
dination causes this influence to decrease from the left to the right side of the figure.  
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Relations with external partners that are founded exclusively on contractual ties mark the tra-
ditional understanding of outsourcing (“buy”) and can therefore be referred to as “outsourc-
ing in a narrower sense” (Bund 2000). Relationships that are more cooperative in nature and 
thus go beyond the traditional understanding of the outsourcing phenomenon (Cunning-
ham/Fröschl 1995) can be described as “outsourcing in a broader sense” (Bund 2000).  
Particularly highly hierarchical arrangements such as R&D subsidiaries or joint ventures may, 
however, call in question the general idea of outsourcing. In a strict sense, neither subsidiaries 
nor joint ventures can be considered “external partners” or “independent companies,” as they 
are—at least partially—under the control of the outsourcing firm (Odenthal 1999). This per-
ceived “contradiction” is, according to the prevailing view in the literature, approached by 
distinguishing between internal and external outsourcing (Arnold 2000; Oertel/Abraham 
1996; Riedl/Kepler 2003), depending on the legal and economic status of the contracting par-
ties (Riedl/Kepler 2003). External outsourcing refers to contract-based transactions with out-
side suppliers, where the interacting firms are both legally and economically independent. 
Internal outsourcing, on the contrary, refers to higher degrees of hierarchical coordination. 
Rather than involving an outside organization, existing internal resources and business activi-
ties are turned into a separate entity. This separate entity is either legally dependent on the 
outsourcing firm (e.g., a so-called profit center) or legally independent (e.g., a subsidiary) but 
still under the influence of the outsourcing firm through equity participation. Either way, the 
outsourced activity can be influenced by the outsourcing firm (Riedl/Kepler 2003; Wrase 
2010; Zahn et al. 1998). 
In line with the definition of R&D outsourcing presented earlier, this dissertation concentrates 
on external outsourcing. In particular, it focuses on contract R&D2, which due to its short- or 
medium-term orientation can be perceived as a special case of “outsourcing in the broader 
sense” (Figure 2). While opinions may diverge on whether contract R&D is cooperative in 
nature (see, e.g., Gerpott 2005, who classifies contract R&D as typical “buy” decision), the 
author of this dissertation follows Hartmann (2004) and Zißler (2011), who consider contract 
R&D to mark the transition from pure market-based transactions to cooperative arrangements. 
This is in line with Kloyer (2005), who also emphasizes the cooperative character of contract 
R&D.  
                                                
2  Note that the terms R&D outsourcing, contract R&D, and R&D supply are used interchangeably throughout 
this dissertation. 
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That the relationship between the partners engaging in contract R&D goes beyond purely con-
tractual ties is mirrored in the fact that their interaction is a mutual process of exchange, with 
the buyer providing the R&D supplier firm with all necessary information concerning the 
buyer’s specific R&D needs and the R&D supplier transferring the corresponding technologi-
cal knowledge results to the buyer firm for commercial exploitation. In practice, this relation-
ship can be assumed to be even more intense as the partners have close contact and constantly 
exchange relevant information and data (Zißler 2011). Thus, in order to achieve a competitive 
advantage, both parties depend on the cooperative behavior of their exchange partner, at least 
for the time of service provision (Hartmann 2004; Zißler 2011). The understanding of contract 
R&D as a cooperative phenomenon corresponds to the definition of inter-firm cooperation 
presented in Section 2.1. 
Setting up an R&D outsourcing relationship usually follows a standardized process (see Fig-
ure 3), as is typical for any other cooperative arrangement (e.g., Helm/Peter 1999; Mellewigt 
2003).  
Figure 3. The process of cooperation in R&D following Mellewigt (2003: 75) 
 
It starts with the initiation, which involves the buyer firm’s decision to tap into external 
sources of knowledge, and continues with partner search, screening, and selection. Having 
found a supplier firm to team up, negotiations begin aimed at designing an outsourcing con-
tract that specifies the R&D task, the activities necessary for its fulfillment, the time required 
for its execution as well as the fees to be paid. The following stage involves monitoring and 
managing the outsourcing relationship, with the partners striving to fulfill their contractual 
duties and exchanging information, services, and goods. The cooperative arrangement usually 
ends with the completion of the present R&D project unless the partners agree to extend their 
relationship for another project (Mellewigt 2003; Tallman/Phene 2006). 
As already indicated, outsourcing allows managers to create flatter, more flexible, and respon-
sive organizations (McIvor 2005). The decision to adopt outsourcing strategies is usually 
driven by the potential gains from tapping into external sources. However, the advantages of 
outsourcing are countered by certain disadvantages. Both “gains and pains” from R&D out-
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sourcing are described in the following two sections. They demonstrate that outsourcing can 
be an efficient undertaking, but only when planned and managed properly (Huang et al. 
2009). 
 
2.2.3 Motives for and benefits from R&D outsourcing 
From the perspective of the resource-based view, outsourcing provides access to resources 
and capabilities beneficial to but not possessed by the outsourcing firm itself (Dolgui/Proth 
2013; Lavie 2006; Weigelt 2009; Zhao/Calantone 2003). Whereas resources include all assets 
controlled by a firm (Barney 1991) and are, thus, viewed as being more generic in nature, 
capabilities refer to firm-specific abilities (Makadok 2001) to make use of the possessed re-
sources in order to achieve organizational goals (Amit/Schoemaker 1993). By delegating the 
provision of R&D to external supplier firms, buyer firms are able to overcome intra-
organizational knowledge shortcomings (Meyer/Leuppi 1992; Piachaud 2002), especially 
when constraints on time, money, and/or competence prevent the buyer firms from establish-
ing the required skills and capabilities in-house (Caudy 2001). The external assignment of 
R&D tasks ensures, furthermore, the rapid deployment of know-how and related capacities 
without adding any additional personnel to the payroll, which, on the whole, may help out-
sourcing firms to move ahead of their competitors (Caudy 2001). 
Saving costs is one of the most frequently mentioned reasons for outsourcing endeavors 
(McIvor 2005), and the external acquisition of knowledge may indeed result in cost savings 
(Dolgui/Proth 2013). Researchers such as Quinn (1992, 2000) have argued that R&D out-
sourcing would decrease new product development costs. It is the R&D supplier firm’s spe-
cialization that allows the whole process of creating R&D outputs to be handled more effi-
ciently. The supplier firm usually applies the latest technology and knows exactly how to de-
ploy resources most economically (Piachaud 2002; Quinn 1992, 2000). Additionally, supplier 
firms may be able to realize economies of scale (Love/Roper 2002; Veugelers/Cassiman 
1999) as similar services are provided to several customers. Hence, costs for training person-
nel and upgrading technology can be spread across the supplier firm’s customer base 
(Belcourt 2006; McIvor 2005). If the R&D supplier is willing to pass on such cost-digression 
effects, this can result in tremendous cost-savings for the buyer firm (Bund 2000; Rom-
mel/Püschel 1994). Furthermore, outsourcing R&D allows manufacturing firms to reduce 
risks by turning fixed costs into variable costs. Instead of establishing or maintaining in-house 
R&D activities, manufacturers can draw on external help when needed and as long as it is 
needed (Bund 2000; McIvor 2005; Piachaud 2002). This automatically implies that it is the 
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supplier firm that has to deal with hiring, training, and maintaining staff and with overcapaci-
ties in times of adverse business conditions (McIvor 2005; Piachaud 2002). 
While Grimpe and Kaiser (2010) consider the potential cost savings to be of minor relevance, 
they highlight the quality advantages R&D outsourcing can provide. Quality improvement is 
an often-mentioned benefit of outsourcing (Blumberg 1998; Dolgui/Proth 2013; Hubbard 
1993). More experience or exposure to certain problems and issues and, thus, specialized 
know-how and equipment usually enable the supplier firm to deliver high-level R&D solu-
tions (Barthelémy 2001; Grimpe/Kaiser 2010). Additionally, quality and performance stand-
ards can be embedded in the outsourcing contract more tightly than in regular employee con-
tracts (Belcourt 2006; McIvor 2005), thus binding the supplier firm to deliver high-class R&D 
outputs.3 
In contrast to in-house R&D, the acquisition of R&D provides the outsourcing firm with flex-
ibility. First, outsourcing enables help to be hired only when needed and only as long as it is 
needed. This, in turn, allows buyer firms to redeploy internal resources to improve the quality 
and speed of accomplishment of other tasks (Zhao/Calantone 2003). By no longer bothering 
with the outsourced activity, buyer firms are able to concentrate more deeply on the develop-
ment of their core activities (Caudy 2001; Dolgui/Proth 2013; McIvor 2005). Second, by out-
sourcing, firms are given the chance to quickly adjust to changing circumstances and to pur-
sue different opportunities (Cao/Leggio 2006; Caudy 2001). As a firm may decide to hire 
more than one supplier firm to address a specific business issue (single- vs. multi-sourcing 
(Söbbing 2002)), parallel work can result in R&D solutions being found more rapidly 
(Cao/Leggio).4  
Ever-shortening product- and technology life cycles as well as a rapid shift in customer pref-
erences have made timing issues a major concern for manufacturing firms (Fine 1998). Con-
stant innovation and the “speed to market” seem to be the key to differentiating from competi-
tors and remaining competitive (Piachaud 2002). Sourcing R&D externally cannot only help 
in meeting temporary customer needs but, in fact, speeds up product development and, thus, 
hastens product-market entry (Caudy 2001; Grimpe/Kaiser 2010; Piachaud 2002). This may 
be due not only to the supplier firm’s specialized expertise and equipment but also the undi-
vided attention the R&D project receives from the supplier firm (Grimpe/Kaiser 2010).  
                                                
3  There are serious doubts as to the validity of this argument given that sometimes even the supplier firm does 
not know where the “journey” is headed. This, in turn, makes a precise contractual specification very difficult. 
4  It is questionable whether reflections on single- vs. multi-sourcing strategies really go beyond mere theoretical 
considerations, given the expenses and dangers connected with the disclosure of internal information and data 
to more than one R&D supplier firm. 
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The external acquisition of R&D can also be used to help stimulate internal R&D 
(Grimpe/Kaiser 2010) by exposing the internal staff to new technology and know-how (Ernst 
2000). By constantly confronting them with the newest approaches, the internal R&D staff is 
implicitly forced to measure up, possibly resulting in “growing beyond themselves” and re-
moving internal resistances to innovation (Tapon/Cadsby 1996; Tapon/Thong 1999).  
While the outsourcing of R&D may certainly provide several benefits, it is, however, indis-
pensable to also look at potential downsides of the external acquisition of knowledge. Some 
of the arguments in favor of outsourcing presented in this section may, under certain circum-
stances, also be arguments against outsourcing. The following section will outline some of the 
potential drawbacks of R&D outsourcing. 
 
2.2.4 Drawbacks from and potential risks of R&D outsourcing 
Expectations of cost savings through outsourcing are often not met by the costs incurred in 
establishing and maintaining the outsourcing relationship itself (Bryce/Useem 1998; Kern et 
al. 2002; McIvor 2005). Apart from the expenses involved in finding an appropriate supplier 
firm and drafting a contract, manufacturing firms may underestimate the time and manage-
ment resources needed to govern the supply relationship (Barthelémy 2001; McIvor 2005; 
Veugelers/Cassiman 1999). Particularly in the case of critical business activities, such as 
R&D, the financial benefits of outsourcing can easily be eaten away by the costs incurred in 
ensuring the transfer of tacit knowledge (Love/Roper 2002). Furthermore, the supplier firm’s 
performance can hardly be ensured over time. While a supplier firm is likely to perform better 
in the beginning in order to make good first impressions, this performance may decline over 
time, thus offsetting some of the cost benefits expected by the buyer firms (Schwyn 1999). To 
sum up, it becomes apparent that the effects of outsourcing on an outsourcing firm’s costs are 
not yet completely understood. While financial benefits can be the result of outsourcing, they 
are not a matter of course at all (Kremic et al. 2006). 
As according to the resource based view valuable skills and capabilities are firm-specific and 
evolve within the firm over time (Barney 1991), researchers warn that outsourcing could lead 
to the buyer firm being progressively “hollowed out” (Bettis et al. 1992; Hamel 1991; 
Schniederjans et al. 2005), thus losing the potential for innovation in the future (Kern et al. 
2002). By relying too much on the external provision of R&D, buyer firms may in fact miss 
out on developing and appreciating internal skills and capabilities and, thus, become overly 
dependent on external sources of knowledge. Outsourcing firms should not underrate this 
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shift in power to the supplier firm (Quinn 1999; Tapon/Thong 1999) as it may open doors to 
unethical supplier behavior. 
The saying “Do what you do best—outsource the rest” (Drucker 1989) may imply the output 
to be of higher quality when delivered by a specialized firm with unique skills. There are, 
however, serious doubts about whether improvements in quality are a logical consequence of 
outsourcing. Given the uncertainties that surround the collaboration with external partners, 
researchers suggest that outsourcing may actually cause quality issues (Caudy 2001; Howells 
et al. 2008; Love/Roper 2002; Piachaud 2002). To begin with, there is the risk of choosing a 
supplier firm that actually lacks the skills it claims to possess (problem of “hidden characteris-
tics,” Love/Roper 2002; see Section 3.1), leading, at best, to delivering R&D outputs of minor 
quality. Furthermore, buyer firms can often not determine the quality of the knowledge out-
puts they receive (problem of “hidden information,” see, Section 3.1), which provides the 
supplier with ample leeway to intentionally withhold efforts and to deliver knowledge results 
of inferior quality (Howells et al. 2008). Lastly, even supplier firms sometimes do not know a 
priori what quality they are able to deliver (Howells et al. 2008), causing R&D contracts to 
remain incomplete (Aghion/Tirole 1994; Klein 1980, Liebeskind 1996). This weakens the 
argument provided in Section 2.2.3 that because of predefined performance standards in the 
contract, the supplier will deliver R&D results of higher quality. 
A great unknown and thus a potential concern in any collaborative relationship is the coopera-
tion partner’s behavior. While fully cooperative behavior is desirable, it is not the normal 
state. Economic exchange relationships are usually characterized by equally cooperative and 
self-seeking behavior. While self-seeking itself is not reprehensible, it is the seeking of self-
interests at any price that is morally objectionable as it implies one partner growing rich at the 
other partner’s expense (Williamson 1975; see Section 3.1). Unethical supplier behavior, 
which is referred to academically as “supplier opportunism” and will be explained in more 
detail in Chapter 3, can include fraudulent representation of skills and competences 
(Love/Roper 2002), withholding relevant knowledge from the buyer (Kloyer 2011; 
Kloyer/Scholderer 2012), or using and modifying the generated knowledge inadequately 
(Martinez-Noya et al. 2013), for example, utilizing it for own competitive activities or simply 
selling it off to competitors of the buyer (Howells et al. 2008; Kogut 1988; Oxley 1997).  
Figure 4 depicts the aforementioned motives and drawbacks of R&D outsourcing and high-
lights the crucial role the supplier’s behavior plays in the success of R&D outsourcing.  
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Figure 4. Motives and drawbacks of R&D outsourcing 
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As visualized in Figure 4, unethical supplier behavior can easily reverse potential advantages 
of R&D outsourcing into disadvantages. Increased costs and serious quality issues can arise 
when employing an R&D supplier that only claims to possess the necessary R&D skills 
(Love/Roper 2002) or that does not adequately share its R&D competence with the buyer firm 
(Kloyer 2011; Kloyer/Scholderer 2012). Cost benefits may, furthermore, be offset by the re-
sources needed to control supplier (mis-)behavior. The same applies to the potential ad-
vantages such as focusing on core activities that can hardly be realized when substantial man-
agement resources are needed to govern the relationship with a somewhat dubious supplier. 
Moreover, the supplier selling the generated knowledge to the buyer’s competitors might also 
offset any time advantages associated with R&D outsourcing. 
In light of the above, supplier misbehavior poses a serious threat to the effectiveness and suc-
cess of R&D outsourcing relationships. Therefore, it is indispensable to understand what ac-
tually triggers this type of behavior and how it can be effectively curtailed for R&D outsourc-
ing to meet its intended objectives. As the danger of opportunism in R&D supply relations 
represents the central field of research in this dissertation, the following chapter will contrib-
ute to sharpening the reader’s understanding of the opportunism phenomenon and clarify what 
specific type of opportunism this dissertation concentrates on. Moreover, it will shed more 
light on the research questions addressed in this dissertation and explain the research papers’ 
purposes. 
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3. Opportunism as a serious threat in R&D outsourcing relationships 
3.1 Definition and types of the opportunism phenomenon 
Economic actors are driven by their own professional and personal objectives, which can, 
however, lead to a divergence of views in exchange relationships regarding the benefits of 
certain types of actions. An exchange partner that unscrupulously pursues its self-interest no 
matter what the consequences for the partner firm can be considered to be behaving opportun-
istically (Hawkins et al. 2009). The previous chapter has already highlighted that partner op-
portunism is a major threat to R&D outsourcing-relationships. As a central behavioral as-
sumption of new institutional economics, opportunism can be understood as “self-interest 
seeking with guile” (Williamson 1975, p. 26). It is important to note that it is not the self-
interestedness but the combination with guile that renders the opportunism phenomenon its 
devious touch. According to Williamson (1985, p. 17), guile encompasses activities such as 
“incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, especially to calculated efforts to mislead, 
distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse.”  
Although TCT does not necessarily assume that all economic actors are prone to opportunism, 
it is the possibility of unethical behavior that raises the need to create a governance structure 
that ensures uncertain behavioral patterns, such as opportunism, are dealt with effectively 
(Hill 1990; Williamson 1985; Williamson/Ouchi 1981).  
While opportunism may occur on both sides of the dyad (Cavusgil et al. 2004; Jap/Anderson 
2003), it is the potential risk of supplier opportunism that builds the thematic core of this dis-
sertation.5 Supplier opportunism can occur before or after contract conclusion (Williamson 
1985) and can thus—according to the point of time of its occurrence—either be called ex-ante 
or ex-post opportunism. Bridging to PAT, ex-ante opportunism refers to the problem of ad-
verse selection (Akerlof 1970), whereas ex-post opportunism captures situations of moral 
hazard (e.g., Arrow 1963; Spence/Zeckhauser 1971). Both aspects are depicted in Figure 5. 
                                                
5  Opportunism exerted by the buyer firm (i.e., hold-up) will only be considered insofar as its anticipation in-
creases the R&D supplier’s motivation to behave unethically. 
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Figure 5. Ex-ante vs. ex-post opportunism 
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Adverse selection occurs when an agent (i.e., the supplier) claims to have certain skills and 
abilities but the principal (i.e., the buyer) cannot completely verify before contract conclusion 
whether this is the case or not. The underlying information asymmetry is that of “hidden char-
acteristics” (Eisenhardt 1989; Furubotn/Richter 2000). Although the danger of “adverse selec-
tion” should not be disregarded in R&D outsourcing relationships, this dissertation assumes 
the information asymmetry of “hidden characteristics” to have already been sufficiently re-
duced ex-ante by credible signals (Spence 1973). The focus of this dissertation is, therefore, 
only on the moral hazard danger.  
Moral hazard refers to situations in which an agent does not put forward the contractually 
agreed-upon effort (Eisenhardt 1989). Problems of moral hazard rest on the information 
asymmetries of “hidden action” and “hidden information.” “Hidden action” describes the fact 
that the principal can only observe the agent’s behavior with great difficulty or at extremely 
high costs (Arrow 1985; Furubotn/Richter 2000). Given the opacity of the innovation process, 
especially in the early R&D stages, it is not difficult to imagine that the R&D buyer firm can 
hardly observe the supplier’s behavior (Kloyer 2011; Kloyer/Scholderer 2012). “Hidden in-
formation,” on the contrary, refers to the problem of the principal lacking the necessary in-
formation to evaluate the agent’s output, e.g., in terms of quality (Arrow 1985; Fu-
rubotn/Richter 2000). Given the often existing novelty and complexity of R&D results, buyer 
firms can be expected to have great difficulties in determining a functional relationship be-
tween resource input and R&D output (Kloyer 2011). As a consequence, R&D suppliers have 
considerable leeway to deliberately withhold efforts. 
Despite distinguishing opportunism according to its time of occurrence, it can furthermore be 
classified as being either active or passive in nature. While this classification goes back to 
Opportunism as a serious threat in R&D outsourcing relationships 22 
Williamson (1985, 1991), it was revitalized and further advanced by Wathne and Heide 
(2000). One may refer to active or passive opportunism “when a party either engages in or 
refrains from particular actions” (Wathne/Heide 2000, p. 38). Taking actions that are forbid-
den by contract can be considered active opportunism, whereas passive opportunism mani-
fests itself in deliberately withholding efforts (Masten 1988) or refraining from performing 
agreed-on activities (Goetz/Scott 1981). According to this classification, moral hazard can be 
understood as a form of passive opportunism (Kloyer 2011).  
The beginning of this chapter has highlighted that economic actors constantly pursue their 
own interests. While self-interest seeking per se is not necessarily “evil,” one ends up wonder-
ing what leads supplier firms to finally act in morally reprehensible ways. The reasons for 
supplier opportunism can be twofold. First, suppliers may engage in unethical behavior simp-
ly because they believe it will pay off handsomely (Williamson 1975, 1985, 1993a; 1993b). 6 
Purposely withholding efforts allows cost savings and, thus, the generation of higher profits 
(Kloyer 2011; Kloyer/Scholderer 2012). Second, the suppliers’ propensity towards opportun-
ism can be the reaction to a perceived hold-up by the buyer (Kloyer 2011; Kloyer/Helm 2008; 
Kloyer/Scholderer 2012). Hold-up, as the central phenomenon in TCT, describes a situation 
in which the buyer firm tries to opportunistically exploit the supplier firm’s dependence by 
renegotiating the original contract to the supplier firm’s disadvantage (Klein et al. 1978). If 
applying a “tit-for tat”-strategy (Axelrod 1984), supplier firms that anticipate buyer hold-up 
can themselves become motivated to behave unethically (Kloyer 2011; Kloyer/Helm 2008; 
Kloyer/Scholderer 2012). 
Given the increasing prevalence of partner opportunism in business practice (Hawkins et al. 
2008), researchers and practitioners alike strive to improve their understanding of the phe-
nomenon. The following section briefly points out the main research areas of opportunism 
and illustrates how this doctoral thesis contributes to prior research by outlining the content of 
the three empirical papers that build the pillars of this dissertation.  
 
3.2 Research on opportunism and focus of the three papers 
The opportunism phenomenon has received substantial attention from scientific researchers 
over the last three decades. This attention has resulted in a vast number of theoretical, concep-
tual, and empirical articles. A review and synthesis of the academic literature reveals that re-
                                                
6  The decision to behave unethically is the result of an economic calculus. If the payoffs from opportunism 
surpass the benefits of cooperation, partners are more likely to behave unethically (Williamson 1975, 1985, 
1993a, 1993b). 
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search on opportunism has basically developed along three main lines. As illustrated in Figure 
6, there has been, first, scientific interest in the factors that provoke and facilitate unethical 
partner behavior (e.g., Katsikeas et al. 2009; Morgan et al. 2007; Ting et al. 2007; Yaqub 
2009). Second, considerable efforts have been dedicated to determining mechanisms that help 
to deter or lessen partner opportunism (e.g., Brown et al. 2000; Cavusgil et al. 2004; 
Helm/Kloyer 2004; Jap/Anderson 2003; Yaqub 2009). Third and finally, research has strived 
to examine the consequences of partner misbehavior (e.g., Luo et al. 2009; Morgan et al. 
2007; Parkhe 1993; Ting et al. 2007). 
Figure 6. Areas of opportunism research and focus of the research papers 
 
Despite the rich scenario of prior research efforts, academic research is still far from having 
completely understood the opportunism phenomenon (Hawkins et al. 2008). Given its preva-
lence in exchange relationships and the wide divergence of empirical opinion regarding its 
drivers, deterrents, and consequences, the phenomenon requires much more academic atten-
tion (Das/Rahman 2010; Hawkins et al. 2008). This dissertation responds to the call by touch-
ing on and contributing to each of the three aforementioned areas of opportunism research, 
thus painting a fairly complete picture of the opportunism phenomenon in an R&D supply 
context.  
Paper 1 of this doctoral thesis covers the first area of opportunism research. Gaining 
knowledge about the factors that provoke unethical partner behavior is indispensable in order 
to apply effective safeguarding measures. Prior research has dedicated considerable efforts to 
determining the antecedents of partner opportunism (e.g., Katsikeas et al. 2009; Morgan et al. 
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2007; Ting et al. 2007; Yaqub 2009). While these efforts have certainly provided valuable 
insights, some issues still need to be clarified. First, there is wide disagreement about the roles 
played by various antecedents in driving a firm’s unethical behavior since findings vary in 
terms of significance, direction, and magnitude (Hawkins et al. 2009). Second, while some 
factors have been widely studied (e.g., specific investments, external uncertainty), others have 
received comparably limited empirical attention (information asymmetries, internal uncertain-
ty). Third, to the best of the author’s knowledge, there is no empirical study that considers 
simultaneously the whole range of TCT- and PAT-related drivers of opportunism in an R&D 
supply context. Motivated by the aforementioned issues, Paper 1 combines the views of TCT 
and PAT and strives to answer the following research question: 
Research Question 1: What drives an R&D supplier to behave unethically towards its 
  buyer firm in an R&D outsourcing relationship? 
Given the devious nature of the opportunism phenomenon (e.g., Caniёls/Gelderman 2010; 
Das/Rahman 2010; Gassenheimer et al. 1996; Parkhe 1993), manufacturing firms would most 
likely refrain from collaborating with external R&D providers if there were no way to effec-
tively control the moral hazard danger (Kloyer 2011). But despite the major efforts to work 
out mechanisms that help to protect and preserve the cooperative relationship (e.g., Brown et 
al. 2000; Cavusgil et al. 2004; Helm/Kloyer 2004; Jap/Anderson 2003; Vázquez et al. 2007; 
Wathne/Heide 2000), no consensus has been reached on their effectiveness (Achrol/Gundlach 
1999; Caniëls/Gelderman 2010). Moreover, despite knowing about their potential relevance in 
explaining economic behavior, prior work has focused primarily on extrinsic, hard measures 
and has almost completely neglected to consider the role played by non-extrinsic, soft safe-
guards in curbing partner opportunism, (Kloyer 2011; Kloyer/Scholderer 2012). Paper 2 ad-
dresses these shortcomings by also taking account of soft variables such as supplier trust, in-
trinsic motivation, and organizational culture. Being, to the best of the author’s knowledge, 
the first study to simultaneously consider and contrast a wide array of hard and soft govern-
ance mechanisms, Paper 2 is dedicated to answering the subsequent research question, thus 
covering the second area of opportunism research: 
Research Question 2: What determines supplier knowledge sharing in R&D supply rela-
tionships and are soft factors the underestimated drivers? 
Like Paper 2, Paper 3 contributes to the second area of opportunism research by taking up and 
further examining a variable discussed in Paper 2: the R&D supplier firm’s trust in the buyer. 
Due to its reconciliatory nature, trust is often hyped as a “silver bullet” in governing economic 
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exchange relationships. While there certainly is a vast array of research on its positive out-
comes (Claro/Claro 2008; Cullen et al. 2000; Das/Teng 2001; Lane et al. 2001; Mohr 2004, 
Morgan/Hunt 1994; Zaheer et al. 1998), the antecedents of trust are not sufficiently under-
stood. In prior work, trust is occasionally considered to develop gradually over time (e.g., 
Gulati 1995; Parkhe 1993; Rousseau et al. 1998). This non-calculative view neglects, howev-
er, the more calculative reasons for trust. In an R&D supply context, it can be assumed that 
trust is primarily a function of perceived opportunism control. Hence, factors that keep the 
danger of buyer opportunism (e.g., hold-up) at a minimum may certainly be key levers in 
driving the supplier’s trust in the buyer. Research that claims to investigate the sources of 
trust should, therefore, consider both non-calculative and calculative reasons. Furthermore, 
despite the extensive research on the consequences of trust, little is known about the role of 
trust in facilitating the supplier firm’s intrinsic motivation. This is surprising for two reasons. 
First, intrinsic motivation is viewed as being an indispensable precondition for successful 
knowledge transfer (Ko et al. 2005; Lin 2007). Second, it is assumed that intrinsic motivation 
is more likely to develop in a positive and trusting atmosphere (Frey/Bohnet 1995; Ryan/Deci 
2000b). However, appropriate empirical research, especially in an inter-organizational setting, 
is still missing. Inspired by these issues, Paper 3 aims at answering the following research 
question:  
Research Question 3: What leads the R&D supplier to trust its buyer firm and does that 
trust spur the supplier firm’s intrinsic motivation? 
In order to paint a complete picture of the opportunism phenomenon, it is necessary to also 
take a look at its consequences. A review of the academic literature gives rise to the impres-
sion that opportunism has invariably negative effects (Hawkins et al. 2008). Indeed, several 
studies found that one-sided opportunism impairs the success of the affected party (e.g., Dahl-
strom/Nygaard 1999; Morgan et al. 2007; Skarmeas et al. 2002; White/Lui 2005) and the co-
operation as whole (Luo 2007; Luo et al. 2009; Parkhe 1993; Ting et al. 2007) by destroying a 
part of the cooperative surplus. What has remained understudied, however, are the conse-
quences unethical behavior has for the success of the opportunist. Motivated by this gap in the 
literature, Papers 1 and 2 seek to answer the subsequent research question, thus contributing 
to the third area of opportunism research: 
Research Question 4: How does supplier opportunism affect the R&D supplier’s success? 
Table 4 summarizes the main structure of the three papers and provides additional information 
on the methodological approach and the paper’s publication status.  
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Table 4. Overview of the dissertation papers 
 Paper 1 Paper 2 Paper 3 
Chapter Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Chapter 6 
Title 
Drivers of supplier oppor-
tunism in vertical R&D 
collaboration from the 
perspectives of transac-
tion cost- and principal-
agent theory 
R&D collaboration be-
tween firms: Hard and 
soft antecedents of suppli-
er knowledge sharing 
Sources of trust and in-
trinsic motivation in 
R&D supply relations 
Authors 
• Kloyer, Martin 
• Helm, Roland 
• Aust, Christin  
• Helm, Roland 
• Kloyer, Martin 
• Aust, Christin 
• Aust, Christin 
• Kloyer, Martin 
• Helm, Roland 
Research  
questions 
• What drives an R&D 
supplier to behave 
unethically towards 
its buyer firm in an 
R&D outsourcing re-
lationship? 
• How does supplier 
opportunism affect 
the R&D supplier’s 
success? 
• What determines 
knowledge sharing in 
R&D supply relation-
ships? Are soft factors 
the underestimated 
drivers? 
• How does supplier 
knowledge sharing 
affect the R&D sup-
plier’s success? 
• What leads the R&D 
supplier to trust its 
buyer firm? 
• Does supplier trust 
spur the supplier 
firm’s intrinsic mo-
tivation? 
Model varia-
bles 
Dependent variables: 
• Supplier opportunism 
• Supplier success 
 
 
Independent variables: 
• External uncertainty 
• Internal uncertainty 
• Specific investments 
• Supplier dependence 
• Buyer dependence 
• Information asymme-
tries 
 
Dependent variables: 
• Supplier knowledge 
sharing 
• Supplier success 
 
Independent variables: 
• Behavior monitoring 
• Prior collaboration 
• Collaboration per-
spective 
• Supplier trust 
• Supplier organiza-
tional culture 
• Supplier intrinsic 
motivation 
 
Dependent variables: 
• Supplier trust 
• Supplier intrinsic 
motivation 
 
Independent variables: 
• Prior collaboration 
• Collaboration per-
spective 
• Buyer dependence 
• Supplier organiza-
tional culture 
 
Methodology Quantitive: Partial least squares (PLS) 
Data Survey data, collected 2013 (sample drawn from ORBIS database, complemented by web research) 
Research 
context Firms operating as R&D suppliers 
Status 
Under review:  
Academy of Management 
Journal (A+) 
Under review:  
Research Policy (A) 
Under review:  
Strategic Management 
Journal (A) 
As Table 4 visualizes, the three papers that build the pillars of this dissertation draw on empir-
ical data received from an online survey conducted in 2013. Besides being among the few 
empirical studies to examine unethical partner behavior in an R&D context (for exceptions, 
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see, for example, Carson et al. 2006, Kloyer 2011; Kloyer/Scholderer 2012), this doctoral 
thesis departs from prior work such as Morgan et al. (2007) by surveying the potential oppor-
tunist (the R&D supplier) and not the party affected by opportunism. It is reasonable to ques-
tion the R&D supplier as only they can provide reliable information on their behavior. R&D 
buyer firms, on the contrary, are victims of “hidden action” and “hidden information.”  
The questionnaire used for data collection was issued in German and English. The English 
version of the questionnaire is displayed in the Appendix. Partial least squares structural equa-
tion modeling (PLS-SEM) was used to test the papers’ hypotheses. It is a variance-based ap-
proach that has been widely applied in marketing and business research (Hair et al. 2012; 
Henseler et al. 2009).7  
The following Chapters 4, 5, and 6 include the three papers of this dissertation. Each paper is 
or was under review in a top-ranked academic journal. Due to journal-specific requirements 
they will differ slightly in terms of structure and citation format.   
 
                                                
7  To avoid redundancy, the author deliberately skips providing further information on the PLS approach at this 
point, as its use is described in detail in each of the three research papers. The interested reader is, further-
more, referred to Hair et al. (2014), who provide a comprehensive manual on the PLS approach. 
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4. Paper 1: Drivers of supplier opportunism in vertical R&D collaboration 
from the perspectives of transaction cost- and principal-agent theory 
Paper 1 
4.1 Introduction 
Organizations are increasingly confronted with a variety of challenges such as intensified 
competition, cost-pressure, and ever-shortening product life cycles. In order to remain com-
petitive, even large manufacturing firms are often required to complement their knowledge 
base by collaborating with external R&D partners. The outsourcing of R&D has become a 
prevalent phenomenon (Arora & Gambardella, 2010; Calantone & Stanko, 2007; Sampson, 
2007) that certainly allows for specialization benefits (Kloyer & Scholderer, 2012). By tap-
ping into external sources of knowledge, however, the manufacturing firm unavoidably risks 
being confronted with opportunism by its R&D supplier, i.e., through moral hazard 
(Sampson, 2007). 8 The supplier could withhold important information, provide false infor-
mation, or simply cheat (Park & Ungson, 2001) by withholding efforts, selling knowledge to 
third parties, or using it for its own competitive activities (Kloyer, 2011; Kloyer & Scholder-
er, 2012). It is, therefore, not surprising that opportunism is widely considered to be among 
the major reasons for cooperation failure (Das, 2004; Tidström & Ahman, 2006) or, at least, 
diminished relationship satisfaction and performance (Gassenheimer, Baucus, & Baucus, 
1996; Joshi & Arnold, 1997). Despite the fact that opportunism has attracted increasing 
scholarly attention in recent years, our understanding of the opportunism phenomenon is still 
fragmentary and, thus, far from being adequate (Das, 2006; Das & Rahman, 2010; Hawkins, 
Wittmann, & Beyerlein, 2008; Wathne & Heide, 2000). 
While much empirical attention has been devoted to the incentives or mechanisms that deter 
or at least lessen partner misbehavior (for an overview, see, for example, Brown, Dev, & Lee, 
2000; Cavusgil, Deligonul & Zhang, 2004; Helm & Kloyer, 2004; Jap & Anderson, 2003; 
Vázquez, Iglesias, & Rodríguez-del-Bosque, 2007; Wathne & Heide, 2000), only a modest 
number of empirical studies throw light on the potential drivers of opportunism (Das, 2006; 
Hawkins et al., 2008). This is surprising as only by understanding the antecedents of oppor-
tunism can firms anticipate such self-serving behavior and take preventative actions. The ex-
isting studies have shown mixed and sometimes even conflicting findings that do not allow 
for deriving warranted conclusions and, thus, call for more research on the topic. To date, 
                                                
8  This article will not describe the basics of new institutional economics with its sub-theories of property rights 
theory, transaction cost theory, and principal-agent theory. There are several established introductions to these 
theories (e. g., Williamson (1985) on transaction cost theory, Arrow (1985) on principal-agent theory, on the 
whole system of theories, for example, Furubotn and Richter (2000), Ménard and Shirley (2008), and Milgrom 
and Roberts (1992). 
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there is no study that simultaneously considers all the factors that transaction cost theory and 
principal-agent theory present as antecedents of supplier opportunism, particularly not in such 
a sensitive field as collaboration in R&D. Both theories explicitly regard opportunism as one 
of their central assumptions (e.g., Williamson, 1981, 1996). While transaction cost theory 
proposes that transaction characteristics such as uncertainty and asset specificity aggravate the 
opportunism problem (e.g., Williamson, 1996), according to principal-agent theory, it is the 
information asymmetries among the contracting parties that allow deriving the scope for op-
portunistic behavior (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Principal-agent theory and the information 
asymmetries have been applied rudimentarily in empirical research on opportunism (Steinle, 
Schiele, & Ernst, 2014). From a practical stance, knowledge about the sources of R&D sup-
plier opportunism is centrally important as it helps buyer firms to shape organizational in-
struments against opportunism, i.e., incentive systems, safeguards, etc.  
In addition to contributing to the existing knowledge of opportunism drivers, we also examine 
the relationship between a supplier’s opportunism and its individual success within the coop-
eration. While Hawkins et al. (2008) claim that the prevalence of opportunism in economic 
exchange relations is not met with a corresponding research interest concerning its perfor-
mance effects, we discovered a lack of empirical research on the link between supplier oppor-
tunism and supplier success. In order to fill this gap, we empirically scrutinize whether it is 
beneficial for a supplier firm to behave unethically in an R&D collaboration 
In order to test our hypotheses, we examined a sample of 104 R&D supplier firms. Some of 
our findings raise non-trivial theoretical questions. The positive impact of specific invest-
ments is contrary to one of the main propositions of transaction cost theory. The differing 
effects of external vs. internal uncertainty underline the need to elaborate the view on that 
transaction cost determinant. Other findings, however, correspond to our theory-based expec-
tations; as principal-agent theory predicts, information asymmetries lead to an increase of 
supplier opportunism. Finally, our results indicate that supplier opportunism has a negative 
effect on the supplier’s success within the cooperation. This finding raises some non-trivial 
questions concerning the relative importance of different types of supplier goals within the 
cooperation. 
The article is structured as follows. In the next section, we show the theoretical development 
of our study’s hypotheses and then present our empirical study in Section 4.3. The results of 
the study are reported in Section 4.4. The article ends with a discussion of the main findings, 
the major managerial implications, and the study’s limitations. 
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4.2 Theory and hypotheses 
4.2.1 Moral hazard caused by R&D suppliers  
While the outsourcing of R&D activities is a prevalent phenomenon (Arora & Gambardella, 
2010; Calantone & Stanko, 2007; Sampson, 2007), it does not come without risks. R&D sup-
ply relationships certainly allow for specialization benefits, but they also bear the danger of 
partner opportunism. While according to transaction cost theory not all economic actors are 
considered prone to opportunism, the risk of partner misbehavior should always be considered 
when examining economic exchange relationships as it is hardly possible to distinguish be-
tween the actors who are and those who are not opportunistic (Williamson & Ouchi, 1981). 
As both parties of a dyad can be inclined to behave opportunistically, it is the potential oppor-
tunism of the supplier firm we focus on in our study. More precisely, we examine moral haz-
ard (e.g., Arrow, 1963; Spence & Zeckhauser, 1971) that is caused by the R&D supplier. This 
kind of post-contractual opportunism is the main focus of principal-agent theory. Moral haz-
ard results from the information asymmetry of hidden action. This means that without know-
ing it, a buyer that cannot observe a supplier’s behavior faces the danger of paying more re-
muneration than justified by the supplier’s activities. This problem is especially severe in 
R&D supply relations as R&D efforts can hardly be observed because generating and imple-
menting innovative and creative ideas is inevitably not transparent.  
Suppliers may behave opportunistically simply because they believe it will pay off handsome-
ly (Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1993a; 1993b). Cost savings due to reduced efforts may enable 
the supplier firm to generate higher profits (Kloyer, 2011; Kloyer & Scholderer, 2012); how-
ever, one-sided opportunism may only be beneficial for a supplier under two conditions: first-
ly, it is not detected (Hill, 1990), and secondly, there is no perspective of a future collabora-
tion with the same partner. If it were to be detected, the supplier’s reputation would be dam-
aged, and a supplier that anticipates follow-up contracts has no rational motive to weaken the 
current and future partner.  
Although transaction cost theory does not directly examine moral hazard, it has to be consid-
ered in our study too. It mainly focuses on the phenomenon of hold-up (e.g., Klein, Crawford, 
& Alchian, 1978). Hold-up describes an ex-post renegotiation of an original contract, which 
becomes possible when one party slides into dependence because of one-sided specific in-
vestments. The renegotiation danger is aggravated in cases of uncertainty, which inevitably 
results in incomplete contracts (Aghion & Tirole, 1994; Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart & 
Moore, 1988, Pisano, 1990). Hold-up influences the danger of moral hazard because a de-
pendent supplier that anticipates buyer opportunism may be inclined to behave opportunisti-
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cally during the supply process (Kloyer, 2011; Kloyer & Helm, 2008; Kloyer & Scholderer, 
2012). In order to compensate for potential losses due to anticipated hold-up, the supplier firm 
could be motivated to withhold information or efforts intentionally. Such actions are presum-
ably particularly strong in R&D collaboration since uncertainty and contractual incomplete-
ness as causes of hold-up are inevitable. Thus, to summarize, a study that claims to consider 
the complete set of the antecedents of moral hazard caused by an R&D supplier has to consid-
er information asymmetries (based on principal-agent theory) as well as investment specificity 
and uncertainty (based on transaction cost theory).  
In view of its prevalence in corporate practice, literature on organization theory has devoted 
considerable attention to the opportunism phenomenon. Despite the wide research endeavors 
on the subject, however, the phenomenon of moral hazard is not understood in its entirety 
(Hawkins et al., 2008; Jap & Anderson, 2003), and our knowledge of the antecedents is rather 
fragmented (Das, 2006; Hawkins et al., 2008).  
 
4.2.2 Uncertainty and its influence on supplier opportunism 
In transaction cost theory, uncertainty is considered a primary constituent of contractual rela-
tions (Williamson, 1979, 1996). Uncertainty is typically understood as the extent to which 
environmental changes alter the conditions underlying an exchange relationship (Leiblein & 
Miller, 2003), which often requires adaptation, that is, the adaption of contractual agreements 
to changing circumstances (Williamson, 1979). By influencing the costs of governance, un-
certainty works as a central factor in guiding firms’ vertical integration decisions.  
The risk of partner opportunism accrues from the fact that the combination of environmental 
uncertainty and bounded rationality (Simon, 1957) make it impossible for the partner firms to 
foresee and articulate the myriad eventualities that may arise in the future (Williamson, 1975, 
1985). This in turn prevents the allying firms from drafting complete contracts. Incomplete 
contractual agreements leave each party discretionary leeway to serve their self-interests un-
scrupulously (Aghion & Tirole, 1994; Artz & Norman, 2002; Goldberg, 1976a; Grossman & 
Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1988; Pisano, 1990; Tripsas, Schrader, & Sobrero, 1995).  
Furthermore, uncertain environments require firms to occasionally revise their strategies and, 
hence, adapt their contractual agreements towards unforeseen contingencies (Lee & Cavusgil, 
2006). While these adaptations are necessary, they provide, however, latitude to behave op-
portunistically and to renegotiate to their own advantage (Anderson & Narus, 1990), i.e., to 
hold-up. In our case, it is the R&D buyer that could try to beat down the supplier firm’s re-
muneration (Tirole, 1986); however, supplier firms anticipating buyer hold-up can themselves 
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become motivated to behave unethically (Kloyer, 2011; Kloyer & Helm, 2008; Kloyer & 
Scholderer, 2012). In highly volatile environments, moreover, the parties of a dyad cannot 
predict with certainty whether and when their efforts may pay off economically. Firms whose 
financial scope is restricted – consider, for instance, an R&D startup firm – could become 
inclined to prefer the direct benefits of behaving opportunistically over uncertain long-term 
pay-offs from cooperation (Lai, Tian, & Huo, 2012).  
Even though it has been conceptualized slightly differently in research, several empirical stud-
ies confirmed the opportunism-increasing effect of environmental uncertainty in exchange 
relationships (Katsikeas, Skarmeas, & Bello, 2009; Lai et al., 2012; Liu, Su, Li, & Liu, 2010; 
Luo, 2007; Mysen, Svensson, & Payan, 2011; Skarmeas, Katsikeas, & Schlegelmilch, 2002; 
Wang & Yang, 2013). Carson, Madhok, and Wu (2006), however, found that environmental 
uncertainty in R&D alliances only unfolds its opportunism-driving force under formal but not 
under relational contract regimes. Anderson (1988), in contrast, failed to confirm the oppor-
tunism-increasing effect of environmental unpredictability. 
The aforementioned empirical studies do not explicitly differentiate between external and 
internal causes of uncertainty. Implicitly, they refer to external determinants of uncertainty, 
such as difficulties in anticipating the developments of market and competition. We will de-
liberately use the term “external uncertainty” because it is not necessarily positively correlat-
ed with the kind of uncertainty that results from the R&D process itself. Following our rea-
soning and in line with prior research, we assume external uncertainty to give rise to supplier 
opportunism. Therefore, we suggest the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1a. The higher the external, environment-related uncertainty in R&D coopera-
tion, the higher the R&D supplier’s opportunism. 
Apart from the external, environment-related uncertainty, there is an internal, process-related 
uncertainty in R&D collaboration. The R&D process itself can be uncertain; neither buyer 
firm nor supplier firm know which scientific and technological hurdles will come their way 
and whether the supplier firm has the capabilities necessary to overcome them (Kloyer, 2011).  
Given the vagueness of the R&D process, the supplier firm needs more entrepreneurial scope 
in order to try new paths. This implies that the supplier firm’s duties and responsibilities can-
not be fully specified contractually (Aghion & Tirole, 1994; Klein, 1980; Liebeskind, 1996), 
which may give the supplier leeway to withhold efforts intentionally without the risk of detec-
tion. Furthermore, there may actually be no clarity about where the supplier’s self-interest 
seeking ends and mean spirited acting “with guile” (Williamson, 1975: 26) begins. Hence, a 
general lack of contractual specification may actually “allow” the supplier firm to operate at 
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the edge of legality without violating agreements. Additionally, it seems plausible to expect 
that a supplier firm that doubts its own capabilities may be inclined to enjoy the short-term 
benefits from opportunism rather than to fully cooperate and take an “uncertain journey.” 
Therefore, we posit the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1b. The higher the internal, process-related uncertainty in R&D cooperation, the 
higher the R&D supplier’s opportunism. 
 
4.2.3 Specific investments and their influence on supplier opportunism 
While both parties in an exchange relationship usually invest specifically, it is, however, the 
R&D supplier firm that, particularly at the beginning, has to make the higher transaction-
specific investments compared to the buyer firm (Kloyer, 2011). Transaction-specific invest-
ments are tangible and intangible investments that are of high value within a focal transaction 
(Williamson, 1981, 1985). They comprise investments in equipment, machinery, employee 
training, and/or knowledge that are tailored to the specific relationship (Anderson, 1985). As 
these investments are unique to a certain task, they lose at least part, if not all, of their value if 
redeployed outside the transaction (Williamson, 1981, 1985). Exchange partners, however, 
find it economical to invest in transaction-specific assets for several reasons. First, in contrast 
to generalized assets, transaction-specific assets allow higher efficiency in operations and lead 
to cost savings in the long run (Das & Rahman, 2010). Second, transaction-specific invest-
ments signal good faith and the intention to continue the relationship, which could help facili-
tate the development of trust among partners (Katsikeas et al., 2009; Parkhe, 1993). 
From the transaction cost perspective, specific investments are said to play a major role in 
curbing partner opportunism (Brown et al., 2000; Williamson, 1985). In alliances, the firm 
that makes idiosyncratic investments, in our case the R&D supplier, is automatically locked 
into the exchange relationship as the invested assets cannot be redeployed elsewhere without 
falling in value. In order to receive full amortization of its investments, the supplier is inter-
ested in sustaining the relationship (Anderson & Weitz, 1992; Jap & Anderson, 2003). There-
fore, the supplier firm would refrain from any behavior that would put the exchange relation-
ship and, consequently, the assets’ actual value at risk (Vázquez et al., 2007). By increasing 
the costs of breaking a relationship (Parkhe, 1993), supplier opportunism is curtailed effec-
tively. Hence, it is the potential of economic loss that may serve as a disincentive for supplier 
opportunism (Crosno & Dahlstrom, 2008; Wathne & Heide, 2000).  
Several studies examined this line of argument empirically. Katsikeas et al. (2009) confirmed 
the negative effect of specific investments on the level of opportunism in import-export rela-
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tionships. The same applies to Ting, Chen and Bartholomew (2007), who found that specific 
investments lower an entrepreneur’s opportunism. Joshi and Stump (1999) proved that specif-
ic investments lead to increasing the dependence on the partner firm, which in turn reduces 
the incentives to behave opportunistically. Skarmeas et al. (2002) could confirm that increas-
ing specific investments leads to a greater relationship commitment by the investing party.  
However, there are also those who doubt the opportunism-reducing effects of specific invest-
ments by the supplier (Brown et al., 2000; Crosno & Dahlstrom, 2008; Crosno, Manolis, & 
Dahlstrom, 2013). Demsetz (1993: 166) states that “Asset specificity raises the prospects for 
opportunism.” This argument can be viewed from two perspectives. First, while specific in-
vestments may reduce the supplier’s propensity to behave opportunistically due to a relation-
ship lock-in, they may simultaneously stimulate the buyer firm to exploit the supplier firm’s 
vulnerability opportunistically via hold-up (Heide & John, 1990; Klein, 1996). Mysen et al. 
(2011) and Wang, Li, Ross, and Craighead (2013) confirmed empirically that specific invest-
ments actually drive the receiving party to expropriate the investments’ value; however, in 
contrast to Wang et al. (2013), Mysen et al. (2011) did not test the effect of specific invest-
ments on opportunism directly but indirectly via dependence. They found that specific in-
vestments increase the investing party’s dependence, which leads to opportunistic exploitation 
by the receiving party. Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne (2003) also found a positive relationship 
between specific investments and the receiving party’s opportunism if neither relational 
norms nor a shadow of the future exist. Furthermore, Liu, Liu, and Li (2014) confirmed that a 
firm’s specific investments lead to partner opportunism when the firm’s network embed-
dedness and the partner firm’s own specific investments are low. How though would buyer 
opportunism now influence supplier misbehavior? As mentioned before, a supplier that antic-
ipates the opportunistic exploitation by its buyer firm can become motivated to behave oppor-
tunistically itself (Kloyer, 2011; Kloyer & Helm, 2008; Kloyer & Scholderer, 2012) to fore-
stall potential losses due to hold-up. 
Second, a relationship lock-in puts a lot of psychological pressure on the supplier firm, which 
leads in the end to counterproductive behavior, such as opportunism. What may appear para-
doxical from an economic stance, can be justified by taking a social psychology perspective. 
According to reactance theory (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981), unethical supplier be-
havior is not uncommon when the supplier has invested specifically. The underlying logic is 
quite simple: transaction-specific investments cause a one-sided dependency that often leads 
the investing party to cede control to the partner firm (Heide & John, 1992). Being deprived 
of control means a restriction of behavioral freedom that, in line with reactance theory logic, 
can motivate the supplier firm to engage in activities tailored to restoring that freedom, i.e., 
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regaining control over the contributed assets. Such activities can include retaliatory, self-
serving behavior such as opportunism.  
Crosno et al. (2013) took this stance and assumed that with increasing specific investments, 
the opportunism of the investing party also increases. In line with their assumption, the au-
thors could confirm empirically that specific investments are positively related to the invest-
ing party’s passive9 opportunism. Contrary to their original assumption about specific invest-
ments and the investing party’s opportunism being negatively related, Brown et al. (2000) had 
come to the conclusion that specific investments do not restrict opportunism but actually 
cause reactant behavior on the part of the investor. 
However, drawing on the majority of previous findings and following the logic of transaction 
cost theory, we assume specific investments of the supplier to reduce supplier opportunism, 
which is why we suggest the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2. The higher the specific investments made by the R&D supplier, the lower the 
supplier’s opportunism. 
 
4.2.4 Partner dependence and its influence on supplier opportunism 
At this point, we deliberately extend the set of opportunism antecedents in transaction cost 
theory because one-sided dependence—with its assumed effects on opportunism—is not only 
caused by one-sided specific investments. Therefore, we will consider dependence between 
cooperation partners in general.  
Dependencies are viewed as the original motive behind firms cooperating. Given that re-
sources are not distributed equally, one organization might have the capabilities beneficial to 
but not possessed by the other. In order to gain access to and leverage the required resources, 
firms enter into collaborative relationships (Gulati, 1998; Morgan, Kaleka, & Gooner, 2007). 
While the previous section has shown that dependencies can also rest on partners having in-
vested specifically, we now concentrate on the dearth of alternative cooperation partners pos-
sessing the required resources and capabilities (Emerson, 1962; Morgan et al., 2007; Pfeffer 
& Salancik, 1978; Provan & Skinner, 1989). Hence, when speaking of partner dependence, 
we refer to the degree to which one partner relies on the other partner’s resources and capabil-
ities in order to achieve its business goals (Dwyer, Schurr, & Oh, 1987).  
                                                
9  The term “passive opportunism” describes the omission of particular actions including the evasion of obliga-
tions, quality shirking, the refusal to adapt, and the withholding of information (Crosno et al., 2013; Wathne & 
Heide, 2000).  
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While mutual dependencies act as glue that secures cooperation stability, unilateral dependen-
cies or dependencies that vary a lot in extent need to be considered with caution. Instead of 
providing ground for cooperation, unilateral dependencies can create power asymmetries that 
may eventually cause inappropriate partner behavior (Das & Teng, 2000b; Das & Teng, 2003, 
Xia, 2011). As dependencies can occur on both sides of the dyad, we will successively derive 
how supplier and buyer dependence may have an impact on supplier opportunism. First 
though, we will outline some general thoughts on how these two factors, dependence and op-
portunism, interact.  
In the literature, there are two very different perspectives concerning the relationship between 
dependencies and opportunism. Proponents of the first perspective follow the logic of transac-
tion cost theory and suggest that dependence and opportunism are negatively related (Provan 
& Skinner, 1989). Dependence on an exchange partner is said to reduce own incentives to 
behave unethically (Joshi & Arnold, 1997; Provan & Skinner, 1989) as detection by the part-
ner would put the cooperative relationship in danger (Das & Rahman, 2001). Given that the 
dependent firm relies on the partner’s resources and capabilities to achieve its business goals, 
the dependent firm would do anything to preserve the relationship (Joshi & Arnold, 1997, 
Provan & Skinner, 1989). This may even include tolerating misbehavior by the partner firm to 
a certain extent (Wathne & Heide, 2000).  
Proponents of the second view, however, propose that dependence and opportunism are posi-
tively related (Joshi & Arnold, 1997). Instead of fostering cooperative behavior, dependence 
can actually cause opposite effects such as unethical behavior. As previously outlined, de-
pendence implies a potential loss of control and, hence, constraints on the freedom of action. 
Taking a social psychological stance and following reactance theory (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & 
Brehm, 1981), restrictions of freedom can motivate the dependent party to undertake actions 
that re-establish the threatened or lost freedom. These actions can be explicit and direct, or 
implicit and hidden, such as opportunism (Joshi & Arnold, 1997). Furthermore, being de-
pendent on the partner firm entails the risk of own vulnerabilities being exploited opportunis-
tically by that partner. However, the anticipation of partner opportunism can in turn motivate 
the dependent firm itself to behave opportunistically (Joshi & Arnold, 1997; Kloyer, 2011; 
Kloyer & Helm, 2008; Kloyer & Scholderer, 2012).  
So what does this mean for the relationship between supplier dependence and supplier oppor-
tunism? According to the first view, dependence should effectively prevent supplier firms 
from behaving unethically as any opportunistic behavior would put the cooperative relation-
ship and hence, the achievement of the firm’s longer-term business goals at risk The second 
view, however, implies that a dependent supplier firm may actually be more inclined to act 
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opportunistically as a form of reactance to the constraints on freedom imposed by the condi-
tion of dependence. 
Previous studies that examined the relationship between dependence and opportunism usually 
applied the logic of transaction cost theory and assumed both constructs to be negatively re-
lated; however, the studies’ findings are mixed. By surveying farm and power equipment 
dealers, Provan and Skinner (1989) could confirm a negative relationship between dealer de-
pendence and dealer opportunism. In their study on supermarket retailers and their suppliers, 
Morgan et al. (2007), however, could not find a significant effect of supplier dependence on 
supplier opportunism. Joshi and Arnold (1997) assumed dependence and opportunism to be 
positively as well as negatively related—but under different conditions. In an experiment with 
purchasing managers, they found that relational norms moderate the relationship between 
dependence and opportunism. Under “low” relational norms, buyer dependence and buyer 
opportunism were positively related, whereas both constructs proved to be negatively related 
under “high” relational norms. 
Following the logic of transaction cost theory, we assume a dependent R&D supplier will 
refrain from opportunism. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3a. The higher the supplier’s dependence on the buyer, the lower the R&D sup-
plier’s opportunism. 
Looking at the relationship between buyer dependence and supplier opportunism, we might 
argue from a transaction cost theory-perspective that a dependent buyer firm is locked into the 
relationship with the supplier. In order to not sacrifice its longer-term business goals, the buy-
er firm would rather “sit through” tensions than give up on the relationship easily (Joshi & 
Arnold, 1997; Provan & Skinner, 1989). This may even include tolerating supplier opportun-
ism (Klein et al., 1978; Wathne & Heide, 2000; Williamson, 1985). As the dependent buyer 
firm is unable to counter supplier misbehavior by threatening the supplier with switching to 
another market partner, it can be expected that the supplier firm will care less about the con-
sequences of opportunistic behavior should it become apparent (Steinle et al., 2014). Hence, 
being aware of the buyer firm’s vulnerable situation could motivate the supplier firm to ex-
ploit the buyer firm’s dependence opportunistically. Even the buyer firm demonstrating reac-
tant behavioral intentions would not change that situation as buyer reactant behavior is even 
more likely to be reciprocated by the opportunism of the supplier firm. Thus, we can expect 
buyer dependence to spur supplier opportunism. 
In their empirical study of supermarket retailers and their suppliers, Morgan et al. (2007) as-
sumed that retailer dependence would positively influence supplier opportunism. Their find-
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ings, however, convey a different message as the authors found the constructs to be unrelated. 
Steinle et al. (2014) came to the same conclusion in their study of buyer-supplier relation-
ships: buyer dependence showed hardly any influence on supplier opportunism.  
Though empirical studies could not find any relationship between buyer dependence and sup-
plier opportunism, we follow our line of argument and posit, in line with the logic of transac-
tion cost theory, the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3b. The higher the buyer’s dependence on the supplier, the higher the R&D sup-
plier’s opportunism. 
 
4.2.5 Information asymmetries and their influence on supplier opportunism 
While the aforementioned transaction cost-related variables have recurrently been the subject 
of empirical research on opportunism in exchange relationships, only few studies have applied 
a classic principal-agent-perspective on opportunism (Hawkins et al., 2008; Steinle et al., 
2014). This seems quite surprising given its potential explanatory power (Steinle et al., 2014) 
and the suitability of principal-agent theory for exploring buyer-supplier relationships (Ar-
nold, Neubauer, & Schoenherr, 2012). Information asymmetries are at the heart of the princi-
pal-agent theory. They occur in situations in which critical information is distributed unequal-
ly among the partners of a transaction. 
Information asymmetries are both drivers and consequences of the division of labor (Yang & 
Ng, 1993) and thus, a firm constituent of outsourcing relationships (McCarthy, Silvestre, & 
Kietzmann, 2013). It is the R&D buyer that engages a R&D supplier in order to benefit from 
its resources and capabilities. As the R&D supplier is an expert in its field, information 
asymmetries exist from the outset of the relationship and may further increase throughout the 
project as the supplier becomes more and more familiar with the R&D task.  
While information asymmetries may not be problematical per se, it is the principal-agent the-
ory’s underlying assumption that because of differing preferences and objectives among buyer 
and supplier, the supplier firm may strive to exploit the information advantage opportunisti-
cally: “If both parties to the relationship are utility maximizers, there is a good reason to be-
lieve that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal.” (Jensen & Meck-
ling, 1976: 308). 
As already mentioned, our study does not concentrate on hidden characteristics and adverse 
selection but on moral hazard, one of the prominent constructs of opportunism research in 
exchange relationships (Stump & Heide, 1996; Wathne & Heide, 2000). Moral hazard results 
from the information asymmetries of hidden action (the unobservability of partner behavior) 
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and hidden information (the inability to assess partner behavior due to a lack of expert 
knowledge) that allow the supplier firm to shirk after contracting (Arrow, 1985; Furubotn & 
Richter, 2000) without the buyer firm noticing. In R&D supply relationships, the buyer firm 
cannot observe the supplier’s efforts during the process of knowledge generation. Even ex-
post, the buyer firm cannot fully assess the quality of the supplier’s intermediate or final 
knowledge output. It does not know if the output is the result of the supplier’s efforts or 
whether it is due to exogenous factors (Kloyer, 2011; Steinle et al., 2014).  
Empirical studies on the relationship between information asymmetries and opportunism are 
comparably scarce and provide differing results. Whereas Katsikeas et al. (2009) came to the 
conclusion that information asymmetries do not necessarily lead to partner opportunism, stud-
ies by Anderson (1988), Steinle et al. (2014) and Ting et al. (2007) confirmed the opportun-
ism-increasing effect of unequally distributed information among transaction partners. The 
results of Carson et al.’s (2006) study vary depending on the contracting regime applied to 
restrain opportunism. Whereas the relationship between information asymmetries and oppor-
tunism is positive under relational contracting regimes, no such relationship could be con-
firmed under formal contracting regimes.  
Given the relatively limited research interest in information asymmetries as a potential ante-
cedent of partner opportunism, we want to enrich prior work by examining the interrelation-
ship between information asymmetries and supplier opportunism in an R&D supply context. 
Following our theoretical reasoning, we assume that the information asymmetries of hidden 
action and hidden information will provide the supplier firm with ample leeway to maximize 
its own benefits by behaving opportunistically. Therefore, we propose the following hypothe-
sis: 
Hypothesis 4. The higher the information asymmetries in favor of the R&D supplier, the 
higher the R&D supplier’s opportunism. 
 
4.2.6 Supplier opportunism and its influence on supplier success 
A review of the literature on the opportunism phenomenon may inevitably lead to the conclu-
sion that due to its devious nature, opportunism has a detrimental impact on the success of 
cooperative relationships (Hawkins et al., 2008). However, in order to fully understand the 
interaction between opportunism and success, it is necessary to draw a more differentiated 
picture: In an inter-firm cooperation, there are two types of success effects from one-sided 
opportunism. On the one hand, there are the effects on the individual success of the opportun-
istic party (1) and of the party affected by opportunism (2). On the other hand, one-sided op-
Paper 1 40 
portunism has an impact on the success of the cooperation as a whole (3). From a theoretical 
point of view (e.g., Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1988), the effects are undisputa-
ble when only looking at one cooperation episode: For (1) the effect is positive, while for (2) 
and (3) it is negative.  
While several studies have examined and proved the negative impact of opportunism on the 
success of the affected party (2) (e.g., Dahlstrom & Nygaard, 1999; Morgan et al., 2007; 
Skarmeas et al., 2002; White & Lui, 2005) and the cooperation as a whole (3) (e.g., Luo, 
2007; Luo, Liu, & Xue, 2009; Parkhe, 1993; Ting et al., 2007), there is, quite surprisingly, a 
dearth of research on the link between opportunism and the success of the opportunistic party 
(3). This relationship, however, is the most interesting as it is anything but trivial. 
According to theory (Grossman & Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1988), opportunism positively 
affects the opportunistic party’s success as the opportunist can immediately realize material 
benefits by reducing its efforts. This logic may certainly hold true for one-shot anonymous 
interactions; however, cooperative transactions, such as collaboration in R&D, are not usually 
one-shot deals (Rose, 2011). On the contrary, partners of an exchange normally strive for re-
peated interaction and a reputation that attracts future collaboration partners (Hill, 1990; Rose, 
2011).  
In relationships that involve the exchange of credence goods such as R&D results, possessing 
a good reputation is an important measure to increase a supplier’s credibility with its potential 
clients (Ganesan, 1994). “Foul play” not only puts chances of future business with the current 
partner at risk (Carson et al., 2006), but it also sends unpleasant signals to other potential 
business partners (Barney & Hansen, 1994; Hill, 1990). An R&D supplier firm that due to 
opportunism has a record of rather short-lived prior exchange relations and/or that lacks high-
class references in its R&D project portfolio is not an attractive collaboration partner. Buyer 
firms will refuse to do business with the respective supplier as they doubt the supplier’s abili-
ties and/or its cooperative nature (Anderson & Weitz, 1989; Shapiro, 1983). Therefore, when 
looking at more than one cooperation episode, it is not the immediate material success, as 
proposed by Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1988), but the supplier firm’s 
longer-term success that matters; however, this longer-term success will suffer from a supplier 
trying to reap short-term benefits by behaving unethically. 
With our measures reflecting the supplier’s perception of general as well as strategic success, 
we consequently assume supplier opportunism and supplier success to be negatively related. 
This is why we propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5. The higher the supplier’s opportunism, the lower the supplier success. 
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Figure 7 summarizes and visually depicts the relationships investigated in this study. 
Figure 7. Research model 
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4.3 Methods 
4.3.1 Sample description 
We used primary data to test our hypothesized research model. Given that R&D buyer firms 
cannot provide valid information on supplier behavior due to information asymmetries, we 
decided to survey the R&D supplying firms only. We deliberately decided against interview-
ing both parties of the dyad for two reasons. First, given the sensitivity of the subject, we con-
sidered it impossible to motivate suppliers to report on their opportunism if there was even the 
slightest possibility of this information being leaked to their buyer firms. Second, we had pre-
liminary evidence that suppliers were reluctant to reveal their buyer firms for reasons of con-
fidentiality.  
To obtain our data, we surveyed R&D supplying firms from eight European countries (Ger-
many, Switzerland, Austria, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and the Netherlands). The 
firms were selected by tapping into two sources. First, we used the ORBIS database to choose 
a sample of firms belonging either to the industry group “7112 - Engineering activities and 
related technical consultancy” or “721 - Research and experimental development on natural 
sciences and engineering”. We decided on these two groups because we believed them to 
consist to a high percentage of companies that act as R&D suppliers. Second, we used the 
internet to complement our sample population by searching for firms that clearly presented 
themselves as being active in the defined field. Using SoSciSurvey (Leiner, 2013), we created 
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a bilingual (German and English) questionnaire, which, following pre-tests with academic 
experts, was made available to the participants on www.soscisurvey.com. 
In April 2013, we sent invitation e-mails to the selected companies. The invitation e-mail pro-
vided a short description of the study’s purpose and a link to our online survey. We asked the 
project manager of the last completed R&D supply project to answer our questionnaire as we 
believed him or her to be highly familiar with all R&D project-related features. We assumed 
the average response time of our questionnaire to be no longer than 15 to 20 minutes. In order 
to incentivize potential respondents, we offered an overview of our study’s major findings.  
About four weeks after our first mail dispatch, we sent a second mail request. Since our mail-
ing efforts did not result in a sufficient response rate, we opted for follow-up phone calls, fo-
cusing, however, only on German firms. Trained interviewers contacted the companies by 
phone, verified their suitability for the study, and outlined the studies’ purpose. Dialog part-
ners who agreed to participate in our survey were sent yet another invitation e-mail.  
In sum, we received 107 questionnaires, 104 of which could be used for further analyses. 
Given that the survey tapped into one of the most sensitive areas of a company, 104 useable 
questionnaires can be considered satisfactory.  
As portrayed in Table 5, most of the R&D supplying firms were small and medium-sized 
companies, located in Germany, and with a median age of 12 years.  
Table 5. Sample description 
Firm  
location: N = 104 
 Number of 
employees:a N = 104 
 Firm age  
in years: N = 103 (1 missing) 
     Austria 4  1-19 52  2-5 19 
Denmark 2  20-99 34  6-10 28 
Finland 2  100-499 15  11-20 35 
Germany 89  ≥  500 3  > 20 21 
Switzerland 7     
     a For the purpose of conducting unifactorial analyses of variance, we decided to merge the last two groups of firms 
into one group, given the insufficient number of R&D suppliers employing 500 or more people. 
 
Unifactorial analyses of variance and Kruskal Wallis tests revealed no significant differences 
between the groups of “firm age” and “number of employees” concerning our model’s de-
pendent and independent variables.  
  
Paper 1 43 
4.3.2 Construct measurement 
All variables were measured reflectively. Where possible, we adapted existing scales, and 
where needed, we developed new measures based on sound analyses of the literature. Our 
measures were refined by a pre-test with academic experts. The final items employed in our 
study are summarized in Table 6. All items were measured on seven-point-Likert scales rang-
ing from “agree not at all” (1) to “agree completely” (7). If necessary, the direction of re-
sponses was reversed prior to analysis (see, for example, supplier opportunism). 
 
4.3.2.1  Dependent variables 
The dependent variables in our study are opportunism of the R&D supplier and the supplier’s 
success. Opportunism was measured by four items that were adapted from earlier studies on 
opportunism in exchange relationships (Brown et al., 2000; Grzeskowiak & Al-Khatib, 2009; 
Heide, Wathne, & Rokkan, 2007; John, 1984). To measure the success of the supplier firm, 
we employed a five-item measurement drawing on items from Jap (1999), Kumar, Scheer, 
and Steenkamp (1995) and Saxton (1997). 
 
4.3.2.2  Independent variables 
In our study, we considered the influence of six independent variables. Besides measuring the 
external, environment-related uncertainty, we enriched the concept of uncertainty in R&D 
supply relations by adding an internal, process-related dimension. Each uncertainty variable 
was measured using two newly developed items. The items of external uncertainty reflect the 
R&D supplier’s uncertainness concerning the market development and the competitors, 
whereas the items of internal uncertainty express the R&D supplier firm’s uncertainness con-
cerning its capabilities to solve the specific R&D task. To measure specific investments, we 
used two items that are similar to those used by Carson et al. (2006). Buyer and supplier de-
pendence were each measured by four items adopted from previous studies (e.g., Jap & Gane-
san, 2000; Morgan et al., 2007). The construct “information asymmetries” was measured by 
two newly developed items reflecting the hidden action and hidden information problem. 
 
4.3.2.3  Control variables 
In empirical studies, the insertion of control variables allows us to account for possible con-
founding factors. What has become common practice in research has to be viewed critically 
from a methodological stance. Control variables are often included in studies without justifi-
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cation; however, as their blind insertion may lead to false conclusions, the use of control vari-
ables should always be driven by either theory and/or empirical evidence (see, for example, 
Becker, 2005; Spector & Brannick, 2011 on this issue). 
In our specific case, we decided to include the variable project importance as a control varia-
ble because of its potential negative effect on supplier opportunism. To measure the construct, 
we asked the supplier firms to assess the relative importance of the focal R&D supply project 
within the company’s project portfolio on a scale ranging from (1) “not important at all” to (7) 
“very important”. 
Following transaction cost theory, the higher the chances or costs of detection, the less likely 
opportunism will occur. With an increasing project importance, the costs of behaving unethi-
cally increase too. Hence, a supply project that is considered to be of high value for the sup-
plier firm should function as an incentive to not behave unethically throughout the relation-
ship. 
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Table 6. Measurements of the variables 
Variable  
(abbreviation) 
Item 
 (abbrev.) 
Items 
External  
uncertainty 
(EUN) 
EUN01_01 
 
 
EUN01_02 
: When the contract was concluded, we could not foresee whether there would 
be a market for a final product / final products that would be based on our 
R&D results. 
: When the contract was concluded, we could not foresee which competing 
R&D suppliers would become active on the same R&D field. 
Internal  
uncertainty 
(IUN) 
IUN01_01 
 
IUN01_02 
: When the contract was concluded, we could not foresee whether we would be 
able to overcome the technological problems connected with our R&D task. 
: When the contract was concluded, we could not foresee whether our R&D 
capabilities would be sufficient. 
Specific  
investments 
(SI) 
SI01_01 
 
 
SI01_02 
: In the beginning of this concrete supply relationship, we had to make material 
and immaterial investments in order to cope with the specific requirements of 
this contract. 
: In the beginning of this concrete supply relationship, we had to make some 
investments that could not be used for other contracts without adaptation. 
Supplier  
dependence 
(SD) 
SD01_01 
 
 
SD01_02 
 
SD01_03 
SD01_04 
: When the contract was concluded, we had no other possibility than to collabo-
rate with our partner to gain access to the resource(s) that was (were) crucial 
to us. 
: When the contract was concluded, it would have been difficult for us to re-
place our partner. 
: When the contract was concluded, we were quite dependent on our partner. 
: When the contract was concluded, we did not have a good alternative to our 
partner. 
Buyer  
dependence 
(BD) 
BD01_01 
 
 
BD01_02 
 
BD01_03 
BD01_04 
: When the contract was concluded, our partner had no other possibility than to 
collaborate with us to gain access to the resource(s) that was (were) crucial to 
her/him 
: When the contract was concluded, it would have been difficult for our partner 
to replace us. 
: When the contract was concluded, our partner was quite dependent on us. 
: When the contract was concluded, our partner did not have a good alternative 
to us. 
Information 
asymmetries 
(IA) 
IA01_01 
IA01_02 
: The buyer was objectively not capable of observing our work. 
: The buyer was objectively not capable of attributing interim and final results 
to our work. 
Supplier  
opportunism 
(OP) 
OP01_01 
OP01_02 
 
OP01_03 
OP01_04 
: We provided our buyer with a completely truthful picture of our activities.b 
: Sometimes we had to withhold information from the buyer in order to protect 
our interests. 
: Sometimes we had to alter the facts slightly in order to get what we needed. 
: Sometimes we had to act in a way that did not correspond exactly to the con-
tractual agreements. 
Supplier success 
(SS) 
SS01_01 
SS01_02 
SS01_03 
 
SS01_04 
SS01_05 
: The collaboration with this buyer has been a successful one. 
: The collaboration with this buyer has realized the goals we set out to achieve. 
: The collaboration with this buyer enabled us to compete more effectively in 
the marketplace. 
: The collaboration with this buyer strengthened our core competences. 
: Overall, we are very satisfied with the performance of the collaboration with 
this buyer. 
b  The direction of the responses was reversed prior to analysis. 
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4.3.3 Analyses 
For data analysis, we applied partial least squares (PLS) using SmartPLS 2.0 software. PLS is 
a variance-based method that primarily aims to maximize the endogenous variables’ ex-
plained variance using an ordinary least square regression-based estimation procedure. While 
still in its infancy (Wong, 2013), studies by Hair, Sarstedt, Ringle, and Mena (2012) and 
Henseler, Ringle, and Sinkovics (2009) have shown that the PLS approach has been used in-
creasingly in marketing and business research in recent times. Due to its less restrictive nature 
concerning distribution, sample size, and measurement scales, it is often referred to as a “soft 
modeling approach” (Vinzi, Trinchera, & Amato, 2010: 48). Given the explorative nature of 
our research, our newly developed measures, and the small sample size, we consider the use 
of PLS as appropriate for our purposes. 
To systematically evaluate PLS results, several criteria need to be applied. Following com-
mon practice, the measurement (or outer) models are assessed first. Reflective measurement 
models are described using three indices: internal consistency, convergent validity, and dis-
criminant validity. Internal consistency is measured using the constructs’ composite reliabil-
ity, where values of 0.60 to 0.70 are considered acceptable (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988; Nunnally & 
Bernstein, 1994). Convergent validity is established on the indicator level when the factor 
loadings, given their significance, exceed the value of 0.70 (Carmines & Zeller, 1979) and on 
the construct level when the average variance extracted (AVE) is above 0.50 (Fornell & 
Larcker, 1981). To exclude discriminant validity problems, the square root of a construct’s 
AVE should be higher than its highest correlation with any other construct in the model (For-
nell-Larcker criterion).  
In order to evaluate the structural (or inner) model, which reflects the relationships between 
the constructs, it is necessary to first check for multicollinearity issues concerning the predic-
tor variables. This can be done by calculating variance inflation factors (VIF) on the construct 
level, using SPSS-software. VIF-values smaller than five indicate no problems with multicol-
linearity (Hair, Hult, Ringle, & Sarstedt, 2014). The most prominent measure to assess the 
inner model is the percentage of variance explained (R2), which reflects the model’s predic-
tive accuracy. Researchers should also examine Stone-Geisser’s Q²-values, whereat positive 
Q²-values indicate that the exogenous constructs have predictive relevance for the endogenous 
constructs of concern. The hypotheses are tested by examining the magnitude and significance 
of the structural path coefficients (Hair et al., 2014). 
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4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Common method bias 
As already outlined above, we did not see any possibility for surveying both parties of the 
dyad. Relying on self-report data collected from a single source, however, represents a poten-
tial for common method bias. In order to reduce the potential of common method bias ex-ante, 
we followed Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Lee, and Podsakoff’s (2003) recommendations. First, we 
structured our questionnaire in a way that led to no conclusion on the assumed relations be-
tween the variables. We asked questions on the outcome variables first, followed by questions 
on the input variables and firm demographics. Second, we guaranteed our participants that all 
provided information would be used in anonymous form and only for research purposes. 
Third, we asked them to answer our questions honestly and to the best of their knowledge, 
emphasizing that there are no right or wrong answers. In addition, we performed statistical 
analyses ex-post in order to assess the severity of a possible bias. Conducting Harman’s sin-
gle-factor test on the model’s variables led to an extraction of several factors, with the largest 
factor explaining less than 30% of the variance. Hence, we draw the conclusion that signifi-
cant common method bias is unlikely to be present in our data.  
 
4.4.2 Assessment of the measurement (outer) models 
Using SPSS, we conducted principal component analyses with Varimax rotation on each set 
of indicators to test for unidimensionality of the constructs. Unidimensionality means that 
each set of indicators must have only one construct in common. Achieving unidimensionality 
is a necessary condition in reflective measurement models as the indicators are understood as 
the variables’ consequences and, thus, are considered interchangeable (Anderson & Gerbing, 
1988). With loadings well above the threshold of 0.5, each set of indicators loaded on its cor-
responding factor, hence confirming the constructs’ unidimensionality.  
To further assess our measurement models, we used SmartPLS software (Ringle, Wende, & 
Will, 2005). Table 7 contains the outcomes of our outer model estimations using SmartPLS.  
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Table 7. PLS results of the reflective measurement models 
Latent variable Indicators Outer loadings 
T- 
statistics 
Composite 
reliability AVE 
Discriminant 
validity 
       External uncertainty EUN01_01 0.98 2.82 0.82 0.71 Yes EUN01_02 0.68 1.76 
       Internal uncertainty IUN01_01 0.80 4.23 0.88 0.79 Yes IUN01_02 0.97 5.97 
       Specific investments SI01_01 0.89 18.87 0.87 0.78 Yes SI01_02 0.87 12.27 
       Supplier dependence SD01_01 0.92 3.78 
0.92 0.75 Yes SD01_02 0.88 3.65 SD01_03 0.86 3.34 
SD01_04 0.79 2.93 
       Buyer dependence BD01_01 0.88 9.91 
0.94 0.79 Yes BD01_02 0.91 10.37 BD01_03 0.94 10.91 
BD01_04 0.83 8.76 
       Information  
asymmetries 
IA01_01 0.88 16.53 0.92 0.85 Yes IA01_02 0.96 70.60 
       Supplier opportunism OP01_01c 0.70 8.42 
0.82 0.53 Yes OP01_02 0.75 10.59 OP01_03 0.80 15.60 
OP01_04 0.65 6.41 
       Supplier success SS01_01 0.94 13.27 
0.92 0.70 Yes 
SS01_02 0.93 13.32 
SS01_03 0.69 4.24 
SS01_04 0.65 4.04 
SS01_05 0.92 12.82 
       c  The direction of the responses was reversed prior to analysis 
 
As can be seen from the results, all constructs show composite reliability-values of above 0.7, 
which allows us to conclude that our measures are internally consistent. For the AVE-values, 
each latent construct accounts for at least 50 % of the variance in the items. The indicator 
loadings are above or close to the demanded 0.70, and their t-values indicate that they are 
significant at a 0.05 level at least, except for EUN01_02. Despite missing the five percent 
significance level, we decided to retain the indicator for several reasons. First, the external 
uncertainty construct scores high on the other quality criteria such as composite reliability or 
AVE. Second, with the “No Sign Change”-option, we used the most conservative bootstrap-
ping option known to result in lower t-values. When switching to the “Individual Sign 
Change”- or “Construct Level Change”-option, the indicator’s loading becomes significant at 
a five percent level. Lastly, deleting the indicator would not alter our structural model results.  
We tested the constructs’ discriminant validity by comparing the square root of each con-
struct’s AVE with the construct’s highest correlation with any other construct in the model. 
We could not find any indication of discriminant invalidity for our constructs. Overall, our 
measurement models can be considered reliable and valid. 
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4.4.3 Assessment of the structural (inner) model 
To rule out doubts of multicollinearity among the predictor variables, we calculated VIF-
values in SPSS using the latent variable correlations provided by SmartPLS. All VIF-values 
fall below the critical value of five. Thus, multicollinearity is not a concern in our study. 
Table 8 presents the results of our inner model estimation, comprising the endogenous varia-
bles’ R²- and Q²-values and the path relationships with their corresponding t-values. 
Table 8. PLS results of the structural model 
   Without control 
path 
With control path 
project im-
portance 
Predicted variable  Predictor variable Hypothesis Path T-
valued 
Path T-valued 
Hypothesized paths       
Supplier opportunism External uncertainty H1a - 0.27 2.17 - 0.28 2.16 
 Internal uncertainty H1b 0.27 2.56 0.27 2.62 
 Specific investments H2 0.25 2.67 0.25 2.66 
 Supplier dependence H3a 0.12 1.28 0.13 1.32 
 Buyer dependence H3b 0.16 2.02 0.16 2.08 
 Information asymmetries H4 0.37 5.13 0.37 5.09 
Supplier success Supplier opportunism H5 - 0.35 4.12 - 0.35 4.13 
       
Control path       
Supplier opportunism Project importance    - 0.04 0.45 
       
Variance explained       
Supplier opportunism   R² = 0.386 R² = 0.387 
Supplier success   R² = 0.125 R² = 0.125 
     
Predictive relevance     
Supplier opportunism   Q² = 0.199 Q² = 0.210 
Supplier success   Q² = 0.067 Q² = 0.067 
     d  T-values greater than 1.96 are significant at p < 0.05, those greater than 2.57 are significant at p < 0.01. 
 
For Hypothesis 1a, the assumed positive relationship between external uncertainty and suppli-
er opportunism cannot be supported. Contrary to our expectations, external uncertainty has a 
significant negative effect on supplier opportunism (β = - 0.27; p < 0.05). In line with our ex-
pectations, Hypothesis 1b is supported, indicating a positive impact of internal uncertainty on 
supplier opportunism (β = 0.27; p < 0.05). The negative relationship between specific invest-
ments made by the supplier and supplier opportunism, as stated in Hypothesis 2, cannot be 
confirmed. Instead we find that specific investments have a significant positive effect on sup-
plier opportunism (β = 0.25; p < 0.01). With regard to the impact of supplier dependence on 
supplier opportunism, we have to reject Hypothesis 3a. The path coefficient fails to be signifi-
cant (β = 0.12; n.s.). In line with our expectations, we find support for Hypothesis 3b, indicat-
ing a positive effect of buyer dependence on supplier opportunism (β = 0.16; p < 0.05). Hy-
pothesis 4 is supported as well; as assumed, we find a positive effect of information asymme-
tries on supplier opportunism (β = 0.37; p < 0.01). The assumed negative link between suppli-
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er opportunism and supplier success, as stated in Hypothesis 5, can also be supported (β = - 
0.35; p < 0.01). With regard to our control variable relative project importance, our findings 
indicate no significant relationships with supplier opportunism (β = - 0.04; n.s.). 
Four of our six variables turn out to be opportunism drivers, with information asymmetries 
having the greatest and buyer dependence having the lowest impact. Surprisingly, external 
uncertainty has an opportunism-reducing effect, while there is no evidence on the role of sup-
plier dependence. 
The overall model explains 38.6% percent of the variance in supplier opportunism and 12.5% 
in supplier success. It is not appropriate to assess the constructs’ R² by drawing on cut-off 
values presented in the academic literature. The recommended values were often no more 
than estimation results of one specific exemplary model and, thus, never initially intended for 
use as general quality guidelines (see, e.g., Chin, 1998: 323). Furthermore, defining accepta-
ble R²-values is difficult in so far as this largely depends on the model complexity, the re-
search discipline (Hair et al., 2014), and the total number of possible factors influencing the 
dependent variable. Hence, a more complex reality needs to be more strongly simplified in 
order to be reproduced in a model. This simplification of reality, however, goes hand in hand 
with a loss of information content and, thus, smaller R²-values. Given the complex and multi-
faceted nature of the opportunism phenomenon, we regard the achieved R² as respectable. The 
same applies to the R² of supplier success when bearing in mind that there are most certainly 
more factors than opportunism that explain its variance. 
Since the Q²-values for opportunism (Q² = 0.199) and for supplier success (Q² = 0.067) are 
larger than 0, we can attest that our model has predictive relevance. Entering our control vari-
able, project importance, into the model does not lead to a significant increase of the R²- or 
Q²-value of supplier opportunism.  
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4.5 Discussion, managerial implications and limitations 
4.5.1 Discussion of the research findings 
Moral hazard is, without doubt, a highly relevant danger that manufacturers of final products 
have to consider if they want to benefit from the knowledge of external R&D suppliers. Our 
interest in investigating the drivers of supplier opportunism accrued from the fact that prior 
empirical work has produced conflicting findings or did not adequately examine some of the 
potential drivers (e.g., information asymmetries and uncertainty). To date, there has not been 
a study that considers all potential opportunism antecedents simultaneously. Based on an ex-
tensive review of the literature and prior empirical work, we built a comprehensive theoretical 
model and tested it empirically in an R&D-supply context.  
Our findings reveal that supplier opportunism is, in fact, driven by several factors. Surprising-
ly, external uncertainty is not one of them. As our findings indicate, higher external uncer-
tainty leads to lower supplier opportunism. At a first glance, this result is counterintuitive, but 
there may be good reasons why a supplier refrains from opportunism when faced with exter-
nal uncertainty. First, in an uncertain surrounding, the supplier has to perform well in order to 
stand out. Without outstanding supplier performance, creating a final product that achieves 
market acceptance and generates positive returns is very unlikely. Hence, refraining from op-
portunism increases the possibility of creating a superior technological outcome that can be 
translated into a successful product. Second, creating a superior outcome may enable the sup-
plier to actually define a dominant design, which, third, might help to build up a reputation 
that makes the supplier firm less replaceable by competitive suppliers, securing thereby future 
income.  
In contrast to external uncertainty, our findings reveal that internal uncertainty seems to drive 
supplier opportunism. Obviously the more uncertain the R&D-process, the harder it is for the 
buyer firms or third parties to effectively control supplier behavior. This in turn leaves ample 
leeway for supplier opportunism to flourish without the unethical behavior being detected. 
Moreover, not even the supplier knows whether his competences will be sufficient to over-
come technological hurdles. Hence, for a supplier that doubts his own abilities, cooperation is 
not an attractive option, as the corresponding long-term benefits are quite uncertain compared 
to the short-term gains from opportunism.  
We believe that these opposing findings concerning the two uncertainty dimensions are highly 
interesting. As prior empirical work has focused primarily on the external, environment-
related dimension, we enriched the concept of uncertainty by adding an internal process-
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related facet. Our findings support our assumption of uncertainty having more than one face 
in determining opportunism in R&D supply relationships.  
With regard to information asymmetries, we were able to confirm their opportunism-driving 
force. The higher the R&D supplier firm’s information advantages, the higher supplier oppor-
tunism. Problems of hidden action and hidden information prevent the buyer firm from ob-
serving or assessing the R&D supplier’s work. Hence, the chances for supplier misbehavior to 
remain undetected are high, which, consequently, increases the benefits from cheating and 
turns supplier opportunism into a profitable option. This finding is consistent with principal-
agent theory, which proposes that information asymmetries are a main source of opportunism 
problems in economic exchange. 
From the theoretical point of view, the perhaps most surprising result is that the more specifi-
cally a supplier firm has invested, the higher its opportunism is. One of the main propositions 
of transaction cost theory is that a partner that transfers hostages ought to refrain from oppor-
tunism in order to not lose the hostage. Therefore, a supplier firm that has transferred hostages 
in the form of its buyer-specific investments would have good reason to not jeopardize the 
continuation of the relationship through opportunism. Relationship termination would lead to 
all, or at least a great deal, of the specific investments being sunk costs. To our surprise, the 
results point in the opposite direction. We explain this finding by drawing on two different 
aspects: the anticipation of hold-up and reactance theory. When a supplier firm has invested 
specifically, the buyer firm gains leeway for hold-up. However, supplier firms that anticipate 
the buyers’ hold-up intentions have a reason to behave opportunistically by expending less 
effort. Furthermore, from a reactance theory point of view, the supplier firms being locked 
into their relationships could automatically have caused a reinforcing spiral of opportunism. 
This accrues from the fact that a supplier whose freedom of action is constrained may be en-
couraged to restore this freedom of action by performing counterintuitive behavior such as 
opportunism. Both anticipation of hold-up and reactance theory seem to be plausible explana-
tions for our finding.  
With regard to the effect of supplier dependence on supplier opportunism, we found no evi-
dence that a dependent supplier is less opportunistic. Hence, we cannot draw any conclusion 
on the role of supplier dependence in explaining supplier opportunism, but the failed verifica-
tion of the hypothesis is in line with the findings on supplier specific investments.  
In line with our assumptions, we found a positive significant effect of buyer dependence on 
supplier opportunism. As it is either too costly or even impossible for the buyer firm to 
change R&D supplier, the supplier firm can rest assured that the buyer firm will rather endure 
tensions than give up on the relationship easily, which means that the buyer firm is also pre-
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pared to absorb the costs of supplier opportunism. Being sure about the buyer firm “not going 
anywhere” seems to automatically open doors to R&D supplier misbehavior. 
With regard to the relationship between supplier opportunism and supplier success, we were 
able to confirm that opportunism lowers the supplier firm’s success. While, according to 
Frank (1988), the human brain has evolved to prefer near-term rewards of opportunism to 
long-term benefits of cooperation, supplier firms seem to be wiser in hindsight and realize 
that unethical behavior does not pay off in the long run.  
 
4.5.2 Managerial implications 
Our findings offer crucial guidance for managers of both buyer and supplier firms. First and 
most importantly, managers need to sharpen their awareness of the potential for opportunism 
in R&D supply relationships and the factors that promote such unethical behavior. Only 
knowing the dangers may enable them to anticipate unethical forms of behavior and take pre-
ventative actions. 
Buyer firms, however, do not need to worry about the external uncertainty surrounding an 
R&D project as it is seen as a challenge by supplier firms that spurs their motivation to per-
form well. Things look different when considering the internal uncertainty dimension of an 
R&D project. Apart from recommendations such as selecting a competent partner firm with 
outstanding records in the required field, it is hardly possible to diminish a project’s internal 
uncertainty, especially if the project taps into novel grounds.  
As one-sided dependencies have the potential to provoke opportunism, they are—though 
hardly avoidable—not a desirable state in the long run. Managers of the corresponding firms 
should, therefore, dedicate their efforts to balancing out disparities. Transaction cost theory 
provides several instruments to change a one-sided dependency into a mutual one; however, 
these instruments have to correspond to the specific problem of the unavoidable incomplete-
ness of contracts in R&D collaboration. Hence, contract fines that a buyer firm would have to 
pay in the case of hold-up cannot be determined ex ante with sufficient precision. In contrast 
to this, it is feasible for a buyer to make supplier-specific counter-investments such as HR 
development measures that enable its R&D personnel to deepen the collaboration with their 
colleagues on the supplier side. The opportunism-driving effect of buyer-specific investments 
made by the supplier could also be buffered, for example, by agreeing on an extension of the 
cooperative relationship in the future, which would allow the supplier to recoup its invest-
ments. Such an announcement, however, has to be credible, i.e., the supplier firm has to have 
reason to believe that there is a rational need for employing it again. Another instrument 
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would be the status of an exclusive supplier as this binds the buyer firm to the specific supply 
relationship and equalizes the supplier firm’s loss of control when investing specifically. On 
the other hand, managers of the supplier firm should recognize that they are prone to oppor-
tunism when having invested specifically and when dealing with dependent buyer firms. 
Bearing in mind that by shirking they may put the relationship and, thus, the firm’s long-term 
goals at risk, managers of the supplier firm should take a long-term perspective and engage in 
self-monitoring and control (Crosno et al., 2013).  
While information asymmetries are a natural side effect of outsourcing relationships, they 
can, however, exacerbate the opportunism-problem and curtail relationship effectiveness. As 
monitoring faces several difficulties in R&D supply relationships (Kloyer & Scholderer, 
2012), it may not be a reliable tool for overcoming information asymmetries. Besides calling 
for supplier firms to take a long-term perspective and engage in self-control, harmonizing 
both parties’ interests can diminish concerns of moral hazard by sharing in the innovation 
return. Patent ownership shares assigned to the supplier firm are highly effective in this regard 
(Kloyer & Scholderer, 2012). 
 
4.5.3 Limitations and directions for future research 
Even though we believe we have tested a sound theoretical model with a reliable and valid 
survey instrument, every study, including this one, leaves room for improvement. In the fol-
lowing, we enumerate some shortcomings and unanswered questions that could be addressed 
in future research endeavors.  
First of all, our data concerns the supplier’s point of view only. Hence, future studies could 
question the buyer firms as well. Interviewing both sides of the dyad, however, may bring 
severe practical problems, as outlined in our section on sample description. It is, therefore, 
questionable whether attempts to survey supplier and buyer firms would provide further in-
sights at all. Even if supplier firms demonstrate a credible willingness to reveal their buyers, 
researchers are advised to always carefully consider whether “going the extra mile” is not 
outweighed by the losses in data quality on the side of the supplier firm. Second, the surpris-
ing effect of external uncertainty on opportunism definitely deserves more empirical attention. 
Further research could, for example, examine more closely the circumstances under which 
uncertainty develops its differing effects on opportunism. Lastly, most of our respondents are 
German suppliers. Future endeavors could stretch beyond national borders and test if our find-
ings are generalizable to foreign settings.  
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5. Paper 2: R&D collaboration between firms: Hard and soft antecedents 
of supplier knowledge sharing 
Paper 2 
5.1 Introduction 
In order to remain competitive and master the increasing technological complexity of new 
products, such as their compatibility to industry 4.0 requirements, manufacturing firms are 
increasingly tapping into external sources of knowledge by integrating R&D supplying firms 
into the innovation process (Gassmann et al. 2010; Un et al., 2010).  
Even though R&D outsourcing is a popular phenomenon (Arora and Gambardella, 2010; Cal-
antone and Stanko, 2007; Gans and Stern, 2003), it has to be viewed as a double-edged sword. 
Using the “market” for the generation of valuable knowledge inputs certainly allows for spe-
cialization benefits, but—alongside other drawbacks such as leading to internal knowledge 
gaps, dependencies, etc.—it renders the outsourcing party vulnerable to moral hazard caused 
by its R&D supplier (Sampson, 2007).  
Information asymmetries and uncertainty provide the supplier firm with ample leeway to pur-
sue own interests at the buyer firm’s expense (Arrow, 1985; Furubotn and Richter, 2000). In 
R&D outsourcing relationships, this can include the deliberate extension of the project dura-
tion, the withholding of relevant knowledge, the selling of knowledge to third parties, or using 
it for own competitive activities (Howells et al., 2008; Kloyer, 2011; Kloyer and Scholderer, 
2012; Oxley, 1997). Hence, among other things, it is the amount of knowledge shared with 
the buyer firm that indicates how opportunistically a supplier firm behaved throughout the 
cooperation process, with lower levels of knowledge sharing indicating higher levels of sup-
plier opportunism.  
Particularly if knowledge is implicit or complex, there is no guarantee of successful 
knowledge transfer (Sampson, 2007). Deliberately withholding efforts and thus providing an 
inferior knowledge output may help the supplier firm to increase own benefits, but at the same 
time, it calls into question the collaboration’s effectiveness. If not forced by particular circum-
stances, buyer firms would refrain from engaging in outsourcing if there was no way to keep 
the moral hazard danger caused by the R&D suppliers in check (Kloyer and Scholderer, 
2012). Hence, the central question is: how can supplier misbehavior be effectively controlled 
for and, consequently, knowledge sharing be stimulated? 
The so-called “governance mechanisms” play a pivotal role in answering this question. They 
represent means that help establish and coordinate exchange relationships (Heide, 1994) by 
lowering the incentives to behave opportunistically (Jap and Anderson, 2003). Although the 
academic literature on exchange theory presents numerous mechanisms that deter partner 
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misbehavior (for an overview, see, for example, Brown et al., 2000; Cavusgil et al., 2004; 
Helm and Kloyer, 2004; Jap and Anderson, 2003; Vázquez et al., 2007; Wathne and Heide, 
2000), there is no consensus on their effectiveness (Achrol and Gundlach, 1999; Caniëls and 
Gelderman, 2010). Furthermore, most studies consider primarily extrinsic determinants of the 
opportunism motivation whereas little is known about the role non-extrinsic mechanisms play 
in this context (Kloyer, 2011; Kloyer and Scholderer, 2012). Our study will simultaneously 
investigate major extrinsic and non-extrinsic factors that presumably influence the willingness 
of R&D suppliers to refrain from opportunistic withholding of knowledge. These factors are 
of paramount importance from the Organization Theory perspective as well as in light of the 
results of our qualitative research. Some potential determinants will be examined for the first 
time.  
Extrinsic motivation to refrain from opportunism is based on economic calculation. In the 
following, factors affecting extrinsic motivation will be labelled “hard” in contrast to the 
“soft” factors that influence the non-extrinsic motivation to transfer knowledge. Economic 
calculation in supply relations results mainly from three determinants. First, specific invest-
ments made in the past (during prior collaboration) lead to lower transaction costs, which ra-
tional partners ought to preserve. Second, a supplier who expects a future collaboration with 
the same buyer has no rational reason to weaken that buyer through opportunism. Third, de-
tection of opportunism by monitoring would lead to direct economic disadvantage. The non-
extrinsic, i.e., soft, factors that we presume will have an influence on the willingness to ab-
stain from knowledge withholding are organizational culture, intrinsic motivation, and trust. 
The effects of the supplier firm’s culture and the supplier’s intrinsic motivation have not been 
empirically examined to date. 
Besides our major attempt to examine and contrast the hard and soft determinants of supplier 
knowledge sharing, we also want to shed light on the question of how supplier knowledge 
sharing, i.e., refraining from opportunism, affects the supplier’s success. This is, to the best of 
our knowledge, new insofar as previous studies have majorly examined the success effects of 
the party affected by opportunism and of the cooperation as a whole, while little is known 
about the success effects for the alleged opportunist. 
We conducted an empirical study based on an examination of 104 R&D supplier firms. The 
findings indicate that prior collaboration, organizational culture, and supplier intrinsic motiva-
tion actually drive supplier knowledge sharing whereas behavior monitoring, the collaboration 
perspective, and trust in the buyer firm surprisingly do not explain supplier knowledge shar-
ing. Finally, we found that supplier knowledge sharing has a positive impact on the supplier 
firm’s success.  
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Our article is organized as follows. In Section 5.2.1, we present theoretical background on the 
opportunism phenomenon and its nexus with knowledge sharing. Sections 5.2.2, 5.2.3, and 
5.2.4 are dedicated to deriving our hypotheses by drawing on existent literature. We present 
our empirical study in Section 5.3, while the study’s results are outlined in Section 5.4. We 
conclude with a discussion of the key research findings, the managerial implications, and the 
study’s limitations in Section 5.5.  
 
5.2 Theory and hypotheses 
5.2.1 Supplier opportunism and knowledge sharing in R&D collaboration 
Despite the prevalence of the outsourcing phenomenon, cooperating with external partners 
always opens doors to relational risks such as partner opportunism (Caniёls and Gelderman, 
2010, Das, 2004; Das and Rahman, 2001). While certainly not all economic actors are mean-
spirited, it is almost impossible to distinguish between those that are and those that are not 
(Williamson, 1985; Williamson and Ouchi, 1981). Hence, partner misbehavior remains a seri-
ous threat in exchange relationships. 
With its roots in transaction cost theory, opportunism is understood as “self-interest seeking 
with guile” (Williamson, 1975, p. 26). However, it is not the self-interest seeking itself, but 
the combination with dishonest behavior such as “incomplete or distorted disclosure of infor-
mation, and calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate or otherwise confuse” 
(Williamson, 1985, p. 47) that renders the opportunism phenomenon its unethical and devious 
touch. As opportunism can occur before or after contract conclusion (Williamson, 1985) it is 
called either ex-ante or ex-post opportunism, depending on when it occurred. While either 
party in an R&D exchange relationship can engage in opportunistic behavior (Jap and Ander-
son, 2003), our study focuses primarily on a form of ex-post opportunism on the part of the 
supplier firm called moral hazard.  
Supplier moral hazard is a form of passive opportunism that describes how a supplier pro-
vides the buyer firm with lower levels of quality or output than was contracted for (Wathne 
and Heide, 2000). By withholding efforts intentionally and delivering an inferior knowledge 
output, the supplier firm strives to maximize its benefits, but at the cost of the buyer firm. As 
behaving opportunistically is associated with withholding knowledge from the buyer, lower 
levels of knowledge sharing with the buyer firm indicate higher levels of supplier opportun-
ism. 
Two circumstances provide latitude for the R&D supplier to behave unethically. First, due to 
information asymmetries (Furubotn and Richter, 2000), the buyer can neither observe supplier 
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behavior during the generation of innovative ideas (hidden action) nor does the buyer firm 
have the necessary information to fully assess the supplied intermediate and/or final 
knowledge output (hidden information). Second, due to some degree of uncertainty, supplier 
duties cannot be specified in all detail, which leads to inevitably incomplete R&D contracts 
(Aghion and Tirole, 1994; Klein, 1980; Liebeskind, 1996). 
But why do R&D supplier firms engage in opportunism in the first place? Suppliers may de-
cide to hold back efforts simply because they believe it will pay off handsomely (Kloyer, 
2011; Kloyer and Scholderer, 2012). Besides reaping potential profits, supplier firms may 
behave unethically because they fear being exploited opportunistically by their buyers through 
hold-up (Klein et al., 1978). 
The nature of R&D collaboration definitely calls for possibilities to keep R&D supplier mis-
behavior in check. The different streams of organization theory provide several so-called 
“governance mechanisms” that allow firms to protect their outcomes and interests against 
partner opportunism (Jap and Anderson, 2003). Governance mechanisms are means that help 
establish and coordinate exchange relationships (Heide, 1994) by lowering the incentives to 
behave opportunistically (Jap and Anderson, 2003). Generally, we have to differentiate the 
following main mechanisms: (1) behavior monitoring (typically connected with extrinsic in-
centives); (2) non-extrinsic mechanisms such as intrinsic motivation and organizational cul-
ture; (3) incentives resulting from specific investments (shadow of the past), socio-emotional 
investments (relational contracting), and material investments; and (4) incentives that are 
based on the perspective of a future collaboration with the same partner (shadow of the fu-
ture). The following sections are dedicated to deriving our model’s hypotheses. 
 
5.2.2 Hard determinants of supplier knowledge sharing 
5.2.2.1  Behavior monitoring and its influence on knowledge sharing 
Monitoring is an organizational process that describes the attempt by one party to measure the 
other party’s effort (Heide et al., 2007). According to agency and transaction cost theory, 
monitoring serves as an effective mechanism to reduce partner opportunism in inter-firm ex-
change relationships (Bergen et al., 1992; Wathne and Heide, 2000). It is targeted at overcom-
ing the information imbalances that are usually present in exchange relationships (Eisenhardt, 
1989). This, however, implies that monitoring will not be effective if the source of opportun-
ism is anything other than information-related (Wathne and Heide, 2000).  
The opportunism-decreasing potential of monitoring can be viewed from two perspectives. 
From an economic perspective, monitoring the partner’s actions or outcomes increases the 
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chances of a defecting partner being caught and ultimately sanctioned for defective behavior 
(Wathne and Heide, 2000). By increasing the chances and costs of being caught, opportunism 
becomes less attractive. Hence, it seems plausible to assume that opportunism can be curtailed 
effectively by increasing investments in monitoring (Heide and Miner, 1992; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Wathne and Heide, 2000). 
Alongside this purely economic perspective, the behavioral perspective argues that monitor-
ing may reduce opportunism and enhance compliance with norms and agreements by apply-
ing unpleasant social pressure on the party concerned (Blau and Scott, 1962; Murry and 
Heide, 1998; Stump and Heide, 1996). Steinle et al. (2014) took this stance in their empirical 
investigation of buyer-supplier-relationships and indeed found that if more monitoring mech-
anisms were in place, the moral hazard caused by the supplier was lower.  
However, there is also empirical evidence that monitoring may have effects on opportunism 
that are contrary to what is predicted by agency and transaction cost theory (Anderson, 1988; 
Heide et al., 2007). Instead of suppressing opportunism, monitoring could actually motivate 
actors to behave even more unethically. The underlying rationale draws on reactance theory: 
curtailing a person’s freedom of action or opinion through monitoring “moves a person to try 
to restore his freedom” (Brehm, 1972, p. 1). Activities tailored to restoring that freedom in-
clude retaliatory, self-serving behavior like opportunism (Joshi and Arnold, 1997). 
Heide et al. (2007) believe the key to reconciling the opposing views on monitoring is to con-
sider whether it is the partner’s actions (behavior monitoring) or the visible consequences of 
the partner’s actions (output monitoring) that are monitored. Whereas the latter is viewed as a 
more “lean back” form of control, the first risks being viewed as intrusive. In contrast to out-
put monitoring, behavior monitoring threatens the partner’s freedom to decide which and how 
things are done, leading to higher levels of reactance and, thus, a crowding out of cooperative 
behavior. The authors were able to confirm this reasoning empirically. While output monitor-
ing helped to reduce the opportunism of the partner firm, monitoring of partner behavior led 
to an increase in partner opportunism (Heide et al., 2007). 
Anderson (1988) originally assumed a sales manager’s behavior monitoring to reduce the 
sales force’s opportunism. The findings revealed, however, that both variables are insignifi-
cantly related. Morgan et al. (2007), on the other hand, found that supplier opportunism was 
less likely to occur with increasing retailer ability to monitor supplier behavior. 
These differing findings call for additional insights into this issue. We follow this call by ex-
amining how buyer monitoring of supplier behavior has an impact on R&D supplier oppor-
tunism and hence the supplier firm’s knowledge sharing. In line with agency and transaction 
cost theory, we basically presume that monitoring—regardless of type—will help to over-
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come the problem of ex-post information asymmetries and hence reduce the likelihood of 
opportunism. However, for monitoring to unfold its opportunism-decreasing power, three 
conditions are necessary: 
• First, there needs to be clarity in defining opportunistic behavior, given the generally 
fine line between serving self-interests and serving self-interests “with guile” (Wil-
liamson, 1975). This, furthermore, implies the selection of monitoring criteria that are 
relevant and tailored to actually detect non-compliance with norms and agreements 
(Anderson and Oliver, 1987).  
• Second, there should be a certain degree up to which monitoring is accepted and con-
sidered appropriate by both parties of the dyad (Wathne and Heide, 2000). Otherwise, 
any monitoring could evoke reactant behavior on the part of the monitored partner 
firm. 
• Third and most important, the partner firm’s behavior needs to be observable and/or 
the firm’s outputs need to be measureable (Kloyer, 2011; Kloyer and Scholderer, 
2012). 
Although the third condition is not typically fulfilled in R&D collaboration—in intransparent 
research even less so than in development—many buyer firms try to reduce supplier oppor-
tunism with instruments of monitoring. Therefore, we state the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. Monitoring of supplier behavior by the buyer firm has a positive impact on 
supplier knowledge sharing. 
 
5.2.2.2  Collaboration perspective and its influence on supplier knowledge sharing 
The time horizon of an exchange relationship is also called the “shadow of the future” (SOF) 
(Das and Rahman, 2010). This term metaphorically expresses the nexus between current 
moves and future consequences (Parkhe, 1993). The SOF is a game theory concept (Axelrod, 
1984) that illustrates the idea that actors would behave differently if they expected to interact 
with each other in the future. Thus, research suggests that the SOF plays a major role in curb-
ing partner opportunism in exchange relationships (e.g., Artz, 1999; Axelrod, 1984; Heide 
and Miner, 1992).  
By comparing the immediate gains from behaving unethically with the potential loss of future 
benefits, exchange partners that expect to deal with each other repeatedly over time evaluate 
carefully whether engaging in opportunism is a fruitful option. Opportunism is only attractive 
if the short-term benefits from cheating surpass the expected long-term benefits from contin-
ued exchange (Nagin et al., 2002; Telser, 1980). 
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However, continued cooperation brings about many benefits, leading to an increase in the 
relationship’s future value. First, ongoing cooperation enhances the chances of fully amortiz-
ing relation-specific investments made by the parties (Das, 2006). Second, by setting up 
common routines and installing common interfaces (Deeds and Hill, 1999; Hoang and 
Rothaermel, 2005), the partners will be able to transact with each other more cost-efficiently 
(Dyer and Singh, 1998) in the future. Third, prolonged cooperation allows the partners to bal-
ance out temporary iniquities amongst them over time (Das and Rahman, 2010). By engaging 
in unethical behavior, however, these long-term benefits would be put at risk as the betrayed 
party could decide to terminate the current relationship immediately and/or to refuse to do 
future business with the opportunistic partner (Carson et al., 2006). 
But how can prospects of prolongation now drive supplier knowledge sharing? First of all, 
prospects of prolonged cooperation can be viewed as a credible signal that the buyer firm has 
a long-term interest in the exchange relationship. Such an interest implies the forgoing of in-
dividual interests in favor of mutual benefits (Anderson and Weitz, 1992). Hence, the danger 
of the supplier being exploited opportunistically by the buyer firm through hold-up can be 
considered rather low, which in turn should equally motivate the supplier to “play by the 
rules” and share the necessary knowledge. The fact that the SOF actually reduces the expro-
priation risk inherent in specific investments could be supported partially (only for the inves-
tor but not the receiver sample) by Rokkan et al. (2003). Second, as prolonged cooperation 
allows the partners to punish and be punished for misbehavior (Blumberg, 2001; Heide and 
Miner, 1992), expectations of reciprocity should discipline the supplier firm to not engage in 
unethical behavior (Parkhe, 1993) but rather to share the relevant knowledge. Third, the threat 
of lost future benefits should be incentive enough for the supplier firm to refrain from oppor-
tunism, thus driving supplier knowledge sharing.  
Several authors examined the relationship between the SOF and opportunism only indirectly 
by assuming that relationship extendedness will reduce the likelihood of opportunism and 
thus result in cooperative partner behavior and/or better cooperation performance. Drawing on 
this assumption, Artz (1999) and Parkhe (1993) found that the SOF led to better performance, 
whereas Heide and Miner (1992) confirmed that the SOF positively influences cooperative 
behavior.  
Given our line of arguments and prior empirical research, we assume that the SOF will effec-
tively curtail supplier opportunism and thus have a positive impact on supplier knowledge 
sharing. Hence, we put forth the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 2. The collaboration perspective positively influences supplier knowledge shar-
ing. 
 
5.2.2.3  Prior collaboration and its influence on supplier knowledge sharing 
Due to the so-called “shadow of the past” (SOP), the probability of opportunism is believed to 
be lower in already-established relationships than in new relationships. The SOP is a figura-
tive term describing how prior exchange episodes have an impact upon how partners will in-
teract in the present and the future (Deeds and Hill, 1999; Jap et al., 2013; Parkhe, 1993). It is 
assumed that having a shared history motivates the collaborating parties to forego individual 
interests in favor of joint outcomes (Jap et al., 2013; Squire et al., 2009; Uzzi, 1997).  
The underlying rationale is simple: both firms have made material and socio-emotional rela-
tion-specific investments in the past that behaving opportunistically in the present would put 
at risk (Deeds and Hill, 1999; Luo, 2002a). To be more precise, relation-specific investments 
have led to the development of relation-specific skills, working routines, and practices. These 
skills, routines, and practices encompass knowledge about the structure and operation of the 
partner firm (Deeds and Hill, 1999; Luo 2002a), the refinement of partner-specific interfaces 
as well as conflict resolution (Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005), and communication strategies 
that enable the supplier to transact with the buyer firm more efficiently (Deeds and Hill, 1999; 
Kotabe et al., 2003; Luo, 2002a; Zollo et al., 2002). By establishing a relationship with the 
buyer that is characterized by commonly shared norms, mutual understanding and, at best, 
trust (Blau, 1964; Gulati, 1995 & 1998; Parkhe, 1993; Richards and Yang, 2007), misunder-
standings and misinterpretations are less likely to occur (Zollo et al., 2002), enabling 
knowledge to be shared among the partner firms without friction and thus at lower costs. The 
cost-advantages resulting from prior relation-specific investments may lead to a competitive 
advantage on both sides of the dyad that neither party would want to put at risk by behaving 
opportunistically. Furthermore, relational concerns and the desire to maintain loyalty across 
organizational borders increase the “moral costs” of defection, thereby rendering opportunism 
less attractive (Granovetter, 1985; Jap et al., 2013). 
The opportunism-decreasing effect of prior collaboration could be confirmed empirically by 
Luo (2007) and Parkhe (1993). Deeds and Hill (1999) found instead an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between the age of the relationship and perceived opportunism, “…with oppor-
tunism rising when the alliance is young and then reaching a peak and declining after some 
initial honeymoon period” (Deeds and Hill, 1999, p. 148). 
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Given our lines of argument and previous empirical findings, we assume that prior collabora-
tion motivates the supplier to refrain from opportunism and share the relevant knowledge, 
which leads us to put forth the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3. Prior collaboration between buyer and supplier has a positive effect on suppli-
er knowledge sharing. 
 
5.2.3 Soft determinants of supplier knowledge sharing 
5.2.3.1  Supplier trust in the buyer firm and its influence on supplier knowledge sharing 
The phenomenon of trust has been widely studied across the organizational and social scienc-
es (Ebert, 2009; MacDuffie, 2011). In economic exchange, trust is considered to be a key suc-
cess factor as it lessens concerns about opportunistic behavior and reduces partner conflicts 
and the necessity of formal contracting (Boersma et al., 2003; Krishnan et al., 2006; Robson 
et al., 2008; Zaheer et al., 1998). Furthermore, trust is said to foster communication, commit-
ment (Cullen et al., 2000; Mohr, 2004), and organizational learning (Lane et al., 2001). How-
ever, despite the attention paid to the trust phenomenon, the question of how to define it re-
mains (Das and Teng, 2001).  
Originally considered as an interpersonal phenomenon by social scientists (e.g., Deutsch, 
1958; Rotter, 1967), management scholars have pointed to the considerable role inter-
organizational trust may play in economic exchange (Gulati, 1995 & 1998; Sako and Helper, 
1998; Zaheer et al., 1998). In contrast to interpersonal trust, where a single member of the 
partner organization is the object of trust, it is the partner organization as a whole that is fo-
cused on when it comes to inter-organizational trust (Laaksonen et al., 2008; Zaheer et al., 
1998). As inter-organizational trust is immune to employee turnover and hence more stable 
than interpersonal trust, we concentrate our examination on the latter form of trust (Sako and 
Helper, 1998).  
In the literature, trust has been viewed from two different angles. Whereas some consider trust 
to be a belief or a positive expectation (Blau, 1964; Pruitt, 1981; Rotter, 1967), others view 
trust as behavior or behavioral intention (Coleman, 1990; Deutsch, 1962; Giffin, 1967; 
Schlenker et al.,1973; Zand, 1972). Moorman et al. (1992) tried to bridge this gap by combin-
ing the approaches and suggesting that for trust to be present, it needs to consist of both, the 
belief and the behavioral intention component. Morgan and Hunt (1994) counter that trust-
worthiness already implicitly incorporates the intention to act and that the intention itself 
should not be viewed as part of the trust definition but rather as an outcome of trust. Given 
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that we are interested in how the tendency to trust leads to supplier knowledge sharing, we 
follow Morgan and Hunt (1994) and separate trust from associated behaviors. Hence, we con-
ceptualize supplier trust in our study as an attitude, i.e., as the belief or positive expectation of 
the supplier firm concerning the buyer firm’s trustworthiness.  
A buyer firm’s trustworthiness can be grounded on the evaluation of different dimensions. 
Here we adopt the dimensions used by authors such as Cummings and Bromiley (1996), 
Doney and Cannon (1997) as well as Kumar et al. (1995): honesty and benevolence. While 
trusting in a buyer’s honesty encompasses the belief that the buyer is sincere and stands by its 
word, trusting in a buyer’s benevolence reflects the supplier’s belief that the buyer is interest-
ed in the supplier’s welfare and would not do anything that could possibly harm the supplier 
firm, even under changing circumstances (see Kumar at el., 1995).  
Trust is considered a critical element of cooperative relationships (Laaksonen et al., 2008; 
Luo, 2002b). By creating an understanding that the partner firms are interested in each other’s 
welfare and would not act at each other’s expense, trust eases concerns about opportunistic 
behavior (Zaheer et al., 1998). This in turn lowers the proclivity to guard against partner mis-
behavior, resulting in transaction cost savings and hence more efficient governance (Bromiley 
and Cummings, 1995, John, 1984, Zaheer et al., 1998). Moreover, by establishing a level of 
behavioral predictability and reliability (Chen et al., 2012), higher levels of trust induce posi-
tive attitudes toward the partner firm and, thus, better cooperation (Dirks and Ferrin, 2001).  
Several studies have come to the conclusion that trust is, indeed, effective in reducing partner 
opportunism (Cavusgil et al., 2004; Liu et al., 2009; Wu et al., 2007). In the same vein, Char-
ki and Josserand (2008) confirmed that a loss in trust augurs higher levels of defective partner 
behavior. Furthermore, by curtailing the perception of unfair play and fostering the formation 
of close relationships (Hajidimitriou et al., 2012), trust facilitates knowledge sharing (Chen et 
al., 2012; Chen et al., 2014; Cheng et al., 2008). 
Given the above reasoning, believing in a buyer’s honesty and good intentions should lessen 
the supplier’s concerns about being exploited opportunistically by the buyer firm through 
hold-up. This in turn lowers the supplier firm’s incentive to behave opportunistically itself by 
holding back relevant knowledge. Instead, trust in the buyer firm should increase the supplier 
firm’s impetus to knowledge sharing. Therefore, we put forth the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4. The supplier’s trust in the buyer has a positive effect on supplier knowledge 
sharing. 
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5.2.3.2  Supplier intrinsic motivation and its influence on supplier knowledge sharing 
Intrinsic motivation has been firmly established in the behavioral sciences since the 1950s 
(Argyris, 1964; Herzberg et al., 1959; Likert, 1961; Maslow, 1954; McGregor, 1960). Eco-
nomic theories, though, acknowledge the existence of intrinsic motivators but pay no further 
attention to them as they are considered difficult to analyze and control (e.g. Williamson, 
1975 & 1985). However, by focusing primarily on extrinsic motivation as a means to influ-
ence behavior, economic theories fail to offer explanations for why individuals contribute 
voluntarily, even without extrinsic incentives. Voluntary contributions are indeed results of 
intrinsic motivation (Simon, 1991).  
Motivation is intrinsic if an individual engages in an activity for inherent satisfaction (Ryan 
and Deci, 2000a). Unlike extrinsic motivation, motivation that is intrinsic is not tied to mone-
tary incentives. It is either the activity’s flow (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975; Ryan and Deci, 2000a) 
or a corresponding end-goal (Loewenstein, 1999) that are the source of satisfaction. In our 
specific case, we concentrate on the activity’s flow, i.e., the enjoying and challenging experi-
ences the R&D project provides the supplier firm with. 
The organizational importance of intrinsic motivation arises from its core advantages. First, 
intrinsic motivation positively influences the quality of work, resulting in more creative and 
innovative outcomes (Amabile, 1996, Ryan and Deci, 2000a; Schwartz, 1990). This should be 
particularly relevant for R&D supply projects. Instead of following the tried and trusted, R&D 
projects often require creative thinking, breaking new ground, and dealing with backlashes, 
Second, intrinsic motivation helps to balance out problems associated with incomplete con-
tracts. As incomplete contracts, by definition, do not specify all relevant aspects of behavior 
and its desired outcomes, they may give rise to dysfunctional behavior. Intrinsic motivation 
helps to fill contractual gaps and align behavior towards issues that are not contractually spec-
ified (Gibbons, 1998; Prendergast, 1999). Third, the transfer of implicit knowledge can hardly 
be stimulated by extrinsic incentives and thus depends to a great extent on the intrinsic moti-
vation of the people involved (Ko et al., 2005; Lin, 2007). 
Individuals who are motivated intrinsically are, by nature, not only attracted to extrinsic in-
centives. Given that opportunism is considered a strong form of extrinsic motivation, the ten-
dency to behave opportunistically and hold back knowledge should decrease the more intrin-
sically motivated individuals are. This means that an intrinsically motivated supplier firm en-
joys and values working on a specific R&D project for its own sake. The supplier derives 
immediate satisfaction from the task itself and should have no interest in behaving unethically 
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by withholding relevant knowledge. Instead, his intrinsic motivation should foster knowledge 
sharing with the buyer firm. As a consequence, our hypothesis is: 
Hypothesis 5. The supplier’s intrinsic motivation has a positive effect on supplier 
knowledge sharing.  
 
5.2.3.3  Organizational culture and its influence on knowledge sharing 
Given its potential for driving superior performance and generating competitive advantage 
(Barney, 1986; Schein, 1985), the concept of organizational culture has recurrently been the 
subject of empirical studies during the past few decades. In the literature on cooperation, spe-
cial attention was paid to the question of whether and how the cultural similarity of the allying 
firms influences cooperation performance (e.g., Avny and Anderson, 2008; Fey and Beamish, 
2001; Pothukuchi et al., 2002). In this study, we focus, however, solely on the supplier firm’s 
culture and analyze its impact on supplier knowledge sharing. 
Casually described by Deal and Kennedy (1982, p. 4) as “the way we do things around here,” 
organizational culture is a rather complex concept. This complexity is underlined by the varie-
ty of existing definitions (Barney, 1986). Among researchers, however, a minimum consensus 
has emerged that organizational culture can be referred to as a set of shared assumptions, val-
ues, and norms that are manifested in practices, behaviors, and artifacts (Hofstede, 1980; 
Trice and Beyer, 1993).  
Within an organization, culture performs several functions, such as defining the organization-
al boundary (Peters and Waterman, 1982; Pfeffer, 1981; Schein, 1992), conveying organiza-
tional members a sense of identity (Pfeffer, 1981), and fostering the generation of commit-
ment (Peters and Waterman, 1982; Pfeffer, 1981). Often referred to as “social glue” (Cart-
wright and Cooper, 1993; Robbins, 2001), culture creates organizational cohesiveness and, 
most importantly, directs and shapes organizational members’ attitudes and behaviors by 
providing appropriate rules and standards of conduct (Pfeffer, 1981).  
In research, it is the concept of values that is commonly used to understand and assess corpo-
rate culture (Hofstede, 1980; O’Reilly et al., 1991). This may be due to the fact that shared 
values are considered to be “…among the building blocks of culture” (Hofstede, 1980, p. 21). 
Values represent relatively stable, collectively held standards of what is right or wrong, ac-
ceptable or inacceptable (Andersen et al., 2014; Singh, 2009). That means values offer a set of 
general guidelines that regulate and unify the behavior of organizational members (Dobni et 
al., 2000; Morgan and Hunt, 1994; Soyer et al., 2007). At the heart of the organizational cul-
ture, values determine how firms conduct their business (Barney, 1986) and how organiza-
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tional members interact with each other and with key players outside the organization (Louis, 
1983).  
Against this background, it is reasonable to assume that a supplier firm characterized by a 
“healthy,” cooperative organizational culture should refrain from any opportunistic behavior. 
Sound values such as fairness, collaboration, and support reinforce “correct” thinking and 
guide behavior when interacting with R&D buying firms. Not sharing the relevant knowledge 
would be contrary to the collectively held values. As a consequence, R&D supplier firms act-
ing on sound organizational principles should be motivated to share the relevant knowledge.  
Even if opportunities for opportunism arise, supplier firms would not take advantage of them 
because “engaging in opportunistic behavior imposes psychic disutility, is punished by social 
sanction or is perceived to be inconsistent with their long-term best interest” (Ellig, 2001, p. 
235). Hence, we propose the following: 
Hypothesis 6. Cooperativeness as a feature of the organizational culture of the supplier firm 
has a positive effect on supplier knowledge sharing. 
 
5.2.4 Supplier knowledge sharing and its influence on supplier success 
In R&D supply relations, a supplier firm’s opportunism is majorly reflected in the amount of 
knowledge shared with the respective buyer. Consequently, higher levels of supplier 
knowledge sharing indicate lower levels of supplier opportunism. In order to understand the 
relationship between knowledge sharing and success, the literature on the opportunism phe-
nomenon must be reviewed, which, however, inevitably creates the impression that unethical 
behavior is “bad” in any case (Hawkins et al., 2008). But is the relationship between oppor-
tunism, i.e., withholding knowledge, and success that straightforward?  
To answer this question, it is necessary to clarify what type of success one is referring to: (1) 
the success of the opportunistic party, (2) the success of the party affected by opportunism, or 
(3) the success of the cooperation as a whole. From a theoretical stance (e.g., Grossman and 
Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1988), the success effects of one-sided opportunism are clear 
when only looking at one cooperation episode. For (1), the effect is positive, as the opportun-
ist can immediately reap material benefits by reducing its efforts; for (2) and (3), the effect is 
negative, as the other party has invested in a cooperation that ultimately does not perform as it 
would have in the case of bilateral specific investments. 
Several empirical studies confirmed the negative influence of one-sided opportunism on the 
success of the affected party (2) (e.g., Dahlstrom and Nygaard, 1999; Morgan et al., 2007; 
Skarmeas et al, 2002; White and Lui, 2005) and the cooperation as a whole (3) (Luo, 2007; 
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Luo et al., 2009; Parkhe, 1993; Ting et al., 2007). What is missing, however, is empirical re-
search on the link between opportunism and the success of the opportunistic party (1). This is 
surprising as this relationship is anything but trivial. 
In the models of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1988), opportunism proves 
to be a beneficial strategy as inter-firm relationships are considered to be one-shot deals. 
However, the majority of real world cooperative transactions are not that short-lived (Rose, 
2011). On the contrary, partners of an exchange usually aim at building and maintaining long-
lasting partnerships and a reputation that attracts future business partners (Hill, 1990; Rose, 
2011). Consequently, it is not necessarily the short-term material success but the exchange 
partner’s longer-term success that matters. This long-term success, however, is at risk if they 
have a reputation as a cheater (Barney and Hansen, 1994; Carson et al., 2006; Hill, 1990; 
Pruitt, 1981). Prospective clients will most likely distance themselves from supplier firms 
when doubting their abilities and/or cooperative nature (Anderson and Weitz, 1989; Shapiro, 
1983). 
Thus, sharing the relevant knowledge and putting in the necessary effort to complete a given 
R&D task does not only improve the buyer’s chances of creating a marketable product, it 
simultaneously benefits the supplier firm in terms of maintaining a flawless reputation that 
stimulates future business. Having a good reputation is an important measure to increase a 
supplier’s credibility with its potential clients (Ganesan, 1994), especially when exchanging 
credence goods, such as R&D results. 
Therefore, in the long run, supplier firms are better off not behaving opportunistically and 
sharing the relevant knowledge with their buyers. Given that our measures reflect the suppli-
er’s perception of success that is more strategic in nature, we assume supplier knowledge 
sharing to positively affect the supplier’s success. Hence, we state the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 7. The better the supplier knowledge sharing, the higher the supplier success. 
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The research model displayed in Figure 8 visualizes our seven hypotheses. 
Figure 8. Research model 
Behavior
monitoring
Trust
Intrinsic
motivation
Organizational
culture
Supplier
knowledge
sharing
Supplier
success
H1
H2
H3
H4
H7
Collaboration
perspective
H5
Prior 
collaboration
H6
Hard factors
Soft factors
 
5.3 Methodology  
5.3.1 Sample description 
As R&D buying firms are victims of hidden action and hidden information, they are not relia-
ble sources when assessing supplier knowledge sharing. Hence, we decided to obtain our data 
by surveying the R&D supplying firms instead. It is of course desirable to question the R&D 
buyer firms as well in order to gain additional insights into the topic; however, as with intra-
firm R&D, R&D supply relationships are kept confidential. Our preliminary interviews 
showed that R&D supplier firms are overly reluctant to reveal their corresponding buyers. 
Furthermore, there is always the danger of a loss in data quality on the side of the suppliers 
when questioning both parties in the exchange relationship. Supplier firms that fear their in-
formation will be leaked to their buyers may be tempted to provide untrue information. 
Against this background, we decided to only question the supplying firms. 
We surveyed R&D supplying firms from eight European countries (Germany, Switzerland, 
Austria, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and the Netherlands). The firm’s contacts were 
obtained using the ORBIS database and additional web searches. With ORBIS, we considered 
the industry groups “7112 - Engineering activities and related technical consultancy” and 
“721 - Research and experimental development on natural sciences and engineering” most 
Paper 2 70 
suitable to draw a sample from, as they are likely to consist to a high percentage of R&D sup-
plying firms. Our bilingual (German and English) questionnaire was created with SoSciSur-
vey (Leiner, 2013), pretested with academic experts, and following refinements, made availa-
ble to the participants on www.soscisurvey.com.  
In April 2013, the selected companies received an e-mail that provided a short description of 
the study’s purpose and a link to our online survey. We asked that our questions be answered 
by the companies’ project manager who was in charge of the last, completed R&D supply 
project. We believe that project managers have the best insights into the R&D process and are 
highly familiar with the contractual, situational, and contextual features surrounding an R&D 
project. We assumed the average response time of our questionnaire to be no longer than 15 to 
20 minutes. In order to incentivize potential respondents, we offered an overview of our 
study’s major findings.  
About four weeks after our first mail dispatch, we sent yet another mail request. We then de-
cided to proceed with follow-up phone calls as our response quote had not been sufficient. 
Trained interviewers called the companies concerned, verified their suitability for the study, 
and asked for their support. Dialog partners who agreed to participate in our survey received 
another e-mail containing a short description and a link to our online-survey. In sum, we re-
ceived 107 questionnaires, of which 104 could be used for further analyses. This can be con-
sidered quite satisfactory given the comparably sensitive information the respondent firms 
had to provide. 
Table 9 shows that the respondent firms have an average age of 12 years. 86 of the 104 firms 
are small or medium-sized companies. Except for four cases, all firms are located in the 
DACH region; however, most of them are in Germany.  
Table 9. Sample description 
Firm loca-
tion: 
 
N = 104 
 Number of 
employees:* 
 
N = 104 
 Firm age in 
years: 
 
N = 103 (1 missing) 
Austria 4  1-19 52  2-5 19 
Denmark 2  20-99 34  6-10 28 
Finland 2  100-499 15  11-20 35 
Germany 89  ≥  500 3  > 20 21 
Switzerland 7       
* For the purpose of conducting unifactorial analyses of variance, we decided to merge the last two groups of firms 
into one group, given the insufficient number of R&D suppliers employing 500 or more people. 
Using unifactorial analyses of variance and non-parametric methods such as Kruskal Wallis, 
we tested for mean differences between the groups. Our findings did not reveal any differ-
ences between the groups of firm age and number of employees concerning our model’s de-
pendent and independent variables. 
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5.3.2 Construct measurement 
Table 10 contains the items we used in our study to operationalize our latent variables.  
Table 10. Measurements of the variables 
Variable  
(abbrev.) 
Item 
(abbrev.) 
Items 
Behavior  
monitoring 
(BM) 
BM01_01 
BM01_02 
BM01_03 
: They buyer tried to observe our work. 
: The buyer tried to measure our efforts. 
: The buyer tried to attribute intermediate and final results to our work. 
Collaboration 
perspective  
(CP) 
CP01_01 
 
CP01_02 
: When the contract was concluded, we had reason to believe that we could get an 
order from the same buyer firm in the near future. 
: When the contract was concluded, we were convinced that it would be possible to 
extend our collaboration with this buyer. 
Prior  
collaboration 
(PC) 
PC01_01 
PC01_02 
 
PC01_03 
: In the past, we have closely collaborated with the same buyer firm. 
: In the past, we have developed a close business relationship with the same buyer 
firm. 
: In the past, we have continuously adapted our collaborational skills and techniques 
(e.g., workflow, communication, process management) to the specific requirements 
of the buyer firm. 
Trust 
(TR) 
TR01_01 
 
TR01_02 
 
TR01_03 
 
TR01_04 
 
TR01_05 
 
TR01_06 
 
TR01_07 
: When the contract was concluded, we were convinced that the buyer firm would 
keep its promises. 
: When the contract was concluded, we were convinced that we could count on the 
buyer to be sincere. 
: When the contract was concluded, we were convinced that the buyer would provide 
us with accurate information. 
: When the contract was concluded, we were convinced that the buyer would consid-
er our concerns in case of changing circumstances. 
: When the contract was concluded, we were convinced that we could depend on the 
buyer's support concerning important matters. 
: When the contract was concluded, we were convinced that the buyer would not 
take advantage of power asymmetries. 
: When the contract was concluded, we were convinced that the buyer would not 
take advantage of one-sided dependencies. 
Intrinsic  
motivation 
(IM) 
IM01_01 
IM01_02 
IM01_03 
IM01_04 
: Working on the R&D task within the collaboration was interesting 
: Working on the R&D task within the collaboration was challenging. 
: Working on the R&D task within the collaboration was satisfying. 
: Working on the R&D task within the collaboration was enjoyable. 
Organizational 
culture 
(OC) 
OC01_01 
OC01_02 
OC01_03 
OC01_04 
OC01_05 
: Our organizational culture is characterized by sharing information freely. 
: Our organizational culture is characterized by fair terms of exchange. 
: Our organizational culture is characterized by being supportive. 
: Our organizational culture is characterized by working in collaboration with others. 
: Our organizational culture is characterized by trust in our collaboration partners. 
Supplier know-
ledge sharing 
(KSS) 
KS01_01 
 
KS01_02 
 
KS01_03 
: Our engineers and sales staff established a close relationship with our partner's 
staff. 
: We shared to full extent the knowledge that was necessary to fulfill our contractual 
obligations. 
: We tried to maximize our customer’s satisfaction by the best possible knowledge 
sharing. 
Supplier suc-
cess 
(SS) 
SS01_01 
SS01_02 
SS01_03 
 
SS01_04 
SS01_05 
: The collaboration with this buyer has been a successful one. 
: The collaboration with this buyer has realized the goals we set out to achieve. 
: The collaboration with this buyer enabled us to compete more effectively in the 
marketplace. 
: The collaboration with this buyer strengthened our core competences. 
: Overall, we are very satisfied with the performance of the collaboration with this 
buyer. 
All our variables represent reflectively-measured constructs. The items were measured on 
seven-point Likert scales ranging from “agree not at all” (1) to “agree completely” (7), except 
for the items of behavior monitoring, which were measured on seven-point Likert scales rang-
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ing from “not at all” (1) to “very intensively” (7).To derive our measurement scales, we main-
ly drew upon prior empirical work. We pre-tested our questionnaire to refine and validate our 
measurement scales. 
 
5.3.2.1  Dependent variables 
The R&D supplier’s knowledge sharing and the success of the cooperation are the dependent 
variables in our study. To measure knowledge sharing, we employed a three-item measure-
ment. The items were adapted from prior studies, such as those conducted by Kotabe et al. 
(2003) and Lawson et al. (2009). Supplier success was measured using five items adopted 
from several studies by, among others, Jap (1999), Kumar et al. (1995) and Saxton (1997). 
 
5.3.2.2  Independent variables 
In our empirical study, we examined the effect of six independent variables on supplier 
knowledge sharing. To measure behavior monitoring, we applied a newly developed three-
item scale, with the items targeted at overcoming the information imbalances of hidden action 
and hidden information. Collaboration perspective was measured by two items similar to 
those used by Carson et al. (2006). We also drew on Carson et al. (2006) to measure prior 
collaboration and employed three similar items. For the latent variable trust, we mainly adopt-
ed the items from Kumar et al. (1995), tapping the two trust-dimensions honesty and benevo-
lence. Even though honesty and benevolence may be theoretically distinct variables, our data 
pointed to the fact that honesty and benevolence are inseparable in practice. Therefore, we 
followed Doney and Cannon (1997) and treated trust as a unidimensional construct. In order 
to measure intrinsic motivation, we employed a four-item-scale based on Mossholder (1980). 
Organizational culture was operationalized using five items derived from O’Reilly et al. 
(1991). 
 
5.3.2.3  Control variables 
In order to account for confounding factors, control variables are usually included in empiri-
cal analyses. Authors such as Becker (2005) or Spector and Brannick (2011), however, advise 
abstaining from including control variables blindly or out of habit. Rather, their inclusion 
should always be driven by either theory or empirical evidence. 
In our study, we decided to control for the potential influence of project importance on sup-
plier knowledge sharing. According to transaction cost theory, supplier opportunism pays off 
if the benefits of such unfaithful behavior surpass the costs of being caught (Williamson, 1975 
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& 1985). Working on a project that is of major importance to the R&D supplier firm arguably 
increases the costs of being detected, which renders supplier opportunism less attractive and 
hence less likely to occur. As a consequence, it can be assumed that project importance posi-
tively influences supplier knowledge sharing. 
We measured project importance by asking the respondents to assess the relative importance 
of the focal R&D project compared to other projects in the company’s project portfolio, rang-
ing from (1) “not important at all” to (7) “very important.”  
 
5.3.3 Analyses 
We applied structural equation modeling (SEM), using SmartPLS 2.0 software to validate our 
measures and test our hypotheses. Partial least squares (PLS) is a variance-based, non-
parametric approach that uses an OSL regression-based estimation procedure to minimize the 
amount of unexplained variance. PLS is most appropriate when the research emphasis is pre-
dictive in nature. Given its minimal demands on data concerning distribution, sample size, 
and measurement scales, it is often referred to as “soft modeling technique.” While still a very 
young approach compared to commonly applied covariance-based techniques, PLS’ populari-
ty has increased over the last years, especially in marketing and business research (Hair et al., 
2012; Henseler et al., 2009). The explorative nature of our study and our small sample size 
support the use of the variance-based PLS approach. 
PLS-SEM results are systematically analyzed, with the measurement (or outer) models evalu-
ated first and the structural (or inner) model afterwards. The measurement models reflect the 
relationships between indicator variables and constructs. As all our constructs are measured 
reflectively, the criteria presented in the following only pertain to the evaluation of reflective 
measurement models. 
Reflective measurement models are assessed using three criteria: internal consistency and 
convergent as well as discriminant validity. For a construct to be internally consistent, the 
construct’s composite reliability should have values of 0.60 to 0.70 (Bagozzi and Yi, 1988; 
Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994). Convergent validity is established on the indicator level when 
the factor loadings, given their significance, exceed the value of 0.70 (Carmines and Zeller, 
1979) and on the construct level when the average variance extracted (AVE) is above 0.50 
(Fornell and Larcker, 1981). To rule out doubts of discriminant invalidity, the square root of a 
construct’s AVE should be higher than its highest correlation with any other construct in the 
model (Fornell-Larcker criterion).  
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With the structural model, which displays the relationships between the constructs, it is neces-
sary to first check whether the predictor variables suffer from issues of collinearity by calcu-
lating variance inflation factors (VIF). VIF-values smaller than five indicate no problems with 
collinearity (Hair et al., 2014). The percentage of variance explained (R²) is the most promi-
nent measure to assess the structural model. Besides R² values, researchers should examine 
Stone-Geisser’s Q² values as well. Positive Q² values indicate that the exogenous constructs 
have predictive relevance for the endogenous constructs of concern. The standardized path 
coefficients and their corresponding t-values provide information on the hypothesized rela-
tionships. Path coefficients can be compared by their magnitude (Hair et al., 2014). 
 
5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Common method bias 
Given the above-mentioned problems associated with questioning both parties of the dyad, we 
collected our data on the dependent and the independent variables from one source only. Stud-
ies such as ours can, however, suffer from common method bias. To reduce the emergence of 
biases, we followed the recommendations of Podsakoff et al. (2003) and applied several ex-
ante measures. First, we structured our questionnaire properly, allowing no conclusion on the 
underlying relations between dependent and independent variables. Questions on the outcome 
variables were asked first, followed by questions on the input variables and firm de-
mographics. Second, we guaranteed participant anonymity and that the information provided 
would be used for research purposes only. Third, we asked that the questions be answered 
honestly and to the best of their knowledge, emphasizing that there are no right or wrong an-
swers. To statistically assess the magnitude of a possible bias ex-post, we performed Har-
man’s single-factor test by simultaneously conducting an unrotated exploratory factor analysis 
on our dependent and independent variables. The test extracted several factors, with the larg-
est factor explaining less than 30% of the variance, indicating no threat of common method 
bias.  
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5.4.2 Assessment of the measurement (outer) model 
Before evaluating the reflective measurement models using SmartPLS (Ringle et al., 2005), 
we applied SPSS and ran separate principal component analyses with Varimax rotation on 
each set of indicators to test for unidimensionality of the constructs. When measuring varia-
bles reflectively, achieving unidimensionality is a necessary condition, (Anderson and Gerb-
ing, 1988). With loadings well above the threshold of 0.5, each set of indicators loaded on its 
corresponding factor, thus confirming the unidimensionality of our constructs.  
To further assess the measurement models, we applied PLS-SEM analysis. Table 11 contains 
the PLS results for the outer models. The composite reliabilities of our measures range from 
0.8399 to 0.9282, suggesting that each scale has excellent reliability. All items have signifi-
cant t-values and, except for TR01_01 and IM01_02, loadings above the recommended value 
of 0.7. Given that TR01_01 and IM01_02 are only slightly below the requested threshold, we 
consider their shortfall of minor importance and our measures as valid on the indicator level. 
As every construct’s AVE exceeds the minimum value of 0.5, convergent validity is support-
ed on the construct level as well. Furthermore, we compared the square root of each con-
struct’s AVE with the construct’s highest correlation with any other construct in the model to 
rule out doubts of discriminant invalidity. We could not find any indication of discriminant 
invalidity regarding our constructs. 
  
Paper 2 76 
Table 11. Results of the reflective measurement model 
Latent variable Indicators Outer loadings T-statistics 
Composite 
reliability AVE 
Discriminant 
validity 
       Behavior monitoring BM01_01 0.827 2.792 
0.8775 0.7049 Yes BM01_02 0.849 2.948 
BM01_03 0.843 2.981 
       Collaboration per-
spective 
CP01_01 0.927 21.756 0.9282 0.8661 Yes CP01_02 0.935 19.306 
       Prior collaboration PC01_01 0.900 22.289 
0.9041 0.7592 Yes  PC01_02 0.912 21.710 
 PC01_03 0.797 13.491 
       Trust TR01_01 0.690 6.668 
0.9201 0.6227 Yes 
TR01_02 0.785 10.833 
TR01_03 0.821 16.508 
TR01_04 0.780 9.674 
TR01_05 0.782 8.875 
TR01_06 0.821 10.703 
TR01_07 0.836 11.560 
       Intrinsic motivation IM01_01 0.835 15.309 
0.8869 0.6643 Yes IM01_02 0.681 6.422 IM01_03 0.885 22.254 
IM01_04 0.845 17.745 
       Organizational  
culture 
OC01_01 0.827 22.050 
0.9169 0.6886 Yes 
OC01_02 0.820 20.803 
OC01_03 0.878 28.064 
OC01_04 0.768 12.470 
OC01_05 0.853 25.234 
       Supplier knowledge 
sharing 
KS01_01 0.739 11.109 
0.8399 0.6370 Yes KS01_02 0.853 22.346 
KS01_03 0.799 17.748 
       Supplier success SS01_01 0.901 22.328 
0.9271 0.7191 Yes 
SS01_02 0.901 23.692 
SS01_03 0.787 9.154 
SS01_04 0.737 7.916 
SS01_05 0.899 20.280 
       
t > 1.65, p < 0.10; t > 1.96, p < 0.05; t > 2.57, p < 0.01 
 
5.4.3 Assessment of the structural (inner) model 
First, the structural model was checked for collinearity problems. This was done by calculat-
ing VIF-values for each predictor variable in SPSS using the latent variable correlations pro-
vided by SmartPLS. Since all VIF-values are well below the critical cut-off of five, collineari-
ty is not considered an issue in our study. 
Table 12 shows the results of our inner model estimation, comprising the endogenous varia-
bles’ R²- and Q²- values, the path relationships, and their corresponding t-values. 
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Table 12. Results of the structural model 
   Without control 
path 
With control path 
project importance 
Predicted variable  Predictor variable Hypothesis Path T-value Path T-value 
Hypothesized paths       
Supplier knowledge sharing Behavior monitoring H1 0.095 1.368 0.101 1.410 
 Collaboration perspective H2 0.094 1.072 0.098 1.095 
 Prior collaboration  H3 0.274 2.984 0.272 2.908 
 Trust H4 0.091 1.272 0.091 1.267 
 Intrinsic motivation H5 0.141 1.924 0.164 2.098 
 Organizational culture H6 0.451 5.762 0.450 5.606 
Supplier success Supplier knowledge sha-
ring 
H7 0.413 3.717 0.413 3.732 
       Control path       
Supplier knowledge sharing Project importance    -0.047 0.607 
       Variance explained       
Supplier knowledge sharing   R² = 0.528 R² = 0.530 
Supplier success   R² = 0.171 R² = 0.171 
     Predictive relevance     
Supplier knowledge sharing   Q² = 0.2986 Q² = 0.3311 
Supplier success   Q² = 0.1210 Q² = 0.1210 
t > 1.65, p < 0.10; t > 1.96, p < 0.05; t > 2.57, p < 0.01 
 
As revealed in Table 12, Hypothesis 1, implying a positive effect of behavior monitoring on 
supplier knowledge sharing, cannot be supported. The path-coefficient is close to zero and not 
significant (β = 0.095; n.s.). Contrary to our expectations, there is also no significant relation-
ship between collaboration perspective and supplier knowledge sharing (β = 0.094; n.s.). 
Hence, Hypothesis 2 has to be rejected as well. Hypothesis 3, indicating a positive impact of 
prior collaboration on supplier knowledge sharing, is supported (β = 0.274; p < 0.01). Suppli-
er trust in the buyer shows no significant impact on supplier knowledge sharing (β = 0.091; 
n.s.). Hence, Hypothesis 4 has to be rejected. As stated in Hypothesis 5, intrinsic motivation 
has a significant positive effect on supplier knowledge sharing (β = 0.141; p < 0.10), which 
leads us to accept Hypothesis 5. The positive relationship between organizational culture and 
supplier knowledge sharing stated in Hypothesis 6 is supported as well (β = 0.451; p < 0.01). 
For the impact of supplier knowledge sharing on supplier success, we found a significant pos-
itive effect (β = 0.413; p < 0.01). Hence, Hypothesis 7 is supported. As to our control variable 
relative project importance, there is no significant relationship with supplier knowledge shar-
ing (β = -0.047; n.s.). 
Altogether, we could confirm four of our seven hypotheses. As can be seen from the standard-
ized path coefficients, organizational culture has the strongest impact on supplier knowledge 
sharing, followed by prior collaboration. Intrinsic motivation, on the contrary, has the smallest 
effect on supplier knowledge sharing. 
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The overall model explains 52.8 percent of the variance in supplier knowledge sharing and 
17.1 percent in supplier success. These R2-values can be considered satisfactory given the 
complexity of the knowledge sharing phenomenon and the multifaceted nature of the supplier 
success.  
The Stone-Geisser’s Q² values are with 0.2986 for supplier knowledge sharing and 0.1210 for 
supplier success larger than 0, which confirms the models’ overall predictive relevance. An 
inclusion of our control variable in the model does neither lead to a significant increase in the 
R²- nor Q²-coefficients of supplier knowledge sharing or supplier success. 
 
5.5 Discussion and conclusion 
5.5.1 Discussion of the key research findings 
In our study, we examined which factors determine supplier knowledge sharing. Knowledge, 
as the exchange good in R&D supply collaboration, is often not shared properly with the buy-
er firm due to opportunistic behavior of the supplier. Hence, the amount of knowledge shared 
with the buyer can be taken as a proxy of how opportunistically a supplier behaved through-
out the cooperation process, with lower levels of knowledge sharing indicating higher levels 
of supplier opportunism.  
Given its devious nature and its assumed detrimental impact on performance (Dahlstrom and 
Nygaard, 1999; Luo et al., 2009; Parkhe, 1993; White and Lui, 2005; Williamson, 1985), it 
appears inevitably necessary to reduce the potential of opportunistic behavior in collaborative 
relationships and boost the knowledge sharing efforts of the supplier through the use of gov-
ernance mechanisms.  
We extended earlier work on governance mechanisms by focusing on “soft” determinants 
that, except for trust, have not been considered so far. These “soft” determinants were com-
plemented and contrasted by several “hard” factors that are considered crucial by organization 
theory and experts from management practice. Our results are nothing short of remarkable as 
they reveal the strong impact “soft” factors have and, thus, emphasize the need for theory and 
practice to embrace such non-extrinsic determinants more tightly in the future. Figure 9 sum-
marizes our study’s findings. 
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Figure 9. The influence of hard and soft factors on supplier knowledge sharing 
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As can be seen from Figure 9, it is the supplier firm’s organizational culture that has the 
strongest influence on supplier knowledge sharing. By promoting and reinforcing “right” 
thinking and adequate behavior, a firm’s shared mental assumptions shape organizational 
members’ attitudes and decision-making. Once transmitted through the organization and 
acknowledged by all organizational members, values function as guiding principles that result 
in collective behaviors. Hence, a supplier firm that is characterized by strong values such as 
cooperation, fairness, and support will act correspondingly when interacting with third parties, 
e.g., by sharing the necessary knowledge. This should hold especially true for people working 
in the supplier company for a longer time as they have already internalized the company’s 
values. 
No less important for supplier knowledge sharing seems to be another soft factor: the supplier 
firm’s intrinsic motivation. In line with our reasoning, our results indicate that higher intrinsic 
motivation leads to higher supplier knowledge sharing. Individuals who are intrinsically mo-
tivated derive satisfaction from fulfilling the task itself and are, thus, automatically immune to 
external stimuli that result from the opportunistic withholding of knowledge. Knowledge is 
created by individuals and largely stored in their heads (Beazley et al. 2002; Wah 1999). 
Hence, for knowledge to be shared it requires the peoples’ willingness to share. According to 
our results, this willingness to share seems to play an important role even beyond organiza-
tional borders, thus turning intrinsic motivation into an inter-organizational phenomenon.  
What really surprised us is the fact that supplier trust does not seem to be as important to 
knowledge sharing as stated in prior work, given the insignificant effect in our study. Bakker 
et al. (2006), who examined the role of trust in new product development teams, consider the 
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effect of trust on knowledge sharing as highly overrated. Given our result, we have to careful-
ly review the role trust plays in R&D supply contexts. Like Bakker et al. (2006), we assume 
that trust may be a condition for but not a driver of knowledge sharing. While the absence of 
trust may hamper supplier knowledge sharing, its presence has only limited effects. Speaking 
in terms of Herzberg et al. (1959), trust does not seem to be a motivator but rather a hygiene 
factor.  
When it comes to the hard factors, which are depicted on the left side of Figure 9, only prior 
collaboration seems to drive supplier knowledge sharing. Mutual material and socio-
emotional investments of the buyer and the supplier firm allow the partners to share 
knowledge more efficiently and thus, to transact with each other at lower costs. More efficient 
knowledge sharing may in turn lead to competitive advantages that the supplier firm would 
put at risk by behaving unethically. This motivates the supplier to satisfy and strengthen the 
buyer firm by sharing the relevant knowledge. The positive effect of prior collaboration may, 
however, only prevail if the employees at both organizations remain more or less the same. 
When major employees leave the organizations, so do the established bonds and routines.  
Neither behavior monitoring nor the collaboration perspective show a significant positive 
influence on supplier knowledge sharing. Regarding the latter, it can be assumed that effective 
knowledge sharing requires more than the willingness to strengthen the current and future 
buyer. Apparently, it is the common knowledge sharing practice in prior collaboration epi-
sodes that is decisive. Behavior monitoring, on the other hand, is confronted with two major 
problems. Firstly, monitoring across organizational borders needs to overcome issues of phys-
ical distance. Secondly, and most importantly, the R&D process is characterized by opacity, 
which hampers the observation of supplier behavior. These obstacles seem to curb the effec-
tiveness of behavior monitoring in detecting opportunism and spurring supplier knowledge 
sharing. Our finding is in line with Kloyer and Scholderer (2012), who found that milestone 
payments are an ineffective governance mechanism in R&D supply relationships. 
Concerning the relationship between knowledge sharing and supplier success, our findings 
indicate that higher supplier knowledge sharing leads to higher perceived success of the sup-
plier firm. While reaping short-term material benefits may be tempting, supplier firms seem to 
realize that withholding efforts does not pay off in the long run. Only by sharing the relevant 
knowledge with their buyers can R&D supplier firms increase their chances of establishing 
long-lasting partnerships and building a reputation as a loyal business partner. This in turn 
will help ensure the supplier firms’ continued existence and their financial well-being. 
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5.5.2 Managerial implications 
Having explored the determinants of knowledge sharing, our results allow recommendations 
to be derived for managers of R&D buyer as well as R&D supplier firms. Most remarkable is 
certainly the decisive role “soft” factors play in determining R&D supplier knowledge shar-
ing. This implies that the management of R&D outsourcing is a complex and challenging un-
dertaking that requires an exceptional focus on the “human element” for it to be successful. 
The sole focus on mechanisms that are easy to measure and implement is short-sighted and 
may eventually prove insufficient. In order to create successful R&D supply relationships, 
managers also need to zoom in on less tangible “soft” factors. With the supplier firm’s organ-
izational culture having the strongest impact on knowledge sharing, R&D buyer firms are 
strictly advised to always keep a watchful eye on a company’s value system in the course of 
partner selection. Tracking the supplier firm’s cooperation history, visiting supplier facilities, 
supplier audits as well as face-to-face-communication may help to gain first impressions on 
the basic principles that guide supplier behavior. It is highly advisable to engage with the 
people who have a long employment history at the supplier firm. They have already internal-
ized the firm’s values and norms and can provide reliable information about how business 
with external partners is handled. As a firm’s values are, however, mostly below the line of 
visibility (Schein, 1985), it is also the supplier’s responsibility to make the firm’s core values 
visible to third parties through words and actions. This can include sending credible signals of 
good faith and intentions, and implementing rules and procedures that provide a predictable 
structure (Deeds and Hill, 1999). In this way, the supplier firm can enhance its chances of 
being selected as a collaboration partner. 
A supplier’s intrinsic motivation has proved to be another important “soft” driver of 
knowledge sharing in R&D collaboration. While intrinsic motivation is always given volun-
tarily, one might wonder whether there is a way of stimulating this kind of motivation. Wide-
ly considered a tool that is hard to manage (Kloyer, 2011; Kloyer and Scholderer, 2012; Lew-
is, 2013), we are convinced that a buyer firm can make important contributions to the devel-
opment of a supplier firm’s intrinsic motivation. That which is called empowerment in man-
agement literature should be applicable to the context of inter-firm R&D collaboration as 
well. As it is assumed that people who feel self-determined and believe their work to be 
meaningful are more intrinsically motivated (Deci et al., 1999, Ryan and Deci, 2000b), we 
recommend that R&D buyers regularly revise their implemented control structures in order to 
not hamper the development of supplier intrinsic motivation. A too close monitoring of the 
supplier firm can be detrimental as it may “crowd out” the intrinsic reason for undertaking a 
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task for its own sake. Furthermore, it can be interpreted as a signal of distrust and provoke 
opportunism instead of compliance (Frey, 1993; Lewis, 2013). In order to provide fertile 
ground for supplier intrinsic motivation to flourish, buyer firms should grant their R&D sup-
pliers more decision-making autonomy in the R&D process (Reeve, 2009; Reeve and Jang, 
2006; Ryan and Deci, 2000a).  
When cooperating for the first time, however, a buyer firm cannot perceive a supplier firm’s 
organizational culture easily or know whether the supplier has fulfilled previous contracts out 
of intrinsic motivation (Kloyer, 2011, Kloyer and Scholderer, 2012). Against this background, 
we suggest that collaborating with a familiar supplier firm can diminish a buyer firm’s doubts 
concerning the supplier firm’s lived values and working attitudes. While partner selection for 
future outsourcing endeavors should certainly always be oriented towards the buyer firm’s 
specific resource needs (Hitt et al., 2000), a buyer firm is, however, well advised to always 
consider the pool of prior partners first. This may not only save search costs, but it also dimin-
ishes the threat of opportunism associated with new partners (Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; 
Podolny, 1994) and, most importantly, result in knowledge being shared efficiently. 
Even though the role of trust in supplier knowledge sharing seems to be limited to being a 
condition and not a driver, we recommend that outsourcing partners actively invest in trust-
building measures from the outset for two reasons. Firstly, an absence of trust or even mis-
trust can hamper knowledge sharing with the buyer firm (Bakker et al., 2006). Secondly, trust 
can create a positive collaboration atmosphere that may provide fruitful ground where suppli-
er intrinsic motivation can evolve.  
The non-effectiveness of behavior monitoring underlines that the outsourcing of R&D seems 
to be inevitably linked to problems in observing and/or assessing work across organizational 
borders. Although widely applied in practice, we strongly advise R&D buyer firms against 
relying on behavior monitoring when controlling for R&D supplier moral hazard. It is not 
only ineffective in driving supplier knowledge sharing but might, in the worst case, even im-
pede the development of supplier intrinsic motivation—an important prerequisite for 
knowledge sharing. 
 
5.5.3 Limitations and directions for future research 
Although we believe we have tested a sound theoretical model using reliable and valid 
measures, our study is subject to several limitations that should be addressed in future re-
search endeavors. In the following, we will provide our study’s constraints and pave avenues 
for further research.  
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First, our findings revealed that the impact of supplier trust on supplier knowledge sharing is 
rather limited. This finding should be explored more deeply, whereby special attention should 
be granted to the indirect effects of trust on knowledge sharing. Second, data were obtained 
from the supplier’s side only. Thus, collecting data from both supplier and buyer firms might 
seem preferable in order to gain deeper insights into the topic; however, we learned in prelim-
inary discussions that supplier firms refused to reveal their business partners. Even if supplier 
firms are willing to unveil their buyer firms, researchers are advised to carefully consider 
whether there is merit in surveying both parties of the dyad by taking into account the poten-
tial loss of data quality on the side of the supplier firms. Lastly, our sample consists, to a high 
percentage, of German suppliers, which leads us to question the generalizability of our results 
across national borders. Future endeavors could devote their efforts to examining the influ-
ence of cultural aspects on knowledge sharing.  
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6. Paper 3: Sources of trust and intrinsic motivation in R&D supply rela-
tions 
Paper 3 
6.1 Introduction 
Collaboration in R&D is a highly prevalent phenomenon (Arora and Gambardella, 2010; Cal-
antone and Stanko, 2007). This results from several phenomena, including the fact that single 
firms are more often faced with an increased complexity of product innovations that they can 
no longer master alone (Gassmann, Enkel and Chesbrough, 2010; Un, Cuervo-Cazurra and 
Asakawa, 2010) as well as the possibility of using collaboration in the form of simultaneous 
engineering to speed up research and development processes (Kloyer and Helm, 2008), which 
is an indispensable necessity because of shorter technology and product life cycles. However, 
an R&D supplier firm will neither enter a supply relationship (if it is not forced to do so for 
economic reasons) nor will it be motivated during the collaboration if it anticipates opportun-
istic buyer behavior. The kind of buyer opportunism that is possible in R&D supply relations 
is the danger of hold-up, which is caused by one-sided buyer-specific investments of the sup-
plier (Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978). Therefore, it is highly important for the practice of 
R&D management to examine under which circumstances the supplier does not anticipate 
hold-up, i.e., under which circumstances the supplier develops trust in the buyer.  
Yet, finding the preconditions of supplier trust is not only a topic for management practice, 
but it is also relevant from the perspective of organization theory. Certainly, the general im-
portance of inter-organizational trust generation has often been mentioned, e.g., by Claro and 
Claro, 2008; Das and Teng, 2001; Lane, Salk and Lyles, 2001; Mohr, 2004; Morgan and 
Hunt, 1994; Zaheer, McEvily and Perrone, 1998. Until now, however, the main focus of em-
pirical research in this field has been on the consequences of trust (Gulati and Sytch, 2008), 
whereas the empirical findings on the preconditions of trust are fragmentary, especially for 
the specific case of R&D supply relations. Moreover, until now, the research on the genera-
tion of inter-firm trust has not sufficiently considered the perspectives of new institutional 
economics and game theory. We will use the insights of these theories not only with regard to 
our selection of potential trust determinants but also concerning the operationalization of the 
dependent variable of trust itself. Concretely, we will concentrate on the independent varia-
bles of collaboration perspective, prior collaboration, buyer dependence, and the organiza-
tional culture of the supplier. Although collaboration perspective and prior collaboration re-
ceived scholarly attention in the past (Deeds and Hill, 1999; Gulati, 1995; Gulati and Sytch, 
2008; Poppo, Zhou and Ryu 2008; Young-Ybarra and Wiersema, 1999), corresponding em-
pirical findings are scarce and inconsistent. As for the organizational culture of the supplier 
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and the buyer dependence, we are, to the best of our knowledge, the first to examine their role 
in R&D supplier trust building.  
In addition to this first purpose of the article, we seek to explore whether and how trust has an 
impact on the supplier’s intrinsic motivation. We deliberately focus on this question because 
of the specific problems facing the management of an R&D supply relationship. Both re-
search and development collaboration—research more than development—require the trans-
fer of tacit knowledge that cannot be observed and can therefore not be steered by classic in-
centives (see, e.g., Kloyer, 2011, Kloyer and Scholderer, 2012). Thus, intrinsic motivation of 
the supplier seems to be an almost indispensable precondition for the transfer of tacit 
knowledge (Ko, Kirsch and King, 2005; Lin, 2007). While, by its very nature, intrinsic moti-
vation is always voluntary, we suggest that supplier intrinsic motivation is more likely to 
evolve in a trusting atmosphere. Despite the growing body of literature on the positive effects 
of trust, little is known about how trust and intrinsic motivation interrelate.  
We attempt to fill this gap by throwing light on this under-researched issue. Hereby, we also 
address the question of whether intrinsic motivation is not only an intra- but also an inter-
organizational phenomenon. 
Our empirical study is based on an examination of 104 supplier firms. The findings show that 
trust does indeed provide fertile conditions for supplier intrinsic motivation to evolve. But 
where does supplier trust come from? According to our research results, it is the expectation 
of a prolongation of the relationship as well as the organizational culture of the supplier firm 
that boost supplier trust, whereas prior collaboration and buyer dependence surprisingly do 
not significantly affect trust. We believe that our findings add to prior research by providing 
new insights into a highly relevant topic. 
This article is organized as follows: The next section provides the theoretical basis of our em-
pirical study by briefly presenting the trust phenomenon and describing the role buyer oppor-
tunism plays in supplier trust building. Drawing on existent literature, the subsequent section 
is then dedicated to developing our hypotheses on possible sources of supplier trust and the 
impact of trust on supplier intrinsic motivation. Our empirical study follows, and the results, 
managerial implications, and the study’s limitations are then discussed in the article’s last 
section. 
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6.2 Theory 
6.2.1 Supplier trust in the buyer firm 
The concept of trust enjoys great popularity in several disciplines, which is underlined by the 
huge amount of literature on the topic (see, e.g., Brinkhoff, Özer and Sargut, 2015; Dietz and 
Den Hartog, 2006; Laaksonen, Pajunen and Kulmala, 2008; Paliszkiewicz, 2011; Zhong et 
al., 2014). Economists consider trust to play an important role in economic relations because 
it substitutes governance mechanisms such as monitoring and formal contracts that would 
cause transaction costs (Claro and Claro, 2008; Das and Teng, 2001; Zaheer et al., 1998). 
Furthermore, trust is said to reduce the incidence of conflict (Zaheer et al., 1998) and encour-
ages communication, commitment (Cullen, Johnson and Sakano, 2000; Mohr, 2004, Morgan 
and Hunt, 1994), and organizational learning (Lane et al., 2001). 
However, despite all the euphoria about trust, there is no consensus on its definition (Das and 
Teng, 2001). Instead, a colorful potpourri of different trust definitions exists (see Claro and 
Claro, 2008). In the following, we will gradually develop how we understand and use trust 
throughout this study by considering different aspects: levels of trust, forms of trust, attributes 
of trustworthiness, and the role of calculativeness in trust. 
While trust can exist at multiple levels such as the organizational, group, or individual level 
(Das and Teng, 2001), we focus on the inter-organizational level only by examining what 
leads a supplier firm to trust its buyer firm. Although there is some disagreement in the litera-
ture on whether organizations can be targets of trust (see Doney and Cannon, 1997), we fol-
low researchers such as Zaheer et al. (1998) and emphasize that firms can be recipients as 
well as donors of trust. Inter-organizational trust can therefore be described as the amount of 
trust the members of the supplier firm place in their buyer firm.  
According to its form, trust is viewed from two different angles by researchers. Whereas some 
consider trust to be a set of beliefs or positive expectations concerning the partner’s trustwor-
thiness (Blau, 1964; Boon and Holmes, 1991; Lewicki, McAllister and Bies, 1998; Rotter, 
1967; Whitener et al., 1998), others instead view trust as an intention (Cook and Wall, 1980; 
McAllister 1995) or action (Coleman, 1990; Deutsch, 1962; Zand,1972). Researchers such as 
Moorman, Zaltman and Deshpande (1992) suggest hybrid trust definitions, encompassing 
both the belief and behavioral component. They argue (p. 315): “…if one believes that a part-
ner is trustworthy without being willing to rely on that partner, trust is limited.” Morgan and 
Hunt (1994), however, criticize the redundancy in Moorman et al.’s approach as, to their 
mind, the belief in someone’s trustworthiness already covers the intention or willingness to 
act correspondingly. In our study on buyer-supplier relationships, we join Morgan and Hunt 
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(1994) and separate trust from associated behaviors by specifying supplier firm trust as the 
belief (a quite central attitude in consumer research) or positive expectation concerning the 
buyer firm’s trustworthiness. 
A buyer’s trustworthiness can rest on the evaluation of different attributes. We follow re-
searchers such as Doney and Cannon (1997) or Kumar, Scheer and Steenkamp (1995) and 
adopt the attributes honesty and benevolence as we consider them most appropriate for our 
research endeavor. Honesty reflects a buyer firm’s inclination to be sincere and to stand by its 
words, whereas benevolence mirrors the buyer’s concern for the supplier firm’s welfare (see 
Kumar et al., 1995).  
While there is no disagreement on the fact that trust can vary in intensity (Williams, 2001), 
opinions diverge on whether calculativeness should play a role in a trust definition. Trust that 
is calculative is given out of a rational, well-deliberated inference (Dietz and Den Hartog, 
2006; Gulati, 1995; Nooteboom, 2002; Rousseau et al., 1998). It is general in nature and 
based on transaction expectations (Bhattacherjee, 2007). Grounded on the assumption that the 
exchange partner always acts in its own self-best interest and thus will refrain from harming 
itself (Gefen, Karahanna and Straub, 2003), calculative trust emerges when the outcome of 
the partner’s intended action is beneficial for the trustor (Schoder and Haenlein, 2004). Ac-
cordingly, a supplier firm would have trust in a buyer firm if the supplier firm can, with some 
certainty, rule out doubts about buyer misbehavior, simply because buyer misbehavior would 
be contrary to the buyer firm’s best interest.  
In contrast to this, non-calculative trust is trustee-specific (Bhattacherjee, 2007) and character-
ized by strong beliefs in the buyer’s good faith and intentions. It is based on the assumption 
that the buyer’s trustworthy behavior does not result from sheer self- interest. Non-calculative 
trust emerges among partners gradually over time (Gulati,1995; Parkhe, 1993; Rousseau et 
al., 1998) and rests on the development of social relationships and positive past experiences 
(Ring, 1996; Young-Ybarra and Wiersema, 1999). It includes learning about the partner’s 
motives and inclinations as well as identifying with him (Lewicki and Bunker, 1996; Shapiro, 
Sheppard and Cheraskin, 1992).  
While some argue calculative trust should not be considered to be real trust (e.g., Dietz and 
Den Hartog, 2006; Miller, 2001; Williamson, 1993a), others suggest that in order to draw a 
complete picture of the trust phenomenon, both calculative and non-calculative elements 
should be incorporated (Bromiley and Cummings, 1995; McEvily, Perrone and Zaheer, 
2003). We believe that trust, particularly in economic exchange, always encompasses some 
element of calculation (see Lane, 2000). Hence, in order to account for the broad phenomenal 
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and experimental basis of trust, we consider it necessary to include rational (calculative) and 
relational (non-calculative) reasons for trust in our framework.  
In our definition, we view supplier trust as the positive belief or expectation of members of 
the supplier firm concerning the buyer firm’s honesty and benevolence based on either calcu-
lative or relational reasons. 
In conjunction with our explanations on calculative trust, we have already mentioned that we 
expect the anticipation of buyer (mis-)behavior by the supplier to play a crucial role in suppli-
er trust building. This is why we will briefly present the phenomenon of buyer opportunism 
and its interaction with supplier trust in the following section. 
 
6.2.2 Buyer opportunism and its role in supplier trust building 
Partner opportunism is considered to be one of the major threats to collaborative relationships 
(Caniёls and Gelderman, 2010; Das, 2004; Das and Rahman, 2001) as it has a detrimental 
impact on relationship performance (Luo, Liu and Xue, 2009; Parkhe, 1993), relationship 
quality (Katsikeas, Skarmeas and Bello, 2009; Parkhe, 1993), and transaction costs (Dahl-
strom and Nygaard, 1999; White and Lui, 2005; Williamson, 1985). Rooted in transaction 
cost theory, opportunism can, according to Williamson (1975, p. 26), be described as “self-
interest seeking with guile.” Self-interest seeking itself is by no means unethical but rather an 
inherent aspect of economic activity. It is the issue of “guile” that gives the opportunism phe-
nomenon its particular devious touch (Jap et al., 2013).  
Opportunism, which may take several forms (Wathne and Heide, 2000), can, following trans-
action cost theory, be distinguished according to the point of time it occurs (Williamson, 
1985). Opportunism that appears before contract conclusion is called ex-ante opportunism, 
whereas opportunism that occurs after the partners have agreed on a contract is referred to as 
ex-post opportunism. Either party in an R&D exchange relationship can engage in opportun-
ism (Cavusgil, Deligonul and Zhang, 2004; Jap and Anderson, 2003). We focus, however, on 
ex-post opportunism of the buyer firm because it is the assumption and anticipation of buyer 
(mis-) behavior that influences supplier trust (building). 
A special variety of ex-post buyer opportunism is buyer hold-up. Originally coined by Gold-
berg (1976b), the term “hold-up” describes situations in which a buyer firm seeks to appropri-
ate the so-called quasi-rent (Klein et al., 1978). In contrast to other forms of ex-post opportun-
ism such as moral hazard, hold-up is not the result of information asymmetries but rather a 
consequence of buyer-specific investments and thus one-sided dependencies on the part of the 
supplier. Particularly at the beginning of an exchange-
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has to make high ad-hoc investments in buyer-specific assets such as laboratory equipment 
(Kloyer, 2011) or employee training. Outside this specific exchange relationship, such in-
vestments would lose dramatically in value, causing the supplier firm to be dependent on its 
buyer. An opportunistic buyer firm could now exploit the dependent supplier by either rene-
gotiating the price (Tirole, 1986) or refusing to pay or serve Alchian and Woodward (1988), 
which is called “quasi-rent appropriation” (Klein et al., 1978). For the buyer firm, however, 
opportunistic behavior is only profitable if the benefits of such deceitful behavior surpass the 
costs associated with it (Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1993a). 
According to Kloyer (2011) and Kloyer and Scholderer (2012), supplier firms that anticipate 
the hold-up risk may become motivated to behave opportunistically themselves. Furthermore, 
and most important for our study, we believe that a supplier expecting to be a victim of buyer 
opportunism will most certainly have no trust in a buyer firm. Hence, for our theoretical view 
on trust sources, it is necessary to always consider whether buyer opportunism may pay off. 
Only if the supplier firm can, with some certainty, “exclude” buyer misbehavior, may it have 
(a calculated) confidence in the buyer firm’s trustworthiness. The latter underlines our deci-
sion for a wide definition of trust that also encompasses calculative elements. 
But ultimately, what are the determinants of supplier trust? In the following section, we ex-
plain why we concentrate on the four potential determinants collaboration perspective, prior 
collaboration, supplier organizational culture, and buyer dependence. 
 
6.2.3 Supplier trust from the perspective of new institutional economics and game theory  
From the perspective of new institutional economics, the preferred instrument against hold-up 
is the assertion of one’s contractual claims in court. However, R&D contracts are inevitably 
incomplete (e.g., Aghion and Tirole, 1994; Grossman and Hart 1986; Hart and Moore 1988; 
Klein, 1999; Kloyer, 2011; Kloyer and Helm, 2008; Liebeskind, 1996, Tripsas, Schrader and 
Sobrero, 1995). In this situation, transaction cost theory provides the instrument of the hos-
tage (Klein, 1985; Williamson, 1983). This means that a buyer that is in a position to conduct 
a hold-up would refrain from doing so if the supplier would have received a hostage from the 
buyer. A hostage can consist of any material or immaterial asset that would be valuable for 
the buyer (Kloyer, 2011; Kronman, 1985). This means that there is a wide range of potential 
hostages, such as contractual penalties, reputation, etc. However, we will concentrate on the 
kind of hostage that occurs automatically when a supply relation lasts for some time. This is 
the phenomenon of relational contracting (Macneil, 1978) that describes the fact that the col-
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laboration partners make two-sided specific investments by learning each other’s strengths 
and weaknesses etc. Thus, we will examine the effect of prior collaboration on supplier trust.  
As a “shadow of the past” might exist (see, e.g., Parkhe, 1993; Poppo et al., 2008), there is 
also the possibility of a “shadow of the future” (Telser, 1980). This is what game theory pre-
dicts (Axelrod, 1984). To put it simply, a supplier would have no reason to expect damaging 
hold-up from its buyer if that buyer wants to extend the collaboration. Damaging a partner 
would not make sense in case of an interest in future collaboration with the same partner (Ax-
elrod, 1984; Heide and Miner, 1992; Nagin et al., 2002; Telser, 1980). Therefore, we will 
analyze the effect of the collaboration perspective on supplier trust. 
We have argued that a supplier firm that receives hostages from the buyer firm in the form of 
specific investments in relational contracting should trust its buyer. The underlying reason is 
that these specific investments result in the buyer firm becoming dependent on the supplier 
firm. Yet, dependency can also result from circumstances other than specific investments (see, 
e.g., Emerson, 1962; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Particularly on R&D markets, there are of-
ten no or only few alternatives to a specific collaboration partner. Therefore, we will also ex-
amine the effect of this kind of dependency on supplier trust. 
Finally, for several reasons, we will look at the potential trust determinant of organizational 
culture. The reason for this is that we have substantial qualitative evidence that the culture of 
R&D suppliers might differ for certain general norms and attitudes that could have an impact 
on the trust in their buyers. Hereby, we maintain our perspective of new institutional econom-
ics, which not only deals with explicit contractual institutions but also with the implicit insti-
tutions of the norms of which a culture consists (Klein, 1999; Williamson, 2000). 
 
6.3 Hypotheses 
6.3.1 Collaboration perspective and its influence on supplier trust 
The longevity of an exchange relationship is considered an important issue of partner behav-
ior as it has an impact on the length of the so-called “shadow of the future” (Das and Rahman, 
2010). The “shadow of the future” is a metaphoric expression underlining the nexus between 
present moves and future consequences (Parkhe, 1993). Research suggests that the longer the 
shadow of the future, the less likely deceitful behavior will occur (e.g., Axelrod, 1984; Heide 
and Miner, 1992). The underlying logic seems quite reasonable: partners who expect to inter-
act with each other in the future carefully evaluate whether engaging in opportunism repre-
sents a beneficial option. Anticipating the bond between future consequences and current ac-
tions, they compare the immediate gains from behaving unethically with the potential loss of 
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future benefits. Opportunism is considered unattractive if the expected benefits from contin-
ued exchange surpass the short-term benefits from cheating, (Nagin et al., 2002; Telser, 
1980). 
Expectations of continuity enhance the R&D relationship’s future value. Ongoing cooperation 
not only increase the chances of fully recouping relation-specific investments made by the 
parties (Das, 2006). It also enables transacting with each other more cost-efficiently (Dyer and 
Singh, 1998) and balancing out temporary iniquities between the partners (Das and Rahman, 
2010). By behaving opportunistically in the present, these long-term benefits would be put at 
risk as the betrayed party could decide on social sanctioning in the form of immediate rela-
tionship termination, the refusal to do business with the opportunistic party in the future (Car-
son, Madhok and Wu, 2006), or retribution in the next move. The latter describes a game-
theoretic approach according to which future interactions allow the partners to reward or pun-
ish each other’s behavior (Heide and John, 1990). The possibility of retaliation in the future 
casts a shadow back upon current moves, thus lowering the tendency to defect in the present 
(Parkhe, 1993).  
But how can prospects of prolongation now foster supplier trust in the buyer firm? First of all, 
prospects of prolonged cooperation may be considered as a credible commitment of the buyer 
firm having a long-term interest in the exchange relationship. Having a long-term interest 
implies forgoing individual interests in favor of mutual benefits (Anderson and Weitz, 1992). 
Second, given that further interaction allows the partners to reward and punish each other 
(Heide and John, 1990), expectations of reciprocity should discipline a buyer firm to not mis-
behave as it would have to face retaliatory measures by the supplier firm (Parkhe, 1993). 
Third, the threat of lost future profits provides the incentive for the buyer firm to play by the 
rules and engenders cooperation in the present.  
To sum up, from a calculative perspective, a buyer firm can be trusted if expectations of buyer 
opportunism (hold-up) are low. This in turn should strengthen supplier firms’ confidence in 
buyer firms’ good faith and intentions. Hence, we suggest the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): The collaboration perspective has a positive effect on the supplier’s trust 
in the buyer. 
 
6.3.2 Prior collaboration and its influence on supplier trust 
Aside from the continuity of an exchange relationship, it is the history of interactions between 
exchange partners that is assumed to be an important determinant of partner behavior. Figura-
tively referred to as the “shadow of the past,” prior ties can determine how partners act in the 
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present and the future (Deeds and Hill, 1999; Jap et al., 2013; Parkhe, 1993). Instead of self-
interest-seeking behavior, actors are more likely to have the “bigger picture” in mind when 
sharing a common history. This means they forgo individual gains in favor of mutual benefits 
(Jap et al., 2013; Squire, Cousins and Brown, 2009; Uzzi, 1997).  
Throughout the literature, it is propagated that prior collaboration accounts for the formation 
of interorganizational trust (Gulati, 1995, Gulati and Sytch, 2008; Parkhe, 1993; Poppo et al., 
2008). In fact, prior collaboration is seen to be the source of calculative as well as non-
calculative trust.  
Calculative trust can emerge if the supplier is confident that the buyer will not behave defec-
tively, simply because opportunism would not be in the buyer firm’s best interest. By sharing 
a cooperative history, it is very likely that the partners have developed common working rou-
tines and practices that allow transacting with each other more efficiently in the present ex-
change episode (Deeds and Hill, 1999; Kotabe, Martin and Domoto, 2003; Luo, 2002a; Mac-
neil, 1978 (relational contracting); Poppo et al., 2008; Zollo, Reuer and Singh, 2002), that is, 
at lower costs. Furthermore, even buyer firms have made specific investments. Deceitful buy-
er behavior would put these investments in jeopardy since the supplier could react to detected 
opportunism by immediately terminating the relationship (Deeds and Hill, 1999; Luo, 2002a). 
A supplier that knows that the buyer will behave in a trustworthy manner in order to not put 
the mentioned benefits at risk would have reason to trust in the buyer firm.  
Non-calculative trust, on the other hand, emerges gradually over time (Gulati, 1995). It rests 
on the foundation of social relationships that are characterized by familiarity and strong be-
liefs in the buyer’s good faith and intentions (Rousseau et al., 1998). Prior interaction allows 
the partners to get to know each other’s idiosyncrasies, developing thereby a deeper mutual 
understanding and stronger identification with their exchange partner (Gulati and Sytch, 
2008). As buyer-specific experience through past exchange episodes provides additional in-
formation on the buyer firm’s objectives, its behavior becomes more predictable (Gulati and 
Sytch, 2008; Parkhe, 1993; Santoro and McGill, 2005). Additionally, commonly-shared 
norms and values facilitate cooperation and improve relationship quality (Parkhe, 1993). In 
contrast to new relationships, older ones are likely to have already gone through critical phas-
es, which may have contributed to stabilizing and improving the working relationship, thus 
providing a platform for trust to develop (Parkhe, 1993). All in all, we can assume that prior 
collaboration accounts for the development of relational trust. 
Despite the widespread logic in the literature that prior collaboration enables trust, empirical 
studies are scarce and provide mixed findings. While Anderson and Weitz (1989) found that 
trust increases as the relationship ages, Poppo et al. (2008) found that the overall positive ef-
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fect of prior history on trust is achieved indirectly through an expectation of continuity. 
Doney and Cannon (1997) and Young-Ybarra and Wiersema (1999) failed to find a signifi-
cant relation between the two constructs. Gulati and Sytch’s (2008) findings indicate that the 
history of interaction between organizational boundary spanners contributes to the formation 
of inter-organizational trust, but in a non-linear fashion. No support was found, however, for 
the assumed positive relationship between prior organizational history and organizational 
trust. 
Drawing on a calculative as well as non-calculative perspective, we, however, follow the line 
of reasoning propagated in the literature and posit the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Prior collaboration between buyer and supplier has a positive effect on 
the supplier’s trust in the buyer. 
 
6.3.3 Buyer dependence and its influence on supplier trust 
Dependence is often viewed as an important determinant of cooperation success. Mutual de-
pendencies are the reason for parties collaborating in the first place, and they provide the 
foundation for cooperation stability. In contrast, unilateral dependencies or dependencies that 
vary a lot in extent are viewed critically as they create dangerous relationship imbalances that 
could provoke inappropriate behavior (Das and Teng, 2000b; Das and Teng, 2003, Xia, 
2011). 
While partner dependence can be the consequence of having invested specifically (Sanner, 
2005), it can also rest on a lack of alternative exchange partners possessing the critical re-
sources (Emerson, 1962; Morgan, Kaleka and Gooner, 2007; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; 
Provan and Skinner, 1989). It is the latter we concentrate on in this study. Hence, we define 
buyer dependence as the degree to which the buyer relies on the supplier’s resources and ca-
pabilities in order to achieve its business goals (Dwyer, Schurr and Oh, 1987).  
But how does buyer dependence now influence supplier trust?  
In order to detangle the relationship between buyer dependence and supplier trust, we first 
have to again consider the relationship between dependence and opportunism. In the litera-
ture, there are two very different views on how dependence and opportunism interrelate.  
According to the first view, a negative relationship exists between dependence and opportun-
ism (Provan and Skinner, 1989). Being dependent on an exchange partner keeps in check 
one’s own opportunistic behavior (Joshi and Arnold, 1997; Provan and Skinner, 1989). As 
opportunism endangers cooperation stability (Das and Rahman, 2001), a dependent buyer 
firm would avoid any behavior that might put the exchange relationship at risk. In order to 
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achieve its business goals, the buyer instead aims at preserving the supply relationship by em-
ploying all available means (Joshi and Arnold, 1997; Provan and Skinner, 1989), even tolerat-
ing supplier misbehavior to a certain extent (Wathne and Heide, 2000). Against this back-
ground and drawing on the calculative approach, one can assume that a supplier has trust in a 
dependent buyer firm because the supplier is confident that the buyer firm can’t help but be-
have in a trustworthy manner in order to not jeopardize the relationship.  
According to the second view, however, dependence and opportunism are related positively 
(Joshi and Arnold, 1997). Instead of fostering cooperative buyer behavior, dependence may 
actually cause opposite effects. Drawing on reactance theory (Brehm, 1966), dependence 
brings about constraints on the freedom of the buyer firm. In order to restore its freedom, the 
buyer firm becomes motivated to take actions that counter these constraints. Such actions can 
be explicit and direct or implicit and hidden, such as opportunism (Joshi and Arnold, 1997). 
In view of the above, one can assume that buyer dependence lowers the supplier’s trust in the 
buyer firm’s honesty and benevolence as the supplier is aware of possible reactance behavior 
on the part of the buyer.  
However, we support the first view and assume that a dependent buyer firm behaves ethically, 
simply because opportunistic behavior would be against its best interest. Hence, the more de-
pendent a buyer firm is on its supplier, the higher the supplier firm’s trust in the buyer. There-
fore our hypothesis is:  
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The buyer’s dependence has a positive effect on the supplier’s trust in 
the buyer. 
 
6.3.4 Organizational culture and its influence on supplier trust 
In order to remain competitive, firms increasingly have to shift their sole focus from outside 
of the organization to what is manifesting within the firm (Soyer, Kabak and Asan, 2007), 
namely its culture. It may be the potential to drive superior performance and generate compet-
itive advantage (Barney, 1986; Schein, 1985) that has earned the concept of organizational 
culture increasing scientific attention in recent years.  
Regardless of the myriad of attempts at a definition (Barney, 1986), a firm’s organizational 
culture remains a complex, multi-faceted phenomenon that is hard to grasp. Researchers, 
however, agree on a minimum consensus according to which organizational culture can be 
described as a set of shared assumptions, values, and norms that find their tangible expression 
in practices, behaviors, and artifacts (Hofstede, 1980; Trice and Beyer, 1993). 
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The substantial role an organization’s culture plays in business conduct is underlined by the 
several functions culture performs. Aside from defining the firm’s boundaries (Peters and 
Waterman, 1982; Pfeffer, 1981; Schein, 1992), providing organizational members with a feel-
ing of identity (Pfeffer, 1981) and fostering the generation of commitment (Peters and Wa-
terman, 1982; Pfeffer, 1981), culture creates organizational cohesiveness (Cartwright and 
Cooper, 1993; Robbins, 2001) and, most importantly, directs and shapes organizational mem-
bers’ attitudes and behaviors by providing appropriate rules and standards of conduct (Pfeffer, 
1981). 
Each organization rests on a profound set of organizational values that are timeless, collec-
tively held convictions of what an organization considers right or wrong, desirable or undesir-
able (Andersen, Taylor and Logio, 2014; Singh, 2009). Values are considered the core com-
ponents of organizational culture (Hofstede, 1984; Miroshnik, 2013). They regulate and unify 
the behavior of organizational members (Dobni, Ritchie and Zerbe, 2000; Soyer et al., 2007) 
and give direction to all decisions made in the organization (Schmidt and Posner, 1983). 
While studies in this context often focused on the role cultural similarity between partners 
plays in the formation of trust (e.g., Kwon, 2008; Robson, Katsikeas and Bello, 2008), we 
instead consider solely the supplier firm’s culture and its impact on trust-building. Are suppli-
er firms whose culture promotes values such as trust throughout the organization more likely 
to be confident about a specific buyer firm’s good faith and intentions? We assume yes. A 
supplier firm carrying collectively-shared values such as general trust in cooperation partners 
has a better predisposition to actually trust in a specific buyer firm. This does not automatical-
ly mean that their trust is given unconditionally or blindly. It is rather that supplier firms 
whose organizational culture promotes trust as a guiding principle when interacting with each 
other and with key players outside the organization are more likely to take a leap of faith and 
have more favorable perceptions of the buyer’s trustworthiness in the first place. Hence, we 
put forth, the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): General trust as feature of the organizational culture of the supplier firm 
has a positive effect on the supplier’s trust in the buyer. 
 
6.3.5 Trust and its influence on intrinsic motivation 
Despite the huge body of literature and studies on the favorable consequences of trust, the 
interrelationship between trust and intrinsic motivation in R&D supply relationships still re-
mains poorly understood.  
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While intrinsic motivation has long traditions in motivation-based organization theory (Ar-
gyris, 1964; Likert, 1961; McGregor, 1960), economic theories acknowledge the existence but 
do not deal with intrinsic motivators because they are regarded as being difficult to analyze 
and control (Williamson, 1975, 1985). However, individuals contribute voluntarily, and these 
voluntary contributions are the consequence of intrinsic motivation (Simon, 1991). Motiva-
tion is intrinsic if the incentive system can be found in the activity itself. This means that, 
contrary to extrinsic motivation, intrinsically motivated individuals engage in activities out of 
genuine interest and for inherent satisfaction (Ryan and Deci, 2000a). It can be the activity 
itself (Csikszentmihalyi, 1975; Ryan and Deci, 2000a), the compliance with standards and 
norms (Sripada and Stich, 2006), or the achievement of personal goals, such as climbing a 
mountain (Loewenstein, 1999), that provide the source of satisfaction. In this study, we focus 
on the enjoying and challenging experiences the R&D project provides the supplier firm with. 
The outstanding importance of intrinsic motivation has been examined primarily in the intra-
organizational (e.g., Hackman and Oldham, 1976; Lin, 2007) or educational context (e.g., 
Deci, Koestner and Ryan, 2001; Reeve, 2009). However, the three core advantages that arise 
from intrinsic motivation can, in our opinion, be transferred to the interorganizational setting 
as well. First, intrinsic motivation affects work quality, thus leading to more creative and in-
novative work results (Amabile, 1996; Ryan and Deci, 2000a; Schwartz, 1990). As R&D 
supply projects often require creative and innovative problem-solving, intrinsic motivation of 
the supplier firm seems to be a key prerequisite for successful collaborative R&D relation-
ships. Second, intrinsic motivation fosters the transfer of implicit knowledge among the par-
ties concerned (Ko et al., 2005; Lin, 2007), which is also a necessary condition for successful 
R&D partnerships. Third, intrinsic motivation supports compliance with psychological con-
tracts (Gibbons, 1998; Prendergast, 1999) and thus curbs dysfunctional partner behavior. 
Against this background, it is important to question how intrinsic motivation can be stimulat-
ed. The literature presents several means that can provide fertile ground for intrinsic motiva-
tion to develop. Creating environments that support autonomy (Reeve, 2009; Reeve and Jang, 
2006; Ryan and Deci, 2000a, 2000b) are one of these measures. By strengthening self-
determination, individuals experience higher levels of intrinsic motivation (Deci et al., 1999). 
Therefore, it seems advisable for buyer firms to revise implemented control structures. An-
other set of stimulators can be found in the creation of a positive collaboration atmosphere. 
Open communication structures and personal relationships (Frey and Bohnet, 1995, Ryan and 
Deci, 2000b) are considered to be among the building blocks of a positive atmosphere. Such a 
positive atmosphere is presumably more likely to evolve in a trusting environment. Therefore, 
we state the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 5 (H5): The supplier’s trust in the buyer has a positive effect on the supplier’s 
intrinsic motivation. 
 
To sum our up reasoning, Figure 10 depicts our research model.  
Figure 10. Research model 
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The five hypotheses will be tested, and their results will be presented in the subsequent sec-
tion, following some comments on sample description and construct measurement. 
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6.4 Methodology 
6.4.1 Sample description 
We used primary data to test our hypotheses. These data were collected by surveying R&D 
supplying firms from eight European countries: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland. Given that there is no means of gathering a 
list of all the R&D-supplying firms from the countries concerned, we are well aware that our 
sample, in contrast to the ideal approach, is not a random one but rather one that has been 
chosen. 
The corresponding firms were selected using the ORBIS database and web search. With OR-
BIS, we selected firms that belonged to either the industry group “7112 - Engineering activi-
ties and related technical consultancy” or “721 - Research and experimental development on 
natural sciences and engineering.” We chose these two groups because we believe that they 
consist to a high percentage of R&D-supplying companies. A web search helped us to com-
plement our sample. Our bilingual (German and English) questionnaire was created with 
SoSciSurvey (Leiner, 2013), pretested with academic experts, and then, following refine-
ments, made available to the participants on www.soscisurvey.com.  
The firms concerned were contacted in April 2013 via an e-mail clarifying the study’s pur-
pose and containing a direct link to our online survey. We asked managers of the last com-
pleted R&D project to answer our questionnaire as to our mind they have the best insight into 
R&D project-related issues. We assumed the average response time to be no longer than 15 to 
20 minutes. In order to incentivize potential respondents, we offered an overview of our 
study’s major findings.  
We sent a reminder e-mail four weeks after our first e-mail request. As the response rate had 
still not been satisfactory after our second mail dispatch, we decided on follow-up phone 
calls. These phone-calls were concentrated on German firms, only because of low participa-
tion quotes from non-German firms and limited resources. The firms concerned were contact-
ed by trained interviewers. Dialog partners who agreed on a participation in our survey were 
sent yet another e-mail containing a link to our online survey.  
In sum, we received 107 completed questionnaires, but only 104 could be used for further 
analyses. We consider this number to be satisfactory since our survey tapped into one of the 
most sensitive areas of a company.  
As can be seen from Table 13, most of the respondent firms were small and medium-sized 
companies, located primarily in Germany. The firms of concern had a median age of 12 years. 
Unifactorial analyses of variance and non-parametric methods such as Kruskal Wallis demon-
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strated no differences between the groups of firm age and number of employees concerning 
our model’s dependent and independent variables. 
Table 13. Sample description 
Firm location: N = 104  Number of employees:* N = 104 
Austria 4  1-19 52 
Denmark 2  20-99 34 
Finland 2  100-499 15 
Germany 89  ≥  500 3 
Switzerland 7    
     
Firm age in years: N = 103 (1 missing)    
2-5 19    
6-10 28    
11-20 35    
> 20 21    
* For the purpose of conducting unifactorial analyses of variance, we decided to merge the last two groups of firms 
into one group, given the insufficient number of R&D suppliers employing 500 or more people. 
 
6.4.2 Construct measurement 
All of our constructs are measured reflectively, assuming that the construct causes the covari-
ation of the indicator variables. When operationalizing our variables, we used existing scales 
where possible. All items were refined by pre-tests and measured on seven-point Likert 
scales, ranging from “agree not at all” (1) to “agree completely” (7). Table 14 contains the 
final items employed in our study.  
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Table 14. Measurements of the variables 
Variable  
(abbrev.) 
Item 
(abbrev.) 
Items 
Collaboration 
perspective 
(CP) 
CP01_01 
 
CP01_02 
: When the contract was concluded, we had reason to believe that we would get an 
order from the same buyer firm in the near future. 
: When the contract was concluded, we were convinced that it would be possible 
to extend our collaboration with this buyer. 
Prior  
collaboration 
(PC) 
PC01_01 
PC01_02 
 
PC01_03 
: In the past, we have closely collaborated with the same buyer firm. 
: In the past, we have developed a close business relationship with the same buyer 
firm. 
: In the past, we have continuously adapted our collaborational skills and tech-
niques (e.g., workflow, communication, process management) to the specific re-
quirements of the buyer firm. 
Buyer  
dependence 
(BD) 
BD01_01 
 
 
BD01_02 
 
BD01_03 
BD01_04  
: When the contract was concluded, our partner had no other possibility than to 
collaborate with us to gain access to the resource(s) that was (were) crucial to 
her/him 
: When the contract was concluded, it would have been difficult for our partner to 
replace us. 
: When the contract was concluded, our partner was quite dependent on us. 
: When the contract was concluded, our partner did not have a good alternative to 
us.* 
Organizational 
culture 
(OC) 
OC01_01 
OC01_02 
OC01_03 
OC01_04 
 
OC01_05 
: Our organizational culture is characterized by sharing information freely. 
: Our organizational culture is characterized by fair terms of exchange. 
: Our organizational culture is characterized by being supportive. 
: Our organizational culture is characterized by working in collaboration with 
others. 
: Our organizational culture is characterized by trust in our collaboration partners. 
Trust 
(TR) 
TR01_01 
 
TR01_02 
 
TR01_03 
 
TR01_04 
 
TR01_05 
 
TR01_06 
 
TR01_07 
: When the contract was concluded, we were convinced that the buyer firm would 
keep its promises. 
: When the contract was concluded, we were convinced that we could count on the 
buyer to be sincere. 
: When the contract was concluded, we were convinced that the buyer would 
provide us with accurate information. 
: When the contract was concluded, we were convinced that the buyer would 
consider our concerns in case of changing circumstances. 
: When the contract was concluded, we were convinced that we could depend on 
the buyer's support concerning important matters. 
: When the contract was concluded, we were convinced that the buyer would not 
take advantage of power asymmetries. 
: When the contract was concluded, we were convinced that the buyer would not 
take advantage of one-sided dependencies. 
Intrinsic  
motivation 
(IM) 
IM01_01 
IM01_02 
IM01_03 
IM01_04 
: Working on the R&D task within the collaboration was interesting. 
: Working on the R&D task within the collaboration was challenging. 
: Working on the R&D task within the collaboration was satisfying. 
: Working on the R&D task within the collaboration was enjoyable. 
* Item was dropped from statistical analyses 
 
6.4.2.1  Dependent variables 
The dependent variables in our study are supplier trust in the buyer and supplier intrinsic mo-
tivation. Poppo, Zhou and Li (2015, forthcoming) made attempts to operationalize calculative 
and relational trust; however, we feel that their trust measures do not describe trust but rather 
variables that may influence trust. Thus, for example, the calculative trust item “degree of 
exchange continuity” (Poppo et al., 2015, p. 8) may function as a potential determinant or 
source of trust but it should, to our mind, not be equated with trust. For our purposes, we 
therefore separate trust from its associated antecedents and incorporate calculative as well as 
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non-calculative reasons for trust only on a theoretical basis, without measuring them directly. 
Our trust scale encompasses the dimensions honesty and benevolence. The corresponding 
items were mainly adopted from Kumar et al. (1995). As our data indicated that honesty and 
benevolence are heavily intertwined, we decided against modelling two distinct constructs. 
Instead, we followed Doney and Cannon (1997) and treated trust as a unidimensional con-
struct.  
To measure intrinsic motivation, we considered the activity itself to be the source of satisfac-
tion and employed a four-item measurement based on Mossholder (1980). 
 
6.4.2.2  Independent variables 
Collaboration perspective, prior collaboration, organizational culture, and buyer dependence 
represent our independent variables. To operationalize collaboration perspective, we em-
ployed two items similar to those used by Carson et al. (2006). Again, we were inspired by 
Carson et al. (2006) when creating our three-item measurement for prior collaboration. Buyer 
dependence was measured by four items adopted from previous studies such as Jap and Gane-
san (2000) and Morgan et al. (2007). Throughout our analyses, however, we had to cut down 
our buyer dependence measure to three items. The indicator BD01_04 had to be dropped due 
to not meeting the quality criteria requested by SmartPLS. We then reran all tests using a 
three-item measure for buyer dependence. The corresponding findings are described below. 
For measuring organizational culture, we drew on O’Reilly, Chatman and Caldwell (1991) 
and employed a five item scale.  
 
6.4.2.3  Control variables 
In empirical studies, control variables are used to account for possible confounding factors. 
The inclusion of variables such as firm age or firm size has become common practice. Some-
times, however, their insertion is far from being well-reasoned, and instead of purifying ana-
lytical results, their blind inclusion can be distorting and misleading (see, e.g. Becker, 2005; 
Spector and Brannick, 2011 on this issue). 
We decided to include the variable project importance because of its potential impact on sup-
plier intrinsic motivation. According to theory, perceived meaningfulness is considered to 
contribute to intrinsic motivation. Meaningfulness can be described as the extent to which 
work is perceived worthwhile and paramount (Pratt and Ashforth, 2003; Thomas, 2000) We 
believe that being part of something big, such as an important project, can increase the mean-
ingfulness felt and hence spur supplier intrinsic motivation. Therefore, we asked interviewees 
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to assess the relative importance of the focal R&D supply project within the company’s pro-
ject portfolio on a scale ranging from (1) “not important at all” to (7) “very important.” 
 
6.4.3 Analyses 
For data analysis, we used partial least squares (PLS), a variance-based structural equation 
modeling method that aims at minimizing the amount of unexplained variance. Originally 
invented by Wold (1975) and further developed by Lohmöller (1989), PLS represents an at-
tractive alternative to commonly applied covariance-based equation modeling methods such 
as LISREL. Often referred to as soft modeling approach, due its minimal demands on data 
distribution, sample size and measurement scales, PLS has been applied increasingly in mar-
keting and business research over the last years (Hair et al., 2012; Henseler, Ringle and 
Sinkovics, 2009). Given our small sample size as well as our study’s explorative nature, the 
application of the PLS method seems suitable. The analysis of PLS results contains the evalu-
ation of the measurement (or outer) models and the assessment of the structural (or inner) 
model.  
To ensure that the constructs are reliable and valid, the reflective measurement models are  
assessed by use of three criteria. A construct is considered as internally consistent if its com-
posite reliability reaches values of 0.60 to 0.70 (Bagozzi and Yi, 1988; Nunnally and Bern-
stein, 1994). To establish convergent validity on the indicator level, factor loadings should be 
significant and exceed the value of 0.70 (Carmines and Zeller, 1979). Convergent validity on 
the construct level is achieved when the construct’s average variance extracted (AVE) is 
above 0.50 (Fornell and Larcker, 1981). In order to exclude doubts of discriminant invalidity, 
the square root of a construct’s AVE should be higher than its highest correlation with any 
other construct in the model (Fornell-Larcker criterion).  
For the structural model, issues of multicollinearity among the predictor variables should first 
be addressed. This can be done by calculating variance inflation factors (VIF) using SPSS. 
VIF-values smaller than five indicate no problems with multicollinearity (Hair, Ringle and 
Sarstedt, 2011). To evaluate the inner model, the percentage of variance explained (R²) should 
be considered. Furthermore, Stone-Geisser’s Q² values should be used to assess the structural 
model’s predictive relevance. Positive Q² values indicate that the exogenous constructs have 
predictive relevance for the endogenous constructs of concern. Information on the hypothe-
sized relationships is expressed by the standardized path coefficients’ magnitude and their 
corresponding t-values (Hair et al. 2014).  
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6.4.4 Common method bias 
Collecting data on dependent and independent variables from a single source could cause 
common method bias. In order to reduce the potential of common method bias, we applied 
several measures recommended by Podsakoff et al. (2003). To begin with, we structured our 
questionnaire properly, allowing no conclusion on the relations between criterion and predic-
tor variables. Furthermore, we promised our participants anonymity and that their responses 
would be used for research purposes only. In addition, we stressed that there are no right or 
wrong answers, asking questions to be answered honestly and to the best of knowledge. To 
statistically access the severity of a possible bias ex-post, we applied an unrotated exploratory 
factor analysis on our dependent and independent variables simultaneously, which is also 
known as Harmon’s single-factor test. The factor that emerged does not account for the ma-
jority of variance in the model as it explains way less than 30 percent of the variance, which 
leads us to conclude that common method bias does not seem to be a major threat in our 
study. 
 
6.4.5 Assessment of the reflective measurement (outer) models 
Before evaluating the reflective measurement models using SmartPLS 2.0 (Ringle, Wende 
and Will, 2005), we used SPSS to run principal component analyses with Varimax rotation on 
each set of indicators to test for unidimensionality of the constructs. Achieving unidimension-
ality is a necessary condition when using reflective measurement models for the constructs. 
As reflective indicators represent consequences of the construct, they are viewed as inter-
changeable. Hence, each set of indicators must have only one construct in common (Anderson 
and Gerbing, 1988). With loadings well above the threshold of 0.5, each set of indicators 
loaded on its corresponding factor, hence confirming unidimensionality of the constructs. 
We then applied PLS-SEM analysis to further assess our measures. The results of our meas-
urement models’ estimation are summarized in Table 15. As our results reveal, all our 
measures are reliable as the constructs’ composite reliabilities range from 0.8849 to 0.9338. 
The item loadings exceed the recommended value of 0.7 and are significant leastwise at a five 
percent level. Hence, convergent validity is established on the indicator level. As every con-
struct’s AVE exceeds the minimum value of 0.5, convergent validity is supported on the con-
struct level as well. When comparing the square root of each construct’s AVE with the con-
struct’s highest correlation with any other construct in the model, we could not find any indi-
cation of discriminant invalidity. Therefore, we conclude that our measurement scales have 
excellent reliability and validity.  
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Table 15. Results of the reflective measurement model 
Latent variable Indicators Outer loadings 
T-
statistics* 
Composite 
reliability AVE 
Discriminant 
validity 
Collaboration  
perspective 
CP01_01 0.924 23.076 0.9281 0.8659 Yes CP01_02 0.937 28.669 
       Prior collaboration PC01_01 0.949 3.485 
0.9070 0.7680 Yes PC01_02 0.952 3.500 
PC01_03 0.705 2.561 
       Buyer dependence BD01_01 0.834 2.296 
0.9338 0.8252 Yes BD01_02 0.937 2.402 
BD01_03 0.949 2.493 
       Organizational  
culture 
OC01_01 0.818 17.026 
0.9171 0.6890 Yes 
OC01_02 0.809 16.375 
OC01_03 0.882 25.008 
OC01_04 0.785 11.905 
OC01_05 0.854 23.078 
       Trust  TR01_01 0.792 12.565 
0.9181 0.6163 Yes 
TR01_02 0.848 23.015 
TR01_03 0.846 22.105 
TR01_04 0.740 10.185 
TR01_05 0.792 13.551 
TR01_06 0.727 7.802 
TR01_07 0.741 7.977 
       Intrinsic  
motivation 
 
IM01_01 0.874 9.281 
0.8849 0.6586 Yes IM01_02 0.776 7.334 IM01_03 0.834 6.883 
IM01_04 0.757 5.125 
       * T-values greater than 1.96 are significant at p < 0.05, those greater than 2.57 are significant at p < 0.01 
 
6.4.6 Assessment of the structural (inner) model 
By calculating VIF-values for each predictor variable, we addressed the potential problem of 
multicollinearity among the predictor variables. As all VIF values were well below the critical 
cut-off of five, we concluded that multicollinearity is not a serious threat in our study. 
The results of our inner model estimation are summarized in Table 16. Hypothesis 1 stated a 
positive relationship between collaboration perspective and supplier trust. Our findings con-
firm the positive impact of a prolonged cooperation on supplier trust (β = 0.315; p < 0.01). 
Hence, Hypothesis 1 is supported. In contrast to our expectations, prior collaboration has no 
significant positive influence on supplier trust (β = -0.005; n.s). Therefore, we have to reject 
Hypothesis 2. With regard to buyer dependence, we cannot confirm a positive effect on sup-
plier trust. The path coefficient is positive but rather small and nonsignificant (β = 0.095; 
n.s.). Hence, Hypothesis 3 has to be rejected, too. Our findings confirm that organizational 
culture positively influences supplier trust (β = 0.292; p < 0.01), which leads us to support 
Hypothesis 4. In line with our assumption, higher supplier trust leads to higher supplier intrin-
sic motivation (β = 0.303; p < 0.01). Hence, Hypothesis 5 is supported. With regard to our 
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control variable relative project importance, our findings show a positive significant relation 
with supplier intrinsic motivation (β = 0.466; p < 0.01).  
Altogether we find support for three of our five hypotheses. Only two of our independent var-
iables appear to be antecedents of supplier trust. The collaboration perspective, as can be seen 
from the standardized path coefficients, has the strongest impact on trust, followed by organi-
zational culture. Prior collaboration and buyer dependence fail to be significant.  
The overall model explains 22.2 percent of the variance in supplier trust and 9.2 percent in 
intrinsic motivation. However, when entering our control variable, the R² of intrinsic motiva-
tion increases considerably from 9.2 percent to 29.8 percent.  
In order to assess the variance explained, the academic literature most frequently draws on R²-
values found in Chin (1998, p. 323). However, these values were estimation results of one 
specific exemplary model and not intended for use as general recommendations for quality 
evaluation. Providing rules of thumb for acceptable R²-values is rather difficult as this heavily 
depends on the model complexity, the research discipline (Hair et al. 2014), and the total 
number of possible factors influencing the dependent variable. The more complex the reality, 
the more it needs to be simplified in order to be reproduced in a model. This simplification of 
reality, however, leads to a loss of information content and thus results in smaller R²-values.  
Given the complexity of the trust phenomenon, we regard the achieved R² as respectable. The 
same applies to the R² of intrinsic motivation when bearing in mind that there most certainly 
are more factors that explain its variance. 
That our model has predictive relevance is confirmed by our model’s Q²-values. The Stone-
Geisser’s Q² coefficients for trust (Q² = 0.128) and intrinsic motivation (Q² = 0.059) are larger 
than 0, certifying our model’s predictive relevance. When inserting our control variable, the 
Q²-value of intrinsic motivation increases up to 0.190. Given this considerable change in R² 
and Q² concerning intrinsic motivation, it seems advisable for future research endeavors to 
carefully examine the exact role of project importance in building intrinsic motivation and its 
relationship with other constructs. 
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Table 16. Results of the structural model 
   Without control 
path 
With control path 
project importance 
Predicted variable  Predictor variable Hypothesis Path T-
value* 
Path T-value* 
Hypothesized paths       
Supplier trust Collaboration perspective H1 0.315 2.850 0.315 2.821 
 Prior collaboration H2 -0.005 0.042 -0.005 0.043 
 Buyer dependence H3 0.095 0.740 0.095 0.748 
 Organizational culture H4 0.292 3.208 0.292 3.185 
Supplier intrinsic motivation Supplier trust H5 0.303 3.297 0.211 2.530 
       Control path       
Supplier intrinsic motivation Project importance    0.466 5.695 
       Variance explained       
Supplier trust   R² = 0.222 R² = 0.222 
Supplier intrinsic motivation   R² = 0.092 R² = 0.298 
     
* T-values greater than 1.96 are significant at p < 0.05, those greater than 2.57 are significant at p < 0.01 
 
6.5 Discussion, implications and limitations 
6.5.1 Key findings 
To our knowledge, we present the first empirical study that simultaneously examines the eco-
nomic preconditions of supplier trust. For this purpose, we focus on those variables that po-
tentially influence supplier trust from the viewpoints of new institutional economics and game 
theory. Within the theories of new institutional economics, it is mainly transaction cost theory 
that deals with the problem of a supplier’s trust by regarding the danger of buyer hold-up. 
Agency Theory would deal with moral hazard as a potential source of a lack of buyer trust. 
On the basis of transaction cost theory, trust-generating effects from specific investments (es-
pecially those resulting from relational contracting/prior collaboration) and dependency are to 
be expected. Moreover, considering new institutional economics in general, the institutions 
that make up the organization’s culture consists should be observed. On the other hand, game 
theory focuses on the effect of the future. 
The most surprising result is that we could not confirm a positive influence of prior collabo-
ration on supplier trust. Instead, the effect of prior collaboration is close to zero and not sig-
nificant. This finding is quite surprising from the perspective of transaction cost theory, which 
heavily underlines the anti-opportunism (and thereby trust-generating) effect of mutual specif-
ic investments in cases of relational contracting. However, given our findings, it seems that 
for trust to develop, more is needed than just prior exchange (Zollo et al., 2002). In our opin-
ion, a conceivable explanation is that the transaction-cost-reduction-potential of mutual spe-
cific investments does not necessarily lead to a prolongation of the collaboration. However, if 
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there is no need of prolongation—for instance, because the supplier does not have that specif-
ic R&D competence that the buyer would need in the future— then the partners could find 
themselves in the situation of an end game. Then, an opportunistic buyer could incline to-
wards hold-up. A supplier, being aware of that danger, would not have reason to trust any-
more.  
Also astonishing is the result that the dependence of a buyer on the supplier does not lead the 
supplier to have trust in the buyer. The effect of buyer dependence on supplier trust is positive 
but rather small and non-significant. However, there is a possible explanation for our finding: 
a supplier firm may be aware of the fact that buyer dependence does not automatically lead to 
cooperative behavior but may even cause defective behavior on the part of the buyer firm. 
This logic is grounded in reactance theory (Brehm, 1966). Being dependent on the supplier 
limits or even threatens the buyer firm’s freedom of action, which leads to buyer reactance. In 
order to restore its freedom, the buyer firm engages in actions such as opportunism. Supplier 
firms that face the possible negative effects of buyer dependence do not consequently trust in 
the buyer’s honesty and benevolence.  
According to our expectations, chances for a prolongation of a present buyer-supplier ex-
change relationship have a positive impact on a supplier’s trust in the buyer. Suppliers seem 
to view prospects of prolongation as credible commitments on the part of the buyer firms to 
forgo one-sided interests in favor of mutual gains. Indeed, a buyer firm that wants to continue 
its collaboration with a specific supplier firm would not act rationally if it would damage that 
supplier through opportunistic behavior. The supplier has reason to trust in that rationale of 
the buyer. Following the negative result concerning the variable of prior collaboration, this 
finding supports the practical relevance of game theory compared with transaction cost eco-
nomics. 
Concerning the suppliers’ organizational culture, we were not surprised to confirm that trust 
as a general trait of the organizational culture of the supplier firm has a positive influence on 
the supplier’s trust in a concrete buyer firm. Companies that are characterized by sound values 
such as honesty, cooperation, and general trust in third parties are, without doubt, more likely 
to believe in a specific exchange partner’s honesty and benevolence. Of course, this does not 
mean that their trust is given blindly and without limitations, but compared to others, they are 
more willing to take a leap of faith and trust until they are proven wrong. 
Concerning our paper’s second aim of shedding light on the poorly understood relationship 
between trust and intrinsic motivation of a supplier, we could confirm, in line with our as-
sumption, that supplier trust in the buyer’s honesty and benevolence positively influences the 
supplier firm’s intrinsic motivation. This finding complies with Ryan and Deci (2000b), who 
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suggest intrinsic motivation to be positively influenced by a sense of relatedness (belonging-
ness or connectedness with others), which is arguably more likely to evolve in a friendly, car-
ing, and trusting environment. However, it is astonishing that the phenomenon of intrinsic 
motivation apparently appears in distant inter-organizational relations, too. 
 
Our results contribute to the understanding of trust in inter-organizational relationships and 
allow implications to be derived for the management of buyer and supplier firms, which will 
be presented in the following section. 
 
6.5.2 Managerial implications 
Having explored determinants of supplier trust and its role in the supplier’s intrinsic motiva-
tion, our results allow recommendations to be derived for managers of R&D buyer as well as 
R&D supplier firms. 
That trust in cooperative relationships is a valuable asset has been recognized throughout the 
literature and could be confirmed by our results. Supplier trust in the buyer firm enhances the 
R&D supplier’s intrinsic motivation, which is an important prerequisite for successful collab-
oration. Intrinsic motivation leads to more innovative outcomes (Amabile, 1996; Ryan and 
Deci, 2000a; Schwartz, 1990), it helps to overcome problems of contractual incompleteness 
(Gibbons, 1998; Prendergast, 1999), and fosters the transfer of implicit knowledge (Ko et al., 
2005; Lin, 2007). Therefore, buyer and supplier firms should always actively invest in creat-
ing trust-based relationships. The importance of trust in fostering intrinsic motivation raises 
the question of how trust emerges. 
Prospects of long-term collaboration lead to an increase in supplier trust. Of course, inten-
tions of prolonging a relationship should never lack a plausible rationale; partner selection 
should always be oriented towards the buyer firm’s specific resource needs (Hitt et al., 2000). 
However, buyer firms are well advised to always consider whether it might be fruitful to con-
tinue an existing relationship and if so, they should credibly declare their prolongation inten-
tions to the supplier firm as this may enhance supplier trust. This could possibly be done by 
talking and defining future projects when the actual project is currently running. Planning 
future business represents a specific investment of time and money, signaling the buyer firm’s 
good intentions and thus strengthening supplier firm trust.  
Concerning prior collaboration, buyer firms should be cautious in concluding that prior ties 
automatically lead to supplier trust. It seems that for trust to develop, more is needed than just 
prior cooperation episodes. First, there is the possibility that these episodes were not internal-
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ly evaluated too positively by each party. Second, often it is uncertain whether current part-
ners possess the critical resources needed in the future.  
Buyer Dependence does not seem to be a source of supplier trust. One-sided dependencies 
represent power imbalances that most likely lead to dissatisfaction and defective behavior in 
the long run. Being threatened by defective behavior undermines the development of trust. 
Therefore, cooperation partners should always try to maintain a balanced relationship by cre-
ating mutual, more equal, dependencies. Buyer dependence can be countered with relation-
specific investments by the supplier firm in laboratory equipment or employee training or 
with the increased use of socialization processes (e.g., communication guidelines, joint work-
shops, team building) in order to build relational capital as suggested by Petersen et al. 
(2008). In this way, both parties are bound to the relationship, thus discouraging self-interest 
seeking behavior and fostering mutual trust. 
A supplier firm that carries organizational values such as general trust is more likely to build 
trusting bonds with a specific buyer firm. On the one hand, it is the supplier firm’s responsi-
bility to make core values visible to outsiders by signalling as organizational values are usual-
ly below the line of visibility (Schein, 1985). This helps buyer firms to select appropriate col-
laboration partners more easily and simultaneously increases the chances of supplier firms 
being selected as potential allies. On the other hand, buyer firms are well advised to always 
keep an eye on the traits of the organizational culture of the supplier firm. Yet, we are aware 
of the fundamental problems that a culture analysis between independent firms would be 
faced with.  
 
6.5.3 Limitations and implications for future research 
The study presented suffers from some limitations. First, we deliberately explored only those 
potential sources of supplier trust that can be derived from new institutional economics and 
game theory. Our results could be enriched by future empirical research on trust-building ef-
fects of all those additional determinants that are discussed in the literature (see, e.g., Ander-
son and Weitz 1989; Bstieler and Hemmert 2008; Doney and Cannon 1997; Dyer and Chu 
2000; for determinants such as frequent communication, aligned goals and interests, reputa-
tion, fairness, support and assistance-giving routines, knowledge and information sharing). 
Second, we only interviewed supplier firms. Even though it may be a challenging undertaking 
(as our respondents refused to reveal their buyers in the preliminary interviews), interviewing 
both sides of the dyad could provide valuable, additional information on the topic. Third, un-
fortunately we could not consider cultural influences as our sample consisted to a great extent 
Paper 3 110 
of German suppliers. Future research could be targeted towards the generalizability of our 
results across national borders. Lastly, our findings reveal a strong influence of our control 
variable project importance on the supplier’s intrinsic motivation. Further empirical studies 
could investigate this topic more deeply by examining different dimensions of project im-
portance and empirically assess their influence on intrinsic motivation and their relationship 
with other constructs in the model.  
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7. Conclusion 
7.1 Synopsis 
Supplier opportunism is, without a doubt, a serious threat that manufacturers of final products 
have to consider when tapping into external sources of knowledge by teaming up with R&D 
supplier firms (Sampson 2007). The prevalence of the opportunism phenomenon has caused 
broad interest and thus led to a huge amount of literature and empirical research. However, 
despite these prior efforts, opportunism is far from being understood in its entirety 
(Das/Rahman 2010; Hawkins et al. 2008). This dissertation is one of a series of recent signifi-
cant works on the severe danger of opportunism in exchange relationships. It represents an 
incremental step towards improving the understanding of a phenomenon that is, however, 
hard to grasp.  
Three articles build the cornerstones of the present work. They cover and contribute to the 
three areas of opportunism research by dealing with the drivers (Paper 1) and consequences of 
R&D supplier moral hazard (Papers 1 and 2), and by examining the safeguards that quell such 
unethical partner behavior (Papers 2 and 3). A profound review of the existing literature and 
prior research led to the development of comprehensive theoretical models that were tested 
empirically by drawing on survey-based data. The overall results of this dissertation are dis-
played in the following figure.  
Figure 11. Main results of the papers of this dissertation  
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Paper 1 treated the first area of opportunism research. By combining TCT and PAT, it scruti-
nized the role several factors play in inducing R&D supplier misbehavior and thus contributes 
to answering the first research question. While some of this study’s findings are perfectly in 
line with theory, others definitely inspire perplexity. The effects of internal uncertainty, buyer 
dependence, and information asymmetries certainly belong to the first category of findings. 
These factors render unethical behavior more attractive and are thus confirmed as drivers of 
R&D supplier opportunism by the study’s results. The effects of buyer-specific investments 
and external uncertainty belong to the second category of findings. Specific investments of 
the supplier firm seem to lead to an increase in supplier opportunism, which is contrary to 
TCT-logic. Possible explanations for this finding can be found in either reactance theory 
(Brehm 1966, 1972) or the anticipation of hold-up by the buyer (Kloyer 2011; 
Kloyer/Scholderer 2012). As buyer-specific investments curtail the supplier firm’s freedom of 
action by becoming locked into the relationship, the unethical behavior on the part of the sup-
plier firm can, according to reactance theory, be understood as a means of regaining this lost 
freedom. Following, furthermore, the hold-up-logic, supplier firms may opportunistically re-
duce their efforts if they anticipate the buyer firm’s intention to unfairly renegotiate their re-
muneration. Also contrary to TCT-logic and thus not less astonishing is the finding that exter-
nal uncertainty lowers supplier misbehavior. It seems as if R&D supplier firms interpret this 
kind of uncertainness as a challenge that needs to be taken to create a superior technological 
outcome. This technological outcome in turn allows the dominant design to be defined and 
the suppliers gain a reputation that makes them less vulnerable to substitution by alternative 
suppliers.  
By studying which mechanisms can curb unethical behavior and spur supplier knowledge 
sharing, Paper 2 provides answers to the second research question. Knowledge, as the good to 
be exchanged in R&D supply relations, was taken as a proxy for how opportunistically the 
supplier firms behaved throughout the cooperation episode, with lower levels of knowledge 
sharing indicating higher levels of supplier opportunism. Besides focusing on traditional, ex-
trinsic mechanisms, this study enriches prior work by zooming in on non-extrinsic, rather soft 
mechanisms of knowledge sharing that have been treated shabbily in the past. The findings 
underline that the management of R&D outsourcing relationships is a challenging undertaking 
that requires an exceptional focus on the “human element” for it to be successful. While tradi-
tional mechanisms (e.g., behavior monitoring, collaboration perspective) proved to be little 
effective, it is the soft mechanisms such as the supplier’s organizational culture and its intrin-
sic motivation that restrain opportunism and spur supplier knowledge sharing. The findings 
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also highlight that for knowledge to be shared effectively, common routines, practices, and 
interfaces that have been established in past exchange episodes are required, thus confirming 
the positive influence of prior collaboration. Slightly bewildering is, however, the finding that 
the supplier firm’s trust in the buyer does not facilitate supplier knowledge sharing. Although 
contrary to prior research, one could assume that trust triggers knowledge sharing only indi-
rectly by influencing other variables such as the supplier firm’s intrinsic motivation. This idea 
was further developed and examined in Paper 3.  
Inspired by the assumption that the role of supplier trust in supplier knowledge sharing might 
be limited to indirect effects only, the last paper of this dissertation, Paper 3, examined how 
trust evolves and whether it nurtures the supplier firm’s intrinsic motivation, thus contributing 
to answering the third research question. Being, to the best of the author’s knowledge, the first 
to simultaneously examine the calculative and non-calculative preconditions of supplier trust 
and the effect trust has on intrinsic motivation in an R&D supply-context, this study offers 
quite interesting insights. Even though it is often considered a mere organizational phenome-
non, intrinsic motivation proved to play an important role in distant inter-organizational set-
tings. Even if it is assumed that intrinsic motivation is always given voluntarily, the findings 
of this study suggest, however, that it can be nurtured under certain conditions. One of these 
conditions is the supplier firm’s trust in the buyer. Trust provides a friendly environment in 
which an existing intrinsic motivation can further grow and flourish. The findings further 
suggest that for a supplier firm to trust its buyer, it requires the extension of a present ex-
change relationship. The prospects of prolongation are viewed as credible commitments of the 
buyer to favor mutual gains over one-sided benefits. According to the study’s results, the sup-
plier’s organizational culture is also conducive to having trust in the buyer firm. Supplier 
firms that are characterized by sound values such as fairness, cooperativeness, and general 
trust are more willing to take a leap of faith and have trust in their buyer firms.  
Both Papers 1 and 2 contribute to answering the fourth and last research question by studying 
the consequences of supplier (mis-)behavior. With their focus on the supplier’s long-term 
success, the papers provide consistent findings. The results of Paper 1 indicate that supplier 
opportunism (e.g., withholding knowledge) is detrimental to the supplier firm’s success, 
whereas in Paper 2, supplier knowledge sharing (i.e., not behaving opportunistically) proved 
to be beneficial. These findings suggest that behaving unethically and reaping short-term ma-
terial benefits does not pay off in the long run. In order to secure their existence and financial 
well-being, supplier firms need to earn a reputation for being a cooperative and reliable busi-
ness partner. 
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Apart from providing answers to the research questions, the papers of this dissertation seek to 
contribute to prior work and organization theory. The research contributions and theoretical 
implications are outlined in the following section. 
 
7.2 Research contributions and implications for theory 
The three papers of this cumulative dissertation consider a very sensitive and, so far, under-
studied field of interest: R&D supply relations. Due to their specific characteristics, R&D 
supply relationships provide ideal ground for deepening the understanding of the antecedents 
and consequences of opportunism and the mechanisms that deter such unethical partner be-
havior.  
Paper 1 enhances current knowledge about the antecedents of supplier opportunism by com-
bining TCT and PAT. Simultaneously examining the whole set of potential opportunism driv-
ers allows a more complete and realistic picture to be drawn, thus extending prior work that 
has considered only some of the variables concurrently. Paper 1, furthermore, departs from 
prior work by enriching the concept of uncertainty by adding an internal, R&D process-
related dimension. Most of the empirical research on exchange relationships has focused ex-
clusively on the external, environment-related uncertainty; considering the internal uncertain-
ty dimension is, however, a necessary step to account for the unpredictability of the R&D 
process itself. It is not uncommon for even supplier firms to be unable to anticipate which 
potential scientific and technological problems will occur and whether they have the compe-
tences necessary to solve them (Kloyer 2011). The fact that the results of Paper 1 indicate that 
the uncertainty dimensions have contrary impacts on supplier opportunism heavily supports 
the approach of considering both internal and external uncertainty. Future theoretical and em-
pirical work is, therefore, strongly advised to also focus on problems of internal uncertainty. 
The most surprising and thought-provoking finding is that external uncertainty reduces the 
R&D supplier firm’s opportunism. While prior work mainly confirmed the opportunism-
driving force of environmental uncertainty, Paper 1 reveals that instead of using it as a loop-
hole to serving self-interests, R&D supplier firms seem to view external uncertainty as a 
chance to assert themselves in a competitive environment by demonstrating their true R&D 
capabilities. Though contrary to what is proposed by TCT, this finding calls for some rethink-
ing in theory as it opens up a totally new perspective on the role external uncertainty may 
play, especially in R&D-specific exchange relationships. 
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In addition, the results of Paper 1 emphasize that economic theory alone cannot sufficiently 
explain organizational behavior. This is demonstrated by the fact that contrary to TCT-logic, 
specific investments of the supplier firm do not deter R&D suppliers from behaving opportun-
istically. Organizations seem to derive value from free choice. Restrictions on this freedom 
provoke unethical behavior (reactance theory; Brehm 1966, 1972). While this finding is cer-
tainly not completely new (see, e.g., Crosno et al. 2013), it highlights, however, that firms are 
“living organisms” that consist of people and are thus limited to the same extent as humans by 
bounded rationality and error in judgment (Svedin 2009). Economic theory should, therefore, 
embrace the insights of social psychology more heavily in order to understand and explain 
organizational behavior.  
Paper 2 enriches the common understanding of those mechanisms that curtail opportunism 
and spur supplier knowledge sharing. It contributes to research by addressing two main short-
comings. First, even though the relevant literature provides a wide variety of governance 
mechanisms (for an overview, see, e.g., Brown et al. 2000; Cavusgil et al. 2004; Helm/Kloyer 
2004; Jap/Anderson 2003; Vázquez et al. 2007; Wathne/Heide 2000), it also reveals a sub-
stantial lack of agreement on the role some variables play in restraining opportunism 
(Achrol/Gundlach 1999; Caniëls/Gelderman 2010) and spurring supplier knowledge sharing, 
with prior empirical findings varying a lot in terms of significance, direction, and magnitude. 
Second, prior work has focused exclusively on the hard, extrinsic determinants of the oppor-
tunism motivation whereas knowledge of the soft, non-extrinsic determinants is more than 
fragmentary. This dearth of research on intrinsic mechanisms stems from the fact that they are 
widely considered to be difficult to analyze and hard to manage (Kloyer 2011; Williamson 
1975, 1985).  
Paper 2 is, to the best of the author’s knowledge, the first to consider a wide range of main 
predictor variables of supplier knowledge sharing in an R&D supply context. It enhances cur-
rent knowledge by providing additional insights into controversially-discussed relationships 
(e.g., monitoring). Furthermore, it responds to the recent call by organizational theorists to 
consider the effects of non-extrinsic variables, such as the supplier’s organizational culture 
and its intrinsic motivation (e.g., Kloyer 2011; Kloyer/Scholderer 2012). The empirical find-
ings clearly indicate the decisive role “soft” determinants play in supplier knowledge sharing. 
This underlines the need for economic theories to turn more heavily towards intrinsic motiva-
tors as knowledge sharing in an R&D supply context cannot be adequately explained by rely-
ing solely on extrinsic determinants.  
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Building on an assumption from Paper 2 that supplier trust may not directly influence supplier 
knowledge sharing but rather indirectly via variables that are decisive for knowledge sharing, 
Paper 3 examined the role trust plays in nurturing the supplier’s intrinsic motivation and the 
reasons that lead to supplier trust. It extends prior work in two ways. First, it considers trust to 
be not merely non-calculative in nature but to always encompass some element of calculation. 
By simultaneously examining major non-calculative and calculative reasons for supplier trust, 
it combines the opposing views and provides a more realistic picture of how trust evolves. 
Second, as intrinsic motivation is widely considered to be decisive for knowledge sharing, it 
is surprising that the question of how it can be nurtured has so far received no empirical atten-
tion, particularly in an inter-organizational context. Paper 3 is, to the best of the author’s 
knowledge, the first to study this highly interesting link between supplier trust and the suppli-
er’s intrinsic motivation.  
To conclude, Papers 1 and 2 both add to prior research by exploring the consequences of un-
ethical partner behavior. They refer to Hawkins et al. (2008), who claim that the prevalence of 
opportunism in business practice is not matched with a corresponding research interest in its 
consequences. While there are some studies that examined the success effects of one-sided 
opportunism for the cooperation as a whole (Luo 2007; Luo et al. 2009; Parkhe 1993; Ting et 
al. 2007) and the party affected by such unethical behavior (e.g., Dahlstrom/Nygaard 1999; 
Morgan et al. 2007; Skarmeas et al. 2002; White/Lui 2005), no study has examined whether 
opportunism contributes to the success of the opportunistic party. In all conscience, this dis-
sertation is the first to examine and prove that the gains achieved on the basis of opportunism 
have no lasting value for an opportunistic supplier as they strive to establish long-term rela-
tionships with their buyer firms, which is contrary to the theoretical framework of Grossman 
and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1988) 
In addition to the outlined research contributions, this dissertation provides R&D buyer and 
supplier firms with important practical implications. These implications will be presented in 
the subsequent section. 
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7.3 Managerial implications 
Although each of the three research papers had its own specific objectives and research ques-
tions, they provide relevant insights and significant answers to the overarching research ques-
tion of how to set up and maintain successful R&D outsourcing relationships. By offering 
helpful hints on how to discern and effectively restrain unethical partner behavior, this disser-
tation has important implications for both buyer and supplier firms.  
The overall findings suggest that three keys are required for R&D outsourcing to meet its in-
tended objectives (see Figure 12). 
Figure 12. The keys to successful R&D outsourcing 
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The preceding figure depicts in its core the cooperation process already portrayed in Section 
2.2.2. In order to enrich the process with this thesis’ findings and implications, some of the 
stages are grouped together. They mark the three keys to successful R&D outsourcing (in 
grey).  
Clarification is the first key to rewarding R&D supply relationships. While clarification is not 
limited to one stage only, it certainly has the greatest meaning in the initiation stage. Clarifica-
tion, in this case, refers to buyer firms obtaining a realistic, uncompromising picture of the 
potential assets and drawbacks of R&D outsourcing when setting their objectives and expec-
tations. Buyers must not be blinded only by the promising advantages of tapping into external 
sources of knowledge; they must be equally aware of the potential of R&D supplier opportun-
ism. This includes awareness of the circumstances under which supplier firms may be in-
clined to behave unethically (Paper 1) and knowledge about effective measures to curtail such 
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unethical partner behavior (Paper 2). Furthermore, buyer firms must know that their own con-
scious and unconscious demeanor can actually trigger unethical supplier behavior, which re-
quires constantly keeping track of own behaviors and actions by engaging in self-monitoring 
and self-control.  
The second key to successful R&D outsourcing lies in the careful screening and subsequent 
selection of an adequate business partner. For buyer firms, an adequate business partner is a 
supplier that is characterized by an excellent reputation and outstanding records in the re-
quested field as well as sound organizational values and principles that guide its actions and 
intrinsic motivation. Choosing an appropriate supplier firm is “half the battle,” as its qualifi-
cations and positive inner attitudes can certainly kill off major concerns from the outset.  
The findings of Paper 1, for example, indicate that internal uncertainties are a major threat to 
the success of R&D outsourcing relationships as they open doors to unethical supplier behav-
ior. Selecting an experienced and qualified supplier firm with sound organizational values can 
certainly not resolve the problem of internal uncertainties but can lower the possibility of the 
supplier exploiting them opportunistically. Due to its experience, the R&D supplier firm is 
used to working in uncertain environments and knows how to deal properly with uncertain-
ties. Furthermore, its reputation is not only a signal of good work and cooperative behavior in 
the past; it also functions as a hostage that the buyer can destroy in case of supplier misbehav-
ior. Lastly, the sound principles and values such as cooperativeness that guide its behavior 
prevent the supplier firm from taking advantage of opportunities for opportunism. 
The importance of employing an R&D supplier with a cooperative organizational culture is 
furthermore highlighted by the results of the Papers 2 and 3. A cooperative culture on the part 
of the supplier firm does not only positively affect the supplier firm’s willingness to share 
knowledge (Paper 2); it also positively influences the supplier’s trust in the buyer firm, which 
represents a necessary precondition for the supplier’s intrinsic motivation (Paper 3). In the 
course of partner selection, buyer firms are, therefore, recommended to always keep a watch-
ful eye on the supplier firm’s organizational culture. First impressions on potential coopera-
tion candidates’ basic norms and values can be gained by tracking the suppliers’ cooperation 
history, visiting supplier facilities, conducting supplier audits, as well as through face-to-face 
communication with employees of the respective supplier firms. On the other hand, suppliers 
are advised to actively engage in making their firms’ core values visible to third parties 
through words and actions. Sending credible signals about good faith and intentions as well as 
implementing rules and procedures that provide a predictable structure (Deeds/Hill 1999) 
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simplify partner selection for the buyer firms and may simultaneously increase the chances of 
suppliers being selected as future business partners. 
The findings of Paper 2 imply that it is important for buyer firms to have a partner that acts 
out of intrinsic motivation. R&D suppliers that are intrinsically motivated are less prone to 
opportunism and more willing to share the relevant knowledge with their buyers. Often, how-
ever, buyer firms do not know whether suppliers fulfilled previous R&D contracts out of in-
trinsic motivation, especially when cooperating for the first time (Kloyer 2011; 
Kloyer/Scholderer 2012). To avoid such doubts, buyer firms are advised to always screen the 
pool of prior collaboration partners first (see also Figure 12). Drawing on familiar suppliers 
entails several benefits. First, working with previous partners saves search costs and reduces 
the opportunism threat associated with new partners (Gulati/Gargiulo 1999; Podolny 1994). 
Second, being well-acquainted with the supplier’s working attitudes and having established 
common routines and interfaces enable knowledge to be shared more efficiently between the 
partners, as suggested by the results of Paper 2. 
Although intrinsic motivation is always given voluntarily, buyer firms can significantly con-
tribute to creating an environment in which an existing supplier motivation thrives. Creating 
such a pleasing and friendly environment is inevitably linked to the third and final key com-
ponent for fruitful R&D outsourcing: the establishment and maintenance of a well-working, 
cooperative relationship.  
A well-working, cooperative relationship is one that is characterized by trust among the part-
ners. The findings of Paper 3 suggest that the supplier firm’s trust in the buyer plays a signifi-
cant role in spurring the supplier firm’s intrinsic motivation. Buyer firms should, therefore, 
constantly invest in trust building measures by sending credible signals about their good faith 
and intentions. This can include the establishment of a long-term business relationship with 
the supplier firm as indicated by the results of Paper 3. Furthermore, buyers should abstain 
from too close monitoring. Monitoring has not only proved to be little effective in R&D out-
sourcing (Paper 2), it can also be interpreted as a sign of distrust (Frey 1993; Lewis 2013) and 
“crowd out” the intrinsic reason to undertake a task for its own sake. Thus, buyer firms are 
well-advised to periodically revise their implemented control structures and grant R&D sup-
plier firms the freedom necessary to strike new paths (Reeve 2009; Reeve/Jang 2006; 
Ryan/Deci 2000a). 
For R&D outsourcing to be successful, the cooperative relationship should, furthermore, be 
balanced, i.e., characterized by mutual and symmetric dependence among the partners. While 
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dependencies are certainly among the primary reasons for cooperation, the results of Paper 1 
suggest that dependencies that vary a lot in extent are “unhealthy” and can, sooner or later, 
give rise to unethical supplier behavior. Managers should, therefore, employ effective 
measures that transform one-sided dependencies into mutual ones. For these measures to be 
effective, they need to be tailored to suit the unavoidable incompleteness of R&D contracts. 
Contract fines, for example, that a buyer firm would have to pay in case of hold-up are not 
reliable instruments as they cannot be precisely stipulated ex-ante. Having the buyer input 
more reciprocal investments (e.g., in HR) is, however, a good way to balance out disparities 
as they equally bind the partners into the relationship. The same applies to the buyer granting 
the dependent supplier firm the status of an exclusive supplier. Another way to buffer the op-
portunism-increasing effect of supplier-dependence is to extend an existing relationship into 
the future as it allows the supplier firm to recoup its specific investments.  
Creating business ties that are long-term oriented is the third “ingredient” for well-working 
R&D relationships. The findings of Paper 3 suggest that supplier firms that anticipate a pro-
spective collaboration with the buyer firm tend to have more trust in their buyers, which may 
not only lower the likelihood of supplier opportunism but also positively affects the supplier 
firm’s intrinsic motivation (Paper 2). Buyer firms are, therefore, recommended to always con-
sider whether it might be fruitful to extend an existing exchange relationship. If there is a 
plausible rationale for employing the supplier firm in the future, buyer firms should take the 
chance and credibly discuss their prolongation intentions with their suppliers, e.g., by talking 
about and defining future projects while the current one is still running. 
Besides being trusting, balanced, and long-term oriented, effective R&D supply relationships 
should, lastly, be characterized by fairness. Fairness in terms of distributive justice is an in-
dispensable asset when it comes to overcoming problems associated with information asym-
metries. The findings of Paper 1 clearly demonstrate that although information asymmetries 
are an unavoidable consequence of R&D outsourcing, they can heavily endanger relationship 
effectiveness by aggravating the opportunism problem. As monitoring did not prove to be a 
reliable measure in this context (Paper 2), buyer firms are advised to strive for harmonizing 
both parties’ interests by sharing fairly in the innovation return. Prior empirical research, es-
pecially that of Kloyer (2011) and Kloyer and Scholderer (2012), showed that assigning pa-
tent ownership shares to the supplier firm is highly effective in this regard.  
Overall, it can be said that the design of successful R&D supply relationships is a complex 
and challenging undertaking that requires a profound understanding of the chances and pit-
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falls of using the “market” for the generation of knowledge inputs. Furthermore, it requires 
sufficient resources to manage the collaborative arrangement from the outset. For buyer firms, 
an effective management plans, documents, governs, and controls precisely the outsourcing 
relationship. This includes not losing sight of prior partners as they may be eligible candidates 
for future outsourcing endeavors.  
Apart from the outlined contributions and implications, this dissertation suffers, like any other 
work, from limitations. These limitations and the resulting avenues for further research will 
be presented in the following section. 
 
7.4 Limitations and future research 
The three studies conducted within the scope of this dissertation were based on sound theoret-
ical models that were tested using a reliable and valid survey instrument. It is, however, im-
portant to note several limitations that readers should keep in mind in relation to the studies’ 
contributions. These limitations simultaneously pave important avenues for further research. 
Apart from paper-specific limitations, which will be discussed later on, there are several con-
straints that refer to the process of data collection and evaluation and thus, equally concern all 
three papers. 
First of all, the data was received by questioning R&D supplier firms only; an approach that is 
widely accepted in empirical research (e.g., Kloyer 2011; Kloyer/Scholderer 2012). In order 
to gain additional insights into the topic, it may seem tempting to say that future research 
should aim at interviewing both supplier and buyer firms. However, questioning both parties 
of an exchange relationship also entails considerable problems, which may offset its ad-
vantages. The data collection within the scope of this dissertation, for example, showed that 
R&D supplier firms are overly reluctant in revealing their buyers. This may be due to the fact 
that R&D outsourcing relationships are usually kept confidential from any third parties. Fur-
thermore, there are serious doubts that R&D suppliers would answer questions honestly when 
fearing that any of their provided information could be leaked to their buyer firms. Over-
reporting “good behavior” and under-reporting “bad behavior” could significantly skew re-
sults—this is known as the social desirability bias (Crowne/Marlowe 1964). Even if suppliers 
credibly declare their willingness to name their R&D partner firms, researchers are well ad-
vised to always consider the pros and cons of questioning both parties carefully.  
Second, despite the attempts to survey supplier firms from seven different countries, most of 
the respondents in the sample are German R&D suppliers. This, however, did not allow the 
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testing for potential cultural differences in the empirical studies. Hence, future research could 
examine the applicability of the presented models and hypotheses beyond German boundaries 
and test whether the findings of this dissertation are generalizable.  
Third, in this dissertation the sample of R&D supplier firms was not distinguished according 
to the nature of service (research vs. development) they provided. Therefore, prospective stud-
ies could, given a sufficient sample size, examine whether and how the findings differ when 
controlling for the market distance of the supplier firms. 
Lastly, the research models of the three papers were tested using PLS path modeling—a vari-
ance-based method that due to its limited restrictions concerning distribution, sample size, and 
measurement scales, is often referred to as a “soft modeling approach” (Vinzi et al. 2010). 
Despite its various advantages (Hair et al. 2014) and its increased use in marketing and busi-
ness research (Hair et al. 2012; Henseler et al. 2009), there are also critical voices that doubt 
the appropriateness of the PLS approach for many of the models tested in research 
(Guide/Ketokivi 2015) and thus call for it to no longer be used (e.g., Antonakis et al. 2010; 
Rönkkö 2014). Researchers are, therefore, advised (1.) to always critically question the suita-
bility of the PLS approach for their specific research problem, thus weighing its benefits 
against its constraints and (2.) to justify its application with well-reasoned arguments. Fur-
thermore, researchers should stay up-to-date on methodological developments in the field of 
structural equation modeling and PLS in particular.  
Besides these general data-based limitations, each study of this dissertation leaves room for 
improvement. The paper-specific limitations and paths for future research are outlined sepa-
rately for each paper in the following. 
With regard to Paper 1, which deals with the drivers of opportunism, one of the most surpris-
ing results is the fact that external uncertainty has an opportunism-decreasing effect in R&D 
supply relations. This is contrary to theory and most of prior empirical research on dyadic 
relationships. Hence, this startling outcome definitely requires further empirical attention. 
Future research endeavours could, for instance, be targeted at defining and examining the 
conditions that may lead external uncertainty to develop its diverse effects on partner oppor-
tunism. Furthermore, previous studies on opportunism drivers in exchange relationships have 
focused primarily on the external dimension of uncertainty. However, as confirmed by this 
study, in R&D collaboration, there is also an internal, process-related dimension of uncertain-
ty that provides ample leeway for supplier opportunism. In order to paint a complete picture 
of the uncertainty phenomenon, upcoming studies are advised to expand their frameworks to 
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cover both aspects of uncertainty. Lastly, the prevailing lack of research interest in the effect 
opportunism has on the success of the opportunistic party opens up a fruitful avenue for fur-
ther research. Prospective studies could examine whether this study’s finding can be con-
firmed in differing contexts. Furthermore, given that the focus of this study is on the supplier 
firm’s longer-term success, future research could extend this work by simultaneously consid-
ering the effects opportunism has on measures for short- and long-term supplier success. 
Addressing the determinants of knowledge sharing, the results of Paper 2 reveal that the im-
pact of supplier trust on supplier knowledge sharing is rather limited. This finding, which 
seems to be counterintuitive on the surface and in contrast to theory, needs to be profoundly 
explored in the future. Special attention should thereby be granted to the assumption that the 
impact of trust on knowledge sharing may be limited to indirect effects only. Hence, deter-
mining and assessing the potential indirect effects of trust appears to be a worthwhile avenue 
for further research. Furthermore, due to the limited empirical interest in the role soft varia-
bles play in knowledge sharing, upcoming studies are advised to verify our findings in differ-
ing contexts. Lastly, similar to the recommendations made in Paper 1, there is tremendous 
scope to explore the success-increasing effect of supplier knowledge sharing. Future work is 
encouraged to contrast the influence supplier knowledge sharing, i.e., not behaving opportun-
istically, has on the supplier firm’s short-term, material and its long-term, strategic success. 
This would clearly extend this thesis’ results.  
Concerning Paper 3, which focuses on the antecedents of supplier trust and how trust influ-
ences the supplier firm’s intrinsic motivation, limitations result from the fact that the study 
does not comprehensively consider all potential sources of trust. Instead, this work only fo-
cuses on those sources that can be derived from new institutional economics and game theory. 
Future research is therefore encouraged to examine the trust-enhancing effects of all those 
potential determinants that were not part of this study but are frequently mentioned in the trust 
literature (see, e.g., Anderson/Weitz 1989; Bstieler/Hemmert 2008; Doney/Cannon 1997; Dy-
er/Chu 2000; for determinants such as frequent communication, aligned goals and interests, 
reputation, fairness, support and assistance-giving routines, knowledge and information shar-
ing). Furthermore, the results show that the supplier firm’s intrinsic motivation does not only 
seem to be heavily influenced by the supplier’s trust in the buyer firm but also by the relative 
importance of the supply project. In this work, however, project importance was given the 
mere role of a control variable. Upcoming empirical studies should, therefore, elevate the sta-
tus of project importance so that it becomes an independent variable. Examining different 
dimensions of project importance and empirically assessing their impact on the supplier 
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firm’s intrinsic motivation and their relationship with other variables in the model represent 
fruitful avenues for further research.  
 
7.5 Concluding remarks 
This dissertation represents another incremental step towards a better understanding of what is 
needed to set up and maintain successful R&D outsourcing relationships. It addresses the ma-
jor obstacle manufacturers of final products have to face when using the “market” for the gen-
eration of knowledge inputs: the unethical behavior of the R&D supplier firm. Despite having 
received great attention equally in research and practice, the opportunism phenomenon has 
still not been fully grasped because of its complex and multi-faceted nature.  
By trying to capture the complexity of the opportunism phenomenon, this dissertation has 
explored the antecedents and consequences of R&D supplier opportunism and the mecha-
nisms that are effective in curbing such unethical supplier behavior. Through addressing is-
sues that have either remained unclear or unconsidered in prior theoretical and/or empirical 
analyses, this dissertation has contributed to and advanced existing work on opportunism and 
has illuminated the general understanding of how to improve the efficiency in R&D outsourc-
ing.  
While R&D collaborations provide, by their very nature, several opportunities for unethical 
partner behavior, the overall results and implications of this thesis suggest that the recipe for 
successful R&D outsourcing includes three major ingredients. First, having a realistic picture 
of the whole outsourcing endeavor; second, engaging a qualified supplier firm with positive 
inner attitudes and values; and third, creating and maintaining a lasting, balanced, and fair 
relationship characterized by a trusting atmosphere and by both partners constantly engaging 
in self-monitoring and self-control. Overall, it can be said that for outsourcing to meet its in-
tended objectives, firms are advised to provide sufficient resources for adequately planning, 
documenting, managing, and controlling the outsourcing endeavor.  
Given the accelerating technological progress and the increasing product complexity, manu-
facturing firms can be expected to rely even more heavily on external R&D partnerships in 
the future. With the market for R&D services constantly growing in width and depth, it may 
be justly concluded that the phenomenon of opportunism in R&D outsourcing will remain a 
highly interesting and promising area of research.  
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Dear Sir or Madam, 
 
for several reasons, the outsourcing of research and development (R&D) has become more important in 
the recent past. However, its success significantly depends on an effective management of the inter-firm 
collaboration. Recent evidence shows that the cooperation success decisively depends on effective 
incentives for the supplier. Therefore, we have started a research project on this topic that addresses 
suppliers of R&D services in eight European countries. 
 
We have selected your company because of its clear profile as R&D supplier in high-tech industries. We 
would very much appreciate your support of our study. Of course, you would in turn receive an overview 
of the key findings as soon as the analyses are finished. 
We guarantee you that we will use all provided information only in anonymous form and only for 
research purposes. 
In case you are interested, we ask you to forward the questionnaire to that project manager who was in 
charge of the last project in which you supplied research and/or development services to a manufacturing 
firm. 
 
We ask you to completely answer our questionnaire. You will not need more than 15-20 min. In case of 
questions, please contact: 
kloyerm@uni-greifswald.de or Christin.Aust@wiwi.uni-regensburg.de 
or call 
+49 (0) 941 943 5623 
 
 
Thank you very much in advance! 
 
Prof. Dr. Martin Kloyer 
 
Prof. Dr. Roland Helm 
 
Ph.D.c. Christin Aust 
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For answering the questions of our study, please think of your last finished project in which you 
supplied research and/or development services to a manufacturing firm. 
 
Note: 
We ask you to answer all our questions honestly and to the best of your knowledge. 
Please keep in mind that there are no "right" or "wrong" answers and that the information you provide will be used 
in anonymous form and only for research purposes. 
The terms "buyer" and "partner" are used synonymously and refer to the manufacturing firm to which you 
suplplied research and/or development services. 
 
 
1. COLLABORTAION OUTCOME 
 
In the following, we would like to know how you would assess the outcome of your collaboration with the buyer. 
Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements. 
 
The collaboration with the buyer … agree  not at all 
agree  
completely 
has been a successful one.         
has realized the goals we set out to achieve.        
enabled us to compete more effectively in the 
marketplace.        
strengthened our core competences.        
  
 agree  not at all 
agree  
completely 
Overall, we are very satisfied with the 
performance of the collaboration with this buyer.        
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 agree  not at all 
agree  
completely 
Our engineers and sales staff established a close 
relationship with our partner’s staff.        
We transferred technology-related know-how to 
our partner firm, beyond contractual obligations.        
We shared to full extent the knowledge that was 
necessary to fulfill our contractual obligations.        
We provided our buyer with a completely truthful 
picture of our activities.        
Sometimes we had to withhold information from 
the buyer in order to protect our interests.        
Sometimes we had to alter the facts slightly in 
order to get what we needed.        
We tried to maximize our customer’s satisfaction 
by the best possible knowledge sharing.        
Sometimes we had to act in a way that did not 
correspond exactly to the contractual agreements.        
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2. CONTEXT FACTORS 
 
By the following statements, we would like to learn more about the circumstances under which you carried out 
the R&D project. Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements.  
We ask you to keep in mind that the statements refer to your last finished R&D project. 
 
When the contract was concluded, … agree  not at all 
agree  
completely 
we anticipated a final product / final products that 
would be based on our R&D results.        
we anticipated precise features of a final product / 
final products that would be based on our R&D 
results. 
       
milestones anticipated the whole R&D task.        
  
 only  development 
only 
research 
What was the nature of your services in this 
collaboration?  
 
 
       
 
 
 
When the contract was concluded, we could 
not foresee ... 
agree  
not at all 
agree 
 completely 
whether there would be a market for a final 
product / final products that would be based on 
our R&D results. 
       
which competing R&D suppliers would become 
active on the same R&D field.        
whether we would be able to overcome the 
technological problems connected with our R&D 
task. 
       
whether our R&D capabilities would be 
sufficient.        
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The buyer was objectively ... agree  not at all 
agree 
completely 
not capable of observing our work.        
capable of measuring our efforts.        
not capable of attributing interim and final results 
to our work.        
 
 
 
3. CONTRACTUAL INCENTIVES 
 
In the following, we would like to find out more about the contract design of your last R&D collaboration.  
Please indicate to what extent you agree with the following statements. 
 
The collaboration contract assigned the rights 
to ... 
agree  
not at all 
agree 
completely 
control the research activities within the 
collaboration to us.        
control the development activities within the 
collaboration to us.        
control the early-stage production of final 
products (that are based on our R&D results) to 
us. 
       
market the final products to us.        
control the marketing process to us.        
exclusively market the final products to us.        
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To what extent did the collaboration contract 
assign ownership shares in the generated patents 
to you? 
 
 % 
 
The collaboration contract assigned the ... agree  not at all 
agree  
completely 
responsibility for patent litigation processes to us.        
rights to sub-license to us.        
 
 
 
Within the incentive system, ... agree  not at all 
agree  
completely 
equity shares played an important role for us.        
royalties played an important role for us.        
milestone-dependent payments played an 
important role for us.        
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4. SITUATIONAL INCENTIVES 
 
By the following statements, we would like to learn more about the situational characteristics of your 
collaboration. For responding to our statements, please keep in mind to use your last finished R&D project as 
point of reference. 
 
 
In the past, we have ... agree  not at all 
agree  
completely 
closely collaborated with the same buyer firm.        
developed a close business relationship with the 
same buyer firm.        
continuously adapted our collaborational skills 
and techniques (e.g., workflow, communication, 
process management) to the specific requirements 
of the buyer firm. 
       
 
 
 
In the beginning of this concrete supply 
relationship, we had to make ... 
 
 
 
 
agree  
not at all 
 
 
 
 
agree  
completely 
material and immaterial investments in order to 
cope with the specific requirements of this 
contract.  
       
some investments that could not be used for other 
contracts without adaptation.        
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Concerning the following statements, how would you assess your partner's situation? 
 
When the contract was concluded, ... agree  not at all 
agree  
completely 
our partner had no other possibility than to 
collaborate with us to gain access to the 
resource(s) that was (were) crucial to her/him. 
 
       
it would have been difficult for our partner to 
replace us.        
our partner was quite dependent on us.        
our partner did not have a good alternative to us.        
 
 
 
 
Concerning the following statements, how would you assess your situation? 
 
When the contract was concluded, ... agree  not at all 
agree  
completely 
we had no other possibility than to collaborate 
with our partner to gain access to the resource(s) 
that was (were) crucial to us.  
       
it would have been difficult for us to replace our 
partner.        
we were quite dependent on our partner.        
we did not have a good alternative to our partner.        
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When the contract was concluded, we ... agree  not at all 
agree  
completely 
had reason to believe that we would get an order 
from the same buyer firm in the near future.  
 
       
were convinced that it would be possible to 
extend our collaboration with this buyer.        
 
 
 
When the contract was concluded, we were 
convinced that ... 
agree  
not at all 
agree 
completely 
the buyer firm would keep its promises.        
we could count on the buyer to be sincere.        
the buyer would provide us with accurate 
information.        
the buyer would consider our concerns in case of 
changing circumstances.        
we could depend on the buyer’s support 
concerning important matters.        
the buyer would not take advantage of power 
asymmetries.        
the buyer would not take advantage of one-sided 
dependencies.        
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The buyer tried to ... not at all very  intensively 
observe our work.        
measure our efforts.        
attribute intermediate and final results to our 
work.        
 
 
 
Third parties were capable of ... agree  not at all 
agree  
completely 
appraising the quality of our work.        
assessing the impact of our work on the market 
success of final products.        
 
 
 
Our organizational culture is characterized by 
... 
agree  
not at all 
agree  
completely 
sharing information freely.        
fair terms of exchange.        
being supportive.        
working in collaboration with others.        
trust in our collaboration partners.        
  
 agree  not at all 
agree  
completely 
We develop trust in our collaboration partners 
independently from contractual safeguards.        
We trust in our collaboration partners as long as 
they fulfill their contractual obligations.        
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Working on the R&D task within the 
collaboration was ... 
agree  
not at all 
agree  
completely 
interesting.         
challenging.        
satisfying.        
enjoyable.        
 
 
 
5. DESCRIPTIVE CHARACTERISTICS 
 
 Finally, we would like to gather some basic information concerning your company. 
The following questions refer to the company that carried out the R&D project. In case your company is 
a subsidiary, please answer the questions from the subsidiary's perspective and not from the parent 
company's perspective. 
 
 
What size is your company concerning number of 
employees?   1 - 19   20 - 99   100 – 499   > 500 
What size is your company concerning annual 
turnover?  
 
  million € 
How old is your company?  years 
What is your company’s country of origin?   Austria       Finland    Netherlands    Sweden   Denmark    Germany  Norway    Switzerland 
 
 
 not important  at all 
very  
important 
What was the relative importance of the project 
within your project portfolio?        
 
 
If you would like to receive a summary of the 
final results of this study, please enter your e-mail 
address.  
(Please note that this information would not be used for 
identification purposes. Your e-mail address would be registered 
separately from your responses.) 
  E-Mail:   
Thank you very much for your participation! 
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